The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 50
Number 2 Summer 2020

Article 1

5-15-2020

Parameters Summer 2020: Full Issue
USAWC Parameters

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War, and
Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Public Affairs Commons

Recommended Citation
USAWC Parameters, "Parameters Summer 2020: Full Issue," Parameters 50, no. 2 (2020), doi:10.55540/
0031-1723.1012.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

VOL. 50 NO. 2 SUMMER 2020

P A R A M E T E R S

Contemporary Strategy & Landpower

Special Commentary:
The Compound Security Dilemma

Isaiah Wilson III and Scott A. Smitson

Geostrategic Net Estimate

John R. Deni
Nathan P. Freier and John H. Schaus

Geostrategic Forecasting
Carol V. Evans
Marybeth P. Ulrich
G. K. Cunningham

Leadership and Innovation

Steven Metz
C. Anthony Pfaff
Michael E. Lynch

Applied Strategic Art

Samantha A. Taylor and Amanda B. Cronkhite
Earl J. Catagnus Jr. and Jonathan P. Klug
John A. Bonin

Secretary of the Army
Mr. Ryan D. McCarthy

Chief of Staff of the Army

General James C. McConville

Commandant

Major General John S. Kem

Director, SSI & USAWC Press
Dr. Isaiah Wilson III

Contributing Editors

Editor in Chief

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Dr. Tami Davis Biddle

Dr. Jacqueline N. Deal

Prof. Patrick Porter

Dr. Hal Brands

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Dr. Patricia M. Shields

US Army War College, DNSS
Johns Hopkins University

Long Term Strategy Group, LLC
US Army War College, SSI

University of Exeter
Texas State University

Editorial Board Members
Dr. Anne Louise Antonoff

Dr. Paul Rexton Kan

Dr. Sibylle Scheipers

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Dr. Richard Krickus

Dr. Andrew C. Scobell

Marine Corps University

US Army War College, SSI

Mr. Jeffery L. Caton

Kepler Strategies, LLC

Dr. Samuel Charap

RAND Corporation

Murray R. Clark, COL
(USAF Retired)
At Large

Dr. Conrad C. Crane, LTC
(USA Retired)
Military History Institute

Prof. Audrey Kurth Cronin
American University

Mark J. Eshelman, COL
(USA Retired)

US Army War College, DDE

Lee K. Grubbs

US Army Training and
Doctrine Command

Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky

Queen’s University, Centre for
International and Defence Policy

Dr. An Jacobs

Nottingham Trent University

US Army War College, DNSS
University of Mary Washington
(Professor Emeritus)

Dr. Genevieve Lester

US Army War College

Dr. Matthew C. Mason

US Army War College, SSI

Dr. Montgomery McFate
Naval War College

Dr. Jennifer Mittelstadt
Rutgers University

University of St. Andrews
RAND Corporation

Dr. Kalev Sepp

Naval Postgraduate School

Dr. Luis Simón

Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Dr. Anna Simons

Naval Postgraduate School

Dr. Emile Simpson

Harvard, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs

Dr. Andrew Monaghan

Dr. Don M. Snider

Dr. Matthew Pinsker

John F. Troxell, COL
(USA Retired)

Chatham House

Dickinson College

Dr. George E. Reed, COL
(USA Retired)
University of Colorado,
Colorado Springs

US Army War College, SSI

At Large

Bert B. Tussing, COL
(USMC, Retired)

US Army War College, CSL

Dr. Bettina Renz

Dr. Marybeth P. Ulrich

Dr. Thomas Rid

Dr. Katarzyna Zysk

University of Nottingham
King’s College London

Dr. Nadia Schadlow

Smith Richardson Foundation

US Army War College, DNSS
Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies

Parameters is an official US Army Periodical, published quarterly by the US Army War College. The Secretary of the Army has determined that
publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this
publication has been approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with Army regulations.
Disclaimer: Articles and reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those
of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Vol. 50 No. 2 • Summer 2020

3  From the Editor
Features
Special Commentary

5  The Compound Security Dilemma: Threats at the Nexus of War and Peace
Isaiah Wilson III and Scott A. Smitson

Geostrategic Net Estimate

19  The United States and the
Transatlantic Relationship
John R. Deni

27 INDOPACOM through 2030
Nathan P. Freier and
John H. Schaus

Geostrategic Forecasting

35 Future Warfare: Weaponizing
Critical Infrastructure
Carol V. Evans

43 The Politics of Oath-Taking
Marybeth P. Ulrich

51 Designing Effective Military
Strategies under Uncertainty
G. K. Cunningham

Leadership and Innovation

61 The Future of Strategic Leadership
Steven Metz

77 Army Modernization in
the 21st Century
Michael E. Lynch

69 Military Ethics below the
Threshold of War
C. Anthony Pfaff

2

Parameters 50(2) Summer 2020
Applied Strategic Art

87 Winning the Narrative War
Samantha A. Taylor and
Amanda B. Cronkhite

95 Integrated Campaigning in
the Pacific, 1918–1948
Earl J. Catagnus Jr. and
Jonathan P. Klug

103 Origins of US Army
Strategic Landpower
John A. Bonin

Book Reviews
National Security

111  The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow
War with Russia Could Spiral into
Nuclear Catastrophe
By George Beebe
Reviewed by James P. Farwell

113  On Absolute War: Terrorism and the Logic of
Armed Conflict
By Eric Fleury
Reviewed by Nathan K. Finney

Military History

115  The Girls Next Door: Bringing the Home
Front to the Front Lines

117  Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin
to Vietnam

119  My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent
into Darkness

120 Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army
on the Eve of the Korean War

By Kara Dixon Vuic
Reviewed by Jacqueline E. Whitt

By Howard Jones
Reviewed by Ron Milam

By Ingo Trauschweizer
Reviewed by Frank Jones

By Thomas E. Hanson
Reviewed by Russell W. Glenn

From the Editor in Chief
This issue of Parameters features talent from across the US Army
War College. It is arranged thematically based on four major research
areas critical to US security: geostrategic net estimate, geostrategic
forecasting, leadership and innovation, and applied strategic art.
Opening this issue, though, is a Special Commentary by Isaiah Wilson
III and Scott Smitson entitled “The Compound Security Dilemma:
Threats at the Nexus of War and Peace.” The authors argue the nature
of today’s threats poses a compound security dilemma that demands
nothing less than compound security solutions capable of embracing
the contemporary multipolar ecosystem and its competitive dynamics.
The first research area, Geostrategic Net Estimate, showcases two
contributions. John Deni’s “The United States and the Transatlantic
Relationship” analyzes the major political and economic variables
that will affect America’s relationship with Europe over the next two
to four years. Looking at the Indo-Pacific region, “INDOPACOM
through 2030” by Nathan Freier and John Schaus outlines the role
the US Army can play in addressing the strategic changes underway
in Asia and the Pacific region. The US Army, the authors believe, can
have a transformational effect on the Joint Force approach to military
capacities of key strategic partners within the region.
Our second forum, Geostrategic Forecasting, offers three essays. In
“Future Warfare: Weaponizing Critical Infrastructure,” Carol Evans
alerts us to the fact that hybrid warfare now includes ways in which
America’s adversaries are weaponizing critical infrastructure—
particularly energy, transportation, information, communications,
and the industrial base—to undermine the defense postures of
NATO and the United States. In “The Politics of Oath-Taking,”
Marybeth Ulrich seeks to raise the awareness of the responsibility
oath-takers, both political and professional, have in upholding the
Constitution. In “Designing Military Strategies under Uncertainty,”
G. K. Cunningham offers suggestions for crafting curriculum for
professional military education that considers the wicked problems
of contemporary international security when establishing contextual
frameworks for strategy.
The third research area, Leadership and Innovation, includes three
articles. Steven Metz’s “The Future of Strategic Leadership” suggests
contemporary strategic leaders have yet to transcend twentieth-century,
industrial-age leadership models to develop the entrepreneurialleadership skills necessary to meet twenty-first century challenges.
Anthony Pfaff’s “Military Ethics below the Threshold of War”
describes a novel ethic for the use of military power that will introduce
new norms associated with escalation, reprisal, and risk, increasing
permissible uses of force while limiting their scope. Michael Lynch’s
“Army Modernization in the 21st Century” maintains the US Army is
learning important lessons from the failure of its future combat system
a decade ago.
TOC

4

Parameters 50(2) Summer 2020

Our final forum, Applied Strategic Art, also consists of three
contributions. In “Winning the Narrative War,” Samantha Taylor and
Amanda Cronkhite examine policy narratives of Presidents George
H. W. Bush and William J. (Bill) Clinton to reveal the fragility of
messaging and how consistency in framing foreign policy initiatives is
crucial to maintaining public support. In “Integrated Campaigning in
the Pacific, 1918–1948,” Earl Catagnus Jr. and Jonathan Klug reveal
the historical underpinnings of two critical Joint Staff documents,
the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning and Joint Doctrine Note
1-19, Competition Continuum. Finally, in “Origins of US Army Strategic
Landpower,” John Bonin argues the core competencies the US Army
demonstrated in World War II remain vital in today’s national security
environment. ~AJE

TOC
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The Compound Security Dilemma:
Threats at the Nexus of War and Peace
Isaiah Wilson III and Scott A. Smitson
© Isaiah Wilson III and Scott A. Smitson

ABSTRACT: The United States faces compound security threats
today reflecting a paradigm shift in the character of global
geopolitical competition. Arraying these threats against liabilities in
strategic and policy frameworks poses a significant, unacknowledged
challenge: a new compound security dilemma. This compound security
dilemma demands compound solutions that recognize, adapt, and
embrace the multipolar ecosystem and its global political, cultural,
economic, health, and competitive dynamics.

T

oday’s tumultuous global security environment is best
characterized as one of contagious, disruptive change—
converging, transregional, compound security threats, a
pathological weakening of nation-states, and arguably a breakdown of
the Western liberal order itself. A variety of security threats driven by
cultural, political, and historical forces have combined in ways that have
fundamentally altered the character of threat and the environment of
global geopolitical competition, confronting US policymakers with a
compound security dilemma heretofore unacknowledged. Traditional
security concerns have now merged with human health and security
issues due to the interconnected nature of our twenty-first century
world, as painfully exemplified by the current pandemic. Foreign policy
concerns have acquired a keen domestic focus while domestic policy
concerns have received global attention.
The policies of a revanchist Russia, continuing conflicts in
Syria and Iraq, and instability in Venezuela all provide compelling,
geographically diverse, and comprehensive examples of the compound
security threats faced by the United States today. Accordingly, US
strategists need a theory and analytics-informed network model that
can highlight the nexes between drivers of instability, horizontally
and vertically and between ecosystems. By describing compound
security threats, the underlying compound security dilemma that
generates these threats, the resulting policy puzzles, and by providing
several examples, we offer the requisite foundations for a theory with
significant utility for military strategy and force planning today and
tomorrow. This special commentary is prerequisite and preamble to a
larger, subsequent research theory-building project focused on further
development and testing of the general governing dynamics of the
compound security dilemma.

TOC
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Compound Security Threats, Defined

The coronavirus provides a window into understanding the
compound threats of today. At the time of this writing, the United
States still confronts this deadly adversary, one that flouts accepted
international laws and conventions regarding warfare and human
security protections. This adversary has already achieved mass societal
disruption at an alarming speed. Within three months this enemy
inflicted over 152,000 casualties (confirmed cases) resulting in over
5,700 deaths globally.1 Worldwide economic market disruptions now
threaten a global recession, and national publics now question the
responsiveness of their governments’ capacity and even willingness to
contain and mitigate the adversary. The second-, third-, and nth-order
damage across all sectors—political, economic, societal, foreign and
domestic—are as yet incalculable. The potential for a global paradigm
shift in the way we perceive these threats is real.
Some readers may ask, why choose to speak of COVID-19 in
terms more appropriate to traditional warfare—why speak of a global
pandemic as a global, epoch-changing war? This moment is beyond the
metaphorical: we are, in fact, at war against this virus, or at least we
should be because COVID-19 is indicative of the changed nature of
many of today’s threats.2
Many contemporary threats have become compounded largely
because their root causes and underlying conditions (or currents) have
been allowed to persist unaddressed or under-addressed (see figure 1).
These causes and conditions include economic imbalances; sectarian
conflict; massive and sudden demographic shifts due to regional conflict,
climate change, and insecurity; loss of trust in governing institutions;
and border concerns inextricably tied to identity. The repercussions
of these compound threats follow a multiplicative—or exponentially
contagious—progression as opposed to an additive, linearly sequential
one typical of traditional threats. Hence these repercussions dramatically
alter the risk calculus, risk reward, and benefits-to-costs factors so critical
to strategy planning and policy decision-making.
The combination—or more accurately compounding—of global
dynamics such as wealth disparities, widening wealth and inequality gaps,
instabilities and unpredictabilities in the global economic market, and
global climate change (to varying degrees, artifacts of globalization) have
resulted in what strategic forecasters have described as an environment
of “constant tension between greater interdependence and intensifying
competition” for increasingly scarce material and high-value resources.3
1. “Trump Tests Negative; World Lockdown Takes Hold,” Bloomberg News, March 14, 2020,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-14/widespread-clampdown-takes-hold
-spanish-emergency-virus-update.
2. Katie Glueck and Sydney Ember, “Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders Rebuke Trump Over Virus:
‘The Clock Is Ticking,’” New York Times, March 12, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12
/us/politics/joe-biden-coronavirus.html.
3. Development Concepts and Doctrine Center (DCDC), The DCDC Global Strategic Trends
Programme: 2007-2036, 3rd ed. (London: UK Ministry of Defence DCDC, January 2007), https://
www.cuttingthroughthematrix.com/articles/strat_trends_23jan07.pdf.
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Figure 1. The compound security threat

In combination these environmental dynamics are the first, most
fundamental and consequential of the major drivers of disruptive change
shaping today’s global security environment and place new stresses on
the long-standing liberal international system. Behavioral changes in
international relations caused by these changes reflect an ongoing shift
from a balance-of-power model of geopolitical competition to one of
instability and unpredictability. In essence this shift marks a return
to pre-World War I geo-mercantilism with “beggar-thy-neighbor”
behaviors that foster go-it-alone and do-it-your-own-way approaches to
solving security dilemmas.4
Veteran US National Security Council and State Department senior
policy adviser Ambassador Richard Haass has dubbed this development a
return to a “self-help” system of international competition.5 This system
4. See Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “Beggar-thy-neighbor policy” by Peter Bondarenko,
August 18, 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/beggar-thy-neighbor-policy.
5. Richard Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New
York: Penguin Press, 2017).
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makes forming and norming—holding together capable and willing
coalitions for collective security and defense—more difficult while also
making the formation of such coalitions more essential. As nation-states
drift toward their own self-help solutions to solve security dilemmas,
they are less likely to treat such dilemmas as collective problems.
This brings us to the issue of the threats themselves. In many respects
these threats are more daunting than those of the Cold War. Historian
Walter Russell Mead described the changed character of geopolitical
competition in this way:
Sometime in 2013, we reached a new stage in world history. A coalition
of great powers has long sought to overturn the post-Cold War Eurasian
settlement that the United States and its allies imposed after 1990; in the
second half of 2013 that coalition began to gain ground. . . . The big three
challengers—Russia, China and Iran—all hate, fear and resent the current
state of Eurasia. The balance of power it enshrines thwarts their ambitions;
the norms and values it promotes pose deadly threats to their current
regimes. . . . increasingly, they think they have found a way to challenge and
ultimately to change the way global politics work.6

The major nation-state challengers (China, Russia, North Korea,
and Iran) identified in the 2018 National Defense Strategy share
common denominators as emerging threats: all represent illiberal
states led by despots driven by anachronistic-world-order motives and
hypernativist and statist philosophies and ideologies. The hard choices of
the global system’s leading power, the United States, regarding whether
and, perhaps more importantly, how to intervene in world affairs will
matter most. This behavioral driver of change, also known as American
Interventionism, is the second major driver of disruptive change for
the future global security environment. Since compound threats
demand nothing less than compound solutions, only by developing an
understanding of the compound security dilemma posed by compound
security threats can we open the door to lasting, compound solutions.

Compound Security Threats under a “New” Compound Security
Dilemma

The term compounded refers to the increased interaction—
interconnectedness and collision—of otherwise once separate policy
issues, reflecting a new, post–Cold War (and now post-9/11) international
security environment.7 Where there was once a brighter line dividing
policy issues of a limited domestic context and scope of impact and
consequence from broader international policy concerns, the division
between the national and the international is less relevant and less viable
today.
6. Walter Russell Mead, “The End of History Ends,” American Interest, December 2, 2013,
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/02/2013-the-end-of-history-ends-2/.
7. See Hugh Liebert, John Griswold, and Isaiah Wilson III, eds., Thinking beyond Boundaries:
Transnational Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); and
Isaiah Wilson III and James J. F. Forest, eds., Handbook of Defence Politics: International and Comparative
Perspectives (New York: Routledge, July 1, 2009).
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The security dilemma of the twentieth century international
environment—defined primarily by physical, material-based security
threats of a military (martial) nature—has now given way to a new
twenty-first century security dilemma, the compound security
dilemma.8 Traditional security concerns over material resources are less
and less divorceable from issues of human security. Matters of health
and biological contagion, once easily and accurately recognized and not
considered domestic security issues, today are merely parts of a larger
and more complicated “global health security” whole in a compound
security dilemma world. The novel coronavirus global pandemic could
not be a more accurate example.

Core Governing Dynamics
A number of core dynamics govern this compound security
dilemma. First, shocks in one traditionally distinct public policy sector
such as economics have cascading effects on other sectors also related
to human security. With little or no warning, a matter of oil supply and
demand can turn into a regional or worldwide security concern, even
predatory conflict. The competition for energy is a clear example of
this compound security dilemma. Competition for energy supplies will
continue to dominate the economic landscape during the next 30 years
and growth in world energy demand is likely to rise annually by between
1.5 and 3.1 percent. This trend is likely to result in highly competitive
pricing and the continued enrichment and economic progress, as well as
predation, of producer countries including Russia and Iran.9 Concepts of
domestic politics and policies such as energy policy and migration policy
now take on a global context: we now must think of these policy issues
and concerns in a security context.
The new compound security dilemma questions the foundational
logic of the traditional security dilemma while also calling for an
entirely new governing logic. It thus raises central questions of scale
and legitimacy regarding preferred unilateral policy approaches over
multilateral options (from an instrumental solvency as well as ideational
sovereignty standpoint).
Another governing dynamic of the compound security dilemma is
the tragedy of scales problem. In the past, policy treatment approaches
to planning, decision-making, and implementation were designed
and optimized toward efficiency metrics, calibrated around responsemitigate-recovery public policy standard operating processes and
procedures. The contagion qualities of compound security threats,
however, outgrow and outpace traditional policy prescriptions given
their exponential growth characteristics.
An additional feature of the compound security dilemma is the
interaction effect at play between simultaneous and overlapping
8. John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2
(1950): 157–180, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009187.
9. DCDC, Global Strategic Trends.
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sources of instability. The manifestations of these threats derive their
character from this interaction between variables; the effect is (at least)
multiplicative not additive in nature (see table 1). This tendency of the
compound security threat to outpace the capacity of policy response
options is just as apt to the COVID-19 pandemic as it is to the rise of
ISIS, the Afghanistan War, the crises in the Middle East, the compound
threat in Venezuela, and numerous other nexes of conflict that manifest
at geopolitical flashpoints.
Table 1. Comparison of security paradigms
Conventional Paradigm

Compound Security Paradigm

Threat Calculation

A+B+C

AxBxC

Threat Manifestation

Divergent or Convergent

Convergent

The compound security dilemma, similar to the paradox of the
wicked problem, features poorly and undertimed treatments to threats
that do not solve or mitigate but rather metastasize those threats at
accelerative rates. This effect heightens the risks of miscalculation,
mis-signaling, and runaway crisis escalation. Further, the actions of our
adversaries generate and exploit compound security threats deliberately
and strategically along the gaps and seams of traditional geographic
combatant command boundaries. The geography of compound threats
is an essential calculus in strategic planning, force planning, and risk
management and mitigation.

The Russia Compound Security Threat
Russia now leads a systematic assault on Western democracies and
the international system founded on Western liberal values. Putin’s Russia
aims to subvert Western democracies internally, spread anti-NATO and
anti–European Union sentiment, and undermine the rules-based liberal
international order.
Russia’s revanchist tendencies and expansionism are most easily seen
in its physical military presence along the traditional and historically
vital nexus of its territorial and ethno-cultural near abroad. As the 1990s
and 2000s witnessed a Western liberal states’ expansionism in various
forms, including an expanded NATO eastward and southward, the
2010s and teens watched a precipitous spread of a Russian sphere of
influence westward and southward. Russia’s recent involvement in the
Syrian conflict can be seen as a continuance of this trajectory. The two
geostrategic pathways are clearly moving in counterpoising directions
leading to an inevitable, though not necessarily obvious, clash, possibly
an epochal one.
For years, Russia has worked to gain influence in southeast Europe,
first and foremost using Serbia, later Kosovo, and more recently Bosnia,
as footholds to establish friendly pockets on a hostile continent at a
historical geopolitical pivot that sits along a major civilizational fault line.
Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and seeks to shatter
TOC
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NATO and change European and Middle East security and economic
structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and
subvert democratic processes is concern enough but when this behavior
is coupled with Russia’s expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, the
challenge is clear.10
At present, Russian activity is aggressive, focused, and directed.
Russia is also engaging in expeditions far beyond its historic near
abroad, bringing even broader geostrategic implications. Russian
involvement in Syria should be viewed as expanding anti-access/
area-denial posture in the eastern Mediterranean, greater Levant, and
the Sinai Peninsula. Russian gray-zone warfare activities in Syria are
complicating and strangling European attempts at pressure on Russia
regarding the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Finally, Russia’s
cybermanipulations of elections threaten the legitimacy and viability of
electoral systems in democratic and democratizing countries, including
the leading and guaranteeing power of the Western liberal community
of democratic states, the United States.

The ISIL and “Syraq” Compound Security Threat
On June 9, 2014, the self-declared Islamic State breached and erased
the international boundary separating Syria and Iraq, making the crises
in Syria and in Iraq compound into one so-called Syraq. The vital
national security interests of the United States did not necessarily fall
within one or both nation-states, rather it fell across their nexus. Syraq
as such is not simply a civil war. It is a compound war—a composite of
at least three wars and possibly a fourth. The first is the Syrian Civil War
in which Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, using primarily conventional
forces, has brutally murdered hundreds of thousands of Syrian people.11
The second is the Syrian insurgency against the Assad regime. In this
part of the conflict, insurgents have been trained and resourced by a
multitude of different countries anxious to see Assad removed from
power. The third is the international war against the Islamic State and
other transregional terrorist organizations.
Arguably there is a fourth war in which the major combatants are
weaponizing refugees by causing mass migration into southern Europe,
metastasizing a threat to NATO member states in southern Europe and
to the internal stability of the EU. This crisis is a form of war that many
still fail to see as such; it is precisely a continuation of politics by other
means with vectored, forced migrations aimed at overburdening and

10. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense
-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
11. “Syria: Events of 2018,” Human Rights Watch, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.hrw
.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/syria.
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eventually “breaking the nations” of Europe.12 And it is part of Russia’s
deliberate strategy of disruption.13

The Venezuela Compound Security Threat
Even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuela
experienced increased deterioration of the rule of law and an expansion
of illicit activities, especially narcotics. Additionally, Venezuela continues
to face a worsening humanitarian crisis, the continued collapse of its
health sector, and greater food insecurity.
Venezuela is also faced with a worsening economic crisis beyond
the effects being created by the current US sanctions regime. As the
COVID-19 pandemic has taken hold bringing economic activity to a
halt across the globe, an oil price war has unfolded—a byproduct of
the failure by Saudi Arabia and Russia to come to a mutual collective
agreement on supply cuts, resulting in an oversupplied market. The
resulting drop in oil prices carries potentially dire implications for
oil-exporting Latin American economies, several of which rely on oil
revenues for substantial shares of their budgets.
The crisis in Venezuela is driving the largest exodus of refugees in
recent history in Latin America—almost 4.5 million as accounted for
the by the United Nations in May.14 Additional projections estimate that
by mid-2020, Venezuela will surpass Syria as the largest humanitarian
crisis in the world.15 While numerous organizations like the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and the US Agency for International
Development are attempting to mitigate the effects of this crisis, neighbor
states like Colombia and Brazil (two major US strategic partners) are at
risk of exceeding their ability to absorb and support this mass exodus.
This challenge will only be compounded as the effects of COVID-19
impact the region.
Finally, the instability of Venezuela also has geostrategic implications
for the United States. Already a major platform of influence prior to the
COVID-19 outbreak, Venezuela is the lens through which Russia and
China continue to prioritize their efforts in Latin America.
While China continues to use its Belt and Road Initiative to gain access
and influence throughout the region, China has also heavily invested in
critical infrastructure, establishing “dual use” ports at key geostrategic

12. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).
13. Geoff Dyer, “NATO Accuses Russia of ‘Weaponising’ Immigrants,” Financial Times, March
1, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/76a52430-dfe1-11e5-b67fa61732c1d025.
14. “Venezuela Situation,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed May 4,
2020, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html.
15. Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, Venezuela Refugee Crisis to Become the Largest and Most
Underfunded in Modern History, Brookings, December 9, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog
/up-front/2019/12/09/venezuela-refugee-crisis-to-become-the-largest-and-most-underfunded-in
-modern-history/.
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choke points including Panama.16 These actions as well as the significant
influence that China retains on the future of Venezuela is demonstrative
of a broader pattern across the Western Hemisphere as stated by the US
Southern Command Commander, Admiral Craig Faller, in a January
2020 testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee:
I look around the region and I see China working on multiple port deals, IT
infrastructure, dams, mining, logging, fishing, including a significant illegal
fishing, illegal mining and illegal logging. And I look at the port access that
they’re pursuing in El Salvador, Jamaica, Bahamas. I ask myself the question
why would China want to buy an island and lock up a 99-year lease for
most of the coast of El Salvador, right here within a two-hour flight of the
continental United States. They are trying to achieve positional advantage
right here in our neighborhood and that is alarming and concerning to me.
It drives the sense of urgency with which I look at this competition.17

Whereas as Chinese interests in Venezuela are a blend of
geoeconomics-meets-geostrategy, Russia’s interests in Venezuela are
weighted toward its increased role and visibility within the military
dimension of its power.
Given Havana’s outsized role and influence in Caracas, Venezuela is
a major fulcrum for Russia’s approach to Latin America. Venezuela and
Cuba are two of Russia’s three key allies in the Western Hemisphere,
and Venezuela accounts for 80 percent of Russia’s foreign military sales
program. Venezuela has been a frequent end point for Russian longrange bomber sorties into and out of the Western Hemisphere; it hosts
Russian navy port visits and exercises; and it serves as a major platform for
Russia’s ongoing information warfare campaign across Latin America.
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia has signaled
its solidarity (in word and action) with President Nicolás Maduro and
remains the external state actor most relevant to the trajectory of the
Maduro regime.18

Compound Security Threats and the Limits of American
Unilateral Power

Our current systems and methods of calculating risks and
force requirements do not fully nor adequately account for these
“compounding” dynamics. As a result, our determinations of risk and
force requirements are anemic, setting conditions for a “too little . . . too

16. Don Giolzetti, “China’s Front Door to America’s Backyard: China’s Rising Influence in
Panama is a Case Study of Its Ambitions in Latin America,” Diplomat, June 28, 2019, https://
thediplomat.com/2019/06/chinas-front-door-to-americas-backyard/.
17. Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command
in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2021 and the Future Years Defense Program:
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 116th Cong. (January 30, 2020) (Testimony of
Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, US Southern Command), https://www.armed-services.senate
.gov/imo/media/doc/20-02_01-30-2020.pdf.
18. “Russia to Boost Venezuela Ties amid US Pressure,” BBC, February 8, 2020, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51423110; and John E. Herbst and Jason Marczak,
Russia’s Intervention in Venezuela: What’s at Stake?, Atlantic Council, September 12, 2019,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in
-venezuela-whats-at-stake/.
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late . . . and not enough for long enough” approach to global transregional
threats to national and hegemonic interests.19 Certainly the convergence
of threats at key geographic locations presents the United States with
additional challenges, but it also presents opportunities to sharpen our
focus and apply our resources in more precise and economical ways, at
decisive locations, through simultaneously executed named operations
and enduring efforts, creating the possibility of achieving overmatching
compound wins.
In short America can no longer go it alone, nor should it. As the cases
discussed illustrate, the United States has a power problem consisting of
three components: (1) insufficient power, type, and kind; (2) insufficient
capacity to produce, maintain, and sustain the power required to meet
contemporary missions; and (3) insufficient capability to convert power
available (on hand or in production) into effective policies and strategies.
Again, the anemic public policy handling of the COVID-19 pandemic
is a sad testimonial to these facts. The United States has reached the
limits of its fungible power, at least from a perspective of single-select
instrumental or unilateral choice.
America remains an exceptional nation in terms of its relative
capabilities and capacity to rival nation-states and in its ability to project
power globally. But like a boxer replete with years of experience and
a reach that outdistances younger, less-experienced competitors, the
“tale of the tape” for the United States today might read: “great reach,
but poor endurance in the latter rounds.” America retains the ability to
reach anywhere and everywhere, but frequently with the wrong kind
of instrument and too little of the right-fitting solution set. America
often arrives too late to prevent, contain, or mitigate today’s compound
security threats or does not sustain the longevity needed for effective
regimens. All told, this is a worrisome combination. There is a point of
diminishing returns that all great powers must face in relation to their
ability to expand, manage, and govern imperial dominions. As historian
Paul Kennedy noted:
Nations project their military power according to their economic resources
and in defense of their broad economic interests. But, the cost of projecting
that military power is more than even the largest economies can afford
indefinitely, especially when new technologies and new centers of production
shift economic power away from established Great Powers—hence the rise
and fall of nations.20

We still live an international relations paradigm that privileges the
sovereignty of individual nation-states, within which states retain the
right to make their own policy choices. But exercising the sovereign
right to determine one’s own art of the possible independently does
not change the nature of threats nor the character of change in global
geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic competition. If the policy
19. See Isaiah Wilson III, “Introduction to the Politics of Defence Planning,” in Wilson and
Forrest, Handbook of Defence Politics, 9.
20. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), jacket.
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choice is unilateralism and self-help, the risk calculations of such choices
must be measured against the changed and changing environment. In an
era where that environment—foreign and domestic—is governed more
by a new compound security dilemma, the risk of continuing to choose
public policies of unilateral self-help will prove beyond the calculus of
risks itself—more the stuff of a gamble.
So what might come of an “America First” foreign policy? History
provides examples of the consequences of adopting purely transactional
approaches: uncertainty, strategic mis-signals and misreads, and illiberal
solutions and outcomes that while perhaps instrumentally beneficial and
successful in achieving and securing short-range strategic goals, wind
up being devoid of a moral footing of the kind needed to secure lasting,
durable, legitimate peace and stability in the longer run.

Implications for Military Strategy and Force Planning

Compound security threats represent a change in the character,
scope, and scale of challenges to our common defense and public welfare.
While hybridity is certainly part of the equation, it is not all of it. The
compounded nature of today’s and tomorrow’s threats dramatically alters
our public policy and force planning, sizing, and shaping calculations
and algorithms.
As former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, speaking to
US troops in Kuwait in December 2004 said, “‘you go to war with the
army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later
time.’”21 Unfortunately, these remarks echo our reality today, a reality
largely of our own making. At the same time, we too often hear this
expression offered as an epiphenomenal excuse for failures of imagination,
anticipation, forecasting, and planning, and for our underpreparedness
for the fullness of contemporary public policy puzzles.
Addressing these failures will require our entire national security
enterprise to come to grips with a recurring set of behaviors that cuts
across our checkered performance against compound threats:
•• The phenomenon and paradox within the social constructions
of the meanings of war and peace, the issues of security and
nonsecurity, and the tendency to win a war but to lose the intended
peace, as evidenced by our decades-long anabasis in Iraq
•• The false distinction between national security and human
security issues, as demonstrated by US-led military-humanitarian
interventions in the 1990s, which addressed only symptoms but
not root causes (Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti)
•• The persistence of chronic, civil-societal, government-society
structural inequalities that go un- or under-addressed for many
reasons yet remain the common denominator of rebellions,

21. Eric Schmitt, “Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld over Lack of Armor,” New York
Times, December 8, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/08/international/middleeast
/iraqbound-troops-confront-rumsfeld-over-lack-of.html.
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insurrections, and insurgencies (Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, the
Arab Spring)
•• The tendency to declare false or premature victories while a
conflict is evolving, not ending; the “mission accomplished”
paradox results in undercounts in risk assessments and capability
requirements calculations (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, COVID-19)

Furthermore, as Amitai Etzioni, author of From Empire to Community:
A New Approach to International Relations (2004), once reminded us,
“Whether one is highly critical of the American global projection of
power or celebrates that the United States has accepted that it is destined
to bring order and liberty to the world. . . . [The question is:] Where
do we go from here?”22 Indeed, we need to think and move in more
comprehensive, multilateral, and communitarian ways and directions.
If our power equation can neither muster nor sustain the type, quality,
and quantities of force we need or dispatch it in ways and according
to timelines necessary to achieve overmatch of compound threats as
they form, or at least before they compound, then we need a whole
new equation.
Our new equation will require novel frameworks and mental models
by which the United States, as part of a global effort, can plan, lead,
and organize solutions to compound security threats. A theory and an
analytics-informed, multilayer, network model (see figure 2) capable of
capturing the interactions of the drivers behind compound problems,
both horizontally and vertically, between separate ecosystems, could
have significant utility.

Figure 2. “Key concepts and dominant interpretations of power relevant to
polycentric environmental governance” by T. H. Morrison et al., is licensed
under CC BY 4.023

22. Amitai Etzioni, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 1.
23. See T. H. Morrison et al., “The Black Box of Power in Polycentric Environmental
Governance,” Global Environmental Change 57 (July 2019): art. 101934, fig. 2, https://doi.org/10.1016
/j.gloenvcha.2019.101934.
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Such an approach might just be the moment of paradigm shift
that many within military, public policy, and public affairs circles have
debated, even promoted, for at least the last three decades. The 2020
novel coronavirus pandemic may be its herald. If so, will we recognize it
and heed its call for the whole-cloth change it requires?
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ABSTRACT: Europe remains as important as ever for US security
but several factors contribute to a degree of unsteadiness in the 2020
European security environment. The outcome of conflict between
forces of stasis and change over the next two to four years will be
determined by several dynamics including Europe’s response to the
COVID-19 economic crisis, Russia’s desire to shatter transatlantic
relations, the American approach to NATO, the impact of Brexit,
whether German leaders will lead, and French efforts to address
long-term economic malaise.

I

n the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of
ongoing security challenges from Russia and elsewhere, how will the
transatlantic security environment evolve in the next few years? This
question is a critical one for American policymakers. The magnitude
and scope of transatlantic trade in goods and services, the commitment
to common values such as democracy and the rule of law, and shared
geopolitical interests within and beyond the transatlantic region make
America’s relationship with Europe of vital interest to the United States.
Continuing Russian military provocations in northeastern Europe,
Moscow’s efforts to undermine democracy and intergovernmental
institutions, foreign fighters from the Islamic State, China’s increasingly
exploitative behavior in Europe, and waves of migrants from Africa
and the Middle East, however, threaten Europe’s stability and security
and hence American vital interests. Magnifying these challenges is the
economic disaster generated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which is likely
to be the worst global contraction since the Great Depression.
This brief article will unpack for policymakers what these challenges
may mean for transatlantic security in the coming two to four years.
To accomplish this, the article will first outline the current state of
play in European security arguing a kind of equilibrium has been
achieved over the last two years, in contrast with the mid-2010s when
the European security environment was in great flux. Nonetheless,
as the second section of this article points out, several ongoing and
emerging challenges combined to create an unsteadiness in European
security at the beginning of this new decade. Whether those challenges
remain relatively manageable or erupt into crises will depend on the
primary drivers of security in Europe, which are identified in the third
section of this article. Finally, the article outlines potential alternative
short-term futures in Europe, drawing out some prospective outcomes
and implications.
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Improved Security Situation

In some respects, Europe has entered a security stasis over the last
two years particularly in contrast to the 2014–16 period and especially
with regard to the most acute security threats confronting Europe—
namely, Russian aggression and international terrorism. This security
stasis was mostly the result of two key factors. First, most North Atlantic
Treaty Organization member states implemented a series of budgetary,
force posture, readiness, and modernization initiatives intended both to
reverse years of steadily declining defense budgets, on average, and to
begin correcting the deficit of territorial defense capability and capacity
across Europe.1
Second, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and others improved their
homeland security postures. Since the mid-2010s, European states have
significantly enhanced intelligence collection and sharing, tightened
counterterrorism laws and border controls, strengthened communitybased monitoring and reporting networks, and devoted more funding to
domestic law enforcement and for other counterterrorism capabilities.2

Persistent Unsteadiness

Despite this progress, there remains a security unsteadiness in
Europe today stemming from several threats and challenges. The first is
continued destabilizing Russian provocations in, near, and over Europe.3
Most obviously, Russian military forces continue to support, enable, and
fight alongside the separatists in eastern Ukraine, a conflict resulting in
at least thirteen thousand deaths and two million refugees flowing into
Poland and other neighboring countries.4
The second threat confronting European security is small-scale
terrorist attacks, including those religiously inspired. Despite relative
success in preventing large-scale attacks and a corresponding drop in

1. John R. Deni, “Is NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence Fit for Purpose?,” Orbis 63, no. 1
(Winter 2019): 92–103, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2018.12.008.
2. Jytte Klausen, “Why Jihadist Attacks Have Declined in Europe: And Why Europe Shouldn’t
Get Comfortable Yet,” Foreign Affairs, December 19, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/europe/2018-12-19/why-jihadist-attacks-have-declined-europe; and Diego Esparza and Thomas
C. Bruneau, “Closing the Gap Between Law Enforcement and National Security Intelligence:
Comparative Approaches,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 32, no. 2 (May
2019): 322–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1522219.
3. See “Russian Aircraft Violates Airspace of NATO Member Estonia,” AP News, September
24, 2019, https://apnews.com/c26f31956ed949eb800dbe632f3c52f0; and Michael Schwirtz, “How
a Poisoning in Bulgaria Exposed Russian Assassins in Europe,” New York Times, December 22, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/world/europe/bulgaria-russia-assassination-squad.html.
4. “Death Toll up to 13,000 in Ukraine Conflict, Says UN Rights Office,” RadioFreeEurope/
RadioLiberty, February 26, 2019, www.rferl.org/a/death-toll-up-to-13-000-in-ukraine-conflict
-says-un-rights-office/29791647.html; and Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turning Muslims Away, Poland
Welcomes Ukrainians,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles
/turning-muslims-away-poland-welcomes-ukrainians-11553598000.
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the number of deaths from terrorism across Europe, there remains a
risk of lone-actor attacks.5
Additionally, other less acute—but no less impactful—challenges
to security in Europe have recently emerged. Chief among these is
China. Europeans have become increasingly worried about Chinese
tech companies acquiring or building telecommunications network
infrastructure in Europe. A 2017 Chinese law requiring its organizations
and citizens to support national security investigations means companies
like Huawei can be compelled to function as arms of the Chinese
government to the detriment of European security.6
In addition, Europeans are increasingly concerned about China’s
investment in other sensitive technologies and critical physical
infrastructure. Chinese investments have been most dramatic in
Southern Europe where several countries have privatized previously
state-owned assets to reduce debt.7 Increasingly strict European Union
investment screening regulations may curb new Chinese activity in the
short run, but this remains a challenge for Europe.8
European economists and other experts have expressed concern
over China’s efforts to systematically steal trade secrets for economic
advantage and for exploitation by China’s military.9 Chinese statedirected economic espionage and intellectual property theft are
frequently funneled directly into military advancements.10
Finally, migration is another enduring challenge to security and
stability in Europe today. The numbers of conflict refugees and
economic migrants seeking asylum in Europe have fallen dramatically
since the mid-2010s. Nonetheless, emigration from regions adjacent
5. Avner Barnea, “Challenging the ‘Lone Wolf ’ Phenomenon in an Era of Information
Overload,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 31, no. 2 (March 2018):
217–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1417349; Robin Simcox, “The PostCaliphate Terror Threat in Europe—and the Need for Continuing US Assistance,” Heritage
Foundation, August 19, 2019, www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/the-post-caliphate-terror
-threat-europe-and-the-need-continuing-us-assistance; and Daniel L. Byman, “Trump’s
Syria Withdrawal is a Boon for ISIS—and a Nightmare for Europe,” Brookings Institution,
October
15,
2019,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/15
/trumps-syria-withdrawal-is-a-boon-for-isis-and-a-nightmare-for-europe/.
6. Jonathan Stearns and Alexander Weber, “China Threat to Telecoms Cited in EU Parliament
Draft Resolution,” Bloomberg News, March 11, 2019, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-11
/china-threat-to-telecoms-cited-in-eu-parliament-draft-resolution-jt4gae79; and Moritz Koch,
“‘Smoking gun’: Streit um beweise gegen Huawei,” Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf), January 29, 2020.
7. Valbona Zeneli, “Mapping China’s Investments in Europe,” Diplomat, March 14, 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/mapping-chinas-investments-in-europe/.
8. Thilo Hanemann, Mikko Huotari, and Agatha Kratz, Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends
and Impact of New Screening Policies, MERICS Papers on China (Berlin: Rhodium Group and
Mercator Institute for China Studies, March 6, 2019), https://www.merics.org/sites/default
/files/2019-03/190311_MERICS-Rhodium%20Group_COFDI-Update_2019.pdf.
9. Zak Doffman, “China’s Spies Accused of Stealing EU Tech Secrets, Just as China and EU
Agree Stronger Ties,” Forbes, April 11, 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/04/11
/chinese-spies-accused-of-major-european-ip-theft-just-as-china-and-europe-agree-stronger
-ties/#1af64e0d70f4.
10. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (Washington, DC: OSD, May 2, 2019), 103–4,
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY
_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
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to or near Europe is unlikely to end considering instability in Syria,
Iraq, and Libya and across much of sub-Saharan Africa.11 Managing the
socioeconomic impact and flow of migrants places significant strain on
social welfare, security, intelligence, and other government institutions
across Europe.

Short-Run Drivers

How these threats evolve will depend in large measure on several
key drivers of security and stability in Europe, primarily the economic
slowdown created by the COVID-19 pandemic. The contraction in
global economic activity threatens to be the worst since the Great
Depression.12 Recovery may have significant effects on fiscal health
across Europe—and hence on defense budgets—and will deepen debt
for many of the most financially vulnerable European states. Robust
global growth could return in 2021, but much will depend on how
governments respond and how quickly a vaccine can be developed to
prevent a resurgence of the virus.
The second driver of security in Europe in the short run is Moscow’s
strategy of undermining the transatlantic relationship, destabilizing
European politics, and dominating Russia’s immediate neighbors,
primarily rooted in Russia’s persistent conflation of territory with
security.13 An unremitting sense of insecurity continues to incentivize
zero-sum strategic approaches to foreign relations.
The third most important driver is the American relationship with
Europe in terms of security and trade. President Trump has a mixed
track record with NATO despite expressing support for the Alliance at
the December 2019 leaders’ meeting in London and even though his own
National Security Strateg y embraces NATO as an invaluable advantage.14
Reportedly, the president expressed his desire for the United States to
withdraw from NATO, but he was convinced not to do so.15 With regard
to trade, the president has declared the EU a “foe” of the United States,
11. John D. Johnson, Raymond H. Chester, and Felix S. Johnfinn, “European Security Threats
and Challenges: An Examination of Mass Migration, Its Impact on European Security and
Practical Policy Recommendations,” Small Wars Journal, n.d., https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art
/european-security-threats-and-challenges-examination-mass-migration-its-impact-european.
12. Adam Behsudi, “IMF Predicts Global Contraction on Par with Great Depression,” Politico,
April 14, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/imf-predicts-global-contraction-great-depression.
13. Stephen J. Blank, ed., Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College Press, 2012); and Keir Giles, Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to
Confront the West (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2019).
14. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, December 2017), 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12
/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf; and Carol D. Leonnig and Philip Rucker, “‘You’re a Bunch of
Dopes and Babies’: Inside Trump’s Stunning Tirade Against Generals,” Washington Post, January
17, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/youre-a-bunch-of-dopes-and-babies-inside
-trumps-stunning-tirade-against-generals/2020/01/16/d6dbb8a6-387e-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d
_story.html.
15. Michael Birnbaum and Philip Rucker, “At NATO, Trump Claims Allies Make New Defense
Spending Commitments after He Upends Summit,” Washington Post, July 12, 2018, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/; and Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Trump Discussed Pulling US
from NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns over Russia,” New York Times, January 14, 2019,
https://nyti.ms/2HaZZrK.
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overturning decades of bipartisan support for European integration, and
he has threatened to impose tariffs on a wide array of European goods.16
If President Trump is elected to a second term, given his foreign
policy tendencies and his lame duck status, it is conceivable he would
deepen the trade dispute with Europe and pull the United States out
of NATO.17 Congress has grown so concerned over the latter that it
voted in 2019 to prohibit the use of funds for withdrawal.18 The US
Constitution is silent on treaty withdrawal, and it is unclear whether
Congress’s actions are sufficient.19
A full-scale trade war with Europe would undermine America’s
most important economic relationship, undercut Europe’s precarious
fiscal situation, and worsen the transatlantic burden-sharing imbalance.
Leaving NATO would erode the credibility of the mutual defense
commitment among remaining Alliance members. Given a deteriorated
economic and security environment, some European states would likely
pursue hedging strategies vis-à-vis both Russia and China, opening the
door for Moscow and Beijing to wield far greater influence in Europe.20
The fourth most important short-term driver is Brexit. The UK’s
2016 decision to leave the EU has already reduced British economic
output and household purchasing power.21 These shifts will ultimately
mean reduced government tax receipts, which will likely result in cuts to
military spending as London attempts to protect social welfare programs
just as it did in the wake of the Great Recession. The magnitude of Brexit’s
damage will only unfold slowly as the UK and the EU negotiate a postBrexit relationship. Regardless, history suggests diminished military

16. Andrew Roth et al., “Trump Calls European Union a ‘Foe’—Ahead of Russia and China,”
Guardian, July 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/15/donald-trump
-vladimir-putin-helsinki-russia-indictments; and Jakob Hanke Vela, “Trump Poised to Hit EU with
Billions in Tariffs After Victory in Airbus Case,” Politico, September 14, 2019, https://www.politico
.eu/article/trump-poised-to-hit-eu-with-billions-in-tariffs-after-airbus-win/.
17. Stephanie Ruhle and Carol E. Lee, “In Private Speech, Bolton Suggests Some of Trump’s
Foreign Policy Decisions are Guided by Personal Interest,” NBC News, November 12, 2019, https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/private-speech-bolton-suggests-some-trump-s-foreign
-policy-decisions-n1080651; and Michael Anton, “The Trump Doctrine,” Foreign Policy, April 20, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/20/the-trump-doctrine-big-think-america-first-nationalism/.
18. Joe Gould, “Would Trump Drive NATO Exit? Congress Works on Roadblocks,”
Defense News, December 16, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/12/16
/would-trump-drive-nato-exit-congress-works-on-roadblocks/.
19. Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, “Constitutional Issues Relating to the
NATO Support Act,” Lawfare (blog), January 28, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com
/constitutional-issues-relating-nato-support-act.
20. Noah Barkin, “Europe’s Moment of Truth with China,” Politico, January 13, 2020,
https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-moment-of-truth-with-china-trade-eu; and Liana Fix and
Bastian Giegerich, “European Security in Crisis: What to Expect if the United States Withdraws
from NATO,” War on the Rocks, November 29, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11
/european-security-in-crisis-what-to-expect-if-the-united-states-withdraws-from-nato/.
21. Ivana Kottasová, “Brexit is Costing the UK Economy $1 Billion a Week. And It Could Get
Worse,” CNN Business, March 22, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/22/business/brexit-uk
-economic-damage/index.html; and Jim Edwards, “The Price of Brexit Has Been £66 Billion So
Far, Plus an Impending Recession—and It Hasn’t Even Started Yet,” Business Insider, April 7, 2019,
https://www.businessinsider.com/price-of-brexit-66-billion-recession-2019-4.
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capacity and capability will precede an eventual reconceptualization of
Britain’s strategic outlook and its willingness to wield force abroad.22
Meanwhile on the continent, the question of German leadership
looms as the fifth most important short-term driver. Throughout
Angela Merkel’s 15 years in power, she has shown a reluctance to lead
Europe on foreign and security policy. Only when crises have fully
erupted—for example, Syria’s civil war and the resulting migration crisis,
Russia’s intimidation of and aggression toward its neighbors, or Libya’s
increasingly fraught civil war—has Merkel engaged meaningfully. If she
fulfills her term of office through late 2021, Germany will likely remain
on the sidelines at least until then, unwilling to wield the influence and
authority that comes with being Europe’s economic hegemon.
The sixth and final short-term driver of European security is France’s
ongoing economic reform effort. Emmanuel Macron—a relative
newcomer to politics—was elected to the presidency in mid-2017 on
the promise of a dramatic shakeup of the French economy. Since then
he has struggled to implement what outside experts and economists
have long acknowledged are fundamental, structural flaws in the
French economic model.23 Reforms are vitally necessary to expand the
economy more aggressively, which will in turn improve government
tax receipts and permit France to fulfill its own ambitious national
security strategy even as it deploys ten thousand troops domestically for
counterterrorism purposes.

Forecasting Alternative European Futures

To safeguard its interests in Europe and beyond, the United States’
grand strategic objective regarding Europe has long been to prevent a
single, protectionist power from dominating the continent. Secondarily,
Washington also desires European partners capable of and willing to
defend common interests and values at home and abroad. Pursuit of
these goals could be frustrated in the next two to four years, depending
on the various drivers identified in the preceding section and how they
affect the ability of European allies to manage the challenges posed by
Russia, terrorism, China, and migration.
The most positive scenario might include the following outcomes
over the next two to four years:
1. Russia calculates that fiscal and political costs of regularly violating
the sovereignty of its neighbors, maintaining its support for the
separatist war in Ukraine, and pursuing sociopolitical instability in
Europe and North America through media and cyber manipulation

22. Fareed Zakaria, “Brexit Will Mark the End of Britain’s Role as a Great Power,” Washington
Post, March 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/brexit
-will-mark-the-end-of-britains-role-as-a-great-power/2019/03/14/5df139fa-468c-11e9-8aab
-95b8d80a1e4f_story.html.
23. Andrew Walker, “What is the French Economic Problem?” BBC News, April 29, 2016; and
Alice Baudry and Laurent Bigorgne, “Diagnosing the French Malaise,” Carnegie Europe, April 13,
2017, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/68661.
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outweigh the benefits. As a result, it gradually begins to reduce the
level of antagonism toward the West, if only for fiscal reasons.
2. The United States remains a steadfast NATO ally, renouncing any
thought of conditionality in its commitment to Article 5 of the
treaty. Given what appears to be a ratcheting down of Russia’s
aggressive behavior across Europe, the United States announces it
will postpone plans to conduct division-level exercises in Europe.
Washington also signals its intent to begin negotiations with the
EU on eliminating remaining trade barriers.
3. The United Kingdom concludes a new trade agreement with the
EU that amounts to what many call a “soft Brexit,” maintaining
the strongest possible economic links to the continent short of EU
membership. For this reason, there is no independence referendum
in Scotland, and British tax receipts slowly stabilize as economic
growth recovers.
4. Merkel steps down in late 2020 and “snap elections” are held.
Merkel’s successor achieves a solid mandate with a clear majority,
earning the political capital necessary for continued growth
in the defense budget, and a decision to exclude predatory,
state-subsidized Chinese telecom firms from German networks,
as well as an increasing willingness on the part of Berlin to lead
Europe more decisively.
5. Macron succeeds in pushing through structural reforms, bolstering
economic growth in France. At the same time, he dramatically
curtails the homeland security mission of the French Army,
freeing more military capability and capacity.
6. Working collaboratively, American and German scientists develop
a COVID-19 vaccine in time for the 2020–21 flu/cold season.
North American and European economic growth rebounds
strongly in 2021, allowing most members of the transatlantic
community to avoid a lengthy recession and painful tradeoffs
between social welfare and national security.

Worst-Case Outcomes
1. Russia expands its military presence in Kaliningrad and builds
new, permanent bases in Belarus, even as its fiscal position
worsens. Meanwhile, it continues to covertly manipulate media
and cybernetworks to undermine and weaken mainstream political
parties in Germany and France. It also solidifies client regime
control in Syria and Libya that in turn push opposition groups,
disfavored minorities, and others to migrate toward Europe.
2. The United States expands its trade war against the EU and
announces its withdrawal from NATO, to become effective in
one year per the terms of the Alliance treaty. At the same time,
Washington begins a major downsizing of its military footprint in
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Europe, withdrawing troops and equipment. It announces plans
to maintain a rotational presence only at Ramstein Airbase.
3. Merkel remains in office through the end of her term in October
2021, after which a minority government comes to power. Lacking
a strong mandate, this government maintains Merkel’s cautious
international approach. Given the American withdrawal from
NATO, Berlin looks to the UK and France for additional security
guarantees yet is offered none for fiscal (UK) and political (France)
reasons. As a result German leaders pursue an accommodation with
Moscow. Amidst the profound changes in the political-military
realm, German leaders remove nearly all restrictions on Chinese
firms’ access to telecom networks in exchange for an end to Beijing’s
threats to shut out German automotive and other manufacturers
from the lucrative Chinese market.
4. The United Kingdom’s rough exit from the EU results in continued
sluggishness in the British economy magnified by what is termed
the Pandemic Depression. As a result, unemployment climbs
significantly. To manage the fallout, the British government shifts
funding from defense and national security accounts to the National
Health Service and social welfare programs. Meanwhile, Scottish
nationalists ramp up large-scale demonstrations—sometimes
turning violent—in support of an independence referendum.
5. Protests in France succeed in causing the political defeat of
Macron’s economic reform packages, further inhibiting France’s
response to the Pandemic Depression. With a contracting economy
and another rising tide of migrants from North Africa and the
Levant on the horizon, far-right political leader Marine Le Pen
wins election in 2022. Her policies undermine the EU as well as
France’s special relationship with Germany, and she announces
French withdrawal from NATO following the United States.
Simultaneously, Le Pen forgives Moscow for its transgressions
in Ukraine—in exchange, Moscow agrees to purchase advanced
French defense equipment.

Obviously, the scenarios outlined above are speculative and any
number of permutations between and beyond the two scenarios are
possible. Nonetheless, it is clear events in Europe will have significant
implications for US national security and defense policy. Policymakers
in Washington cannot fully control the transatlantic security drivers but
having an awareness of those drivers and their potential implications
can help the United States to mitigate the worst-case outcomes.
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INDOPACOM through 2030
Nathan P. Freier and John H. Schaus
ABSTRACT: INDOPACOM transformation faces two risks:
the same kind of strategic distraction that derailed prior efforts
to refocus on the Indo-Pacific and competing Joint and service
concepts and priorities. Mitigating these risks and restoring a
hypercompetitive US position in INDOPACOM relies on US
senior leaders’ adopting bold change. The Army can lead the way
by adopting four transformational roles in INDOPACOM—
grid, enabler, multidomain warfighter, and capability and capacity
generator.

C

hina’s advantages in anti-access/area-denial will require novel
US warfighting solutions going forward.1 A more credible,
hypercompetitive United States IndoPacific Command
(INDOPACOM) Joint Force will inevitably rely on the deliberate and
innovative combination of service strengths. The Army’s substantial
Joint enabling capability in mission command, protection, sustainment,
movement, and intelligence (and information) make it an attractive
foundation upon which to build a more agile, distributed, and lethal
theater-level Joint Force approach.2

Distraction

For nearly 20 years, the US military focused to a fault on irregular
wars with nonstate actors in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more broadly the
Global War on Terror. During that time, the Department of Defense
prioritized counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and nation building
in its strategy, concepts, plans, and readiness. The post-9/11 wars were
perhaps the most disruptive for the US Army. The Army shouldered the
wars’ principal burdens.3 Army forces grew accustomed to predictable
mission sets and deployment cycles in familiar regions, and US soldiers
became expert irregular warfighters. This all occurred, however, as
profound change in the competitive environment emerged on the other
side of the world.
As the United States fought insurgents and terrorists, China
developed hypercompetitive approaches focused on outflanking US
1. Kathy Gilsinan, “How the U.S. Could Lose a War with China,” Atlantic, July 25, 2019, https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/07/china-us-war/594793/.
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Operations, Army Doctrine Publication
(ADP) 3-0 (Washington DC: HQDA, 2016), 10, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files
/misc/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/adp/ADP_3-0.pdf; and Philip Davidson, “China’s
Challenge to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (speech, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA,
October 1, 2019), https://www.belfercenter.org/.
3. Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M. Morgenstern, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding:
Background and Status, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Rept. No. 116-R44519 (Washington,
DC: CRS, September 6, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf.
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interests and, if necessary, defeating US forces in the Indo-Pacific
region. To date, China’s hypercompetitive methods have confounded
traditional US approaches to competition, deterrence, and warfighting.4
As a result, the US military and the Army specifically are out of position
conceptually, physically, and with deployed and anticipated capabilities
in this highly contested region.

The Transformation Imperative

The 2018 National Defense Strateg y (NDS 18) recognizes an imperative
for wholesale Joint transformation to meet the challenge of great power
rivalry.5 United States INDOPACOM is a centerpiece in that anticipated
transformation. Among the services, the Army may have the toughest
challenge meeting essential transformational objectives.
The Army recently adopted the concept of multidomain operations
as its contribution to great power rivalry.6 Consistent with its self-image
as the nation’s war winner, its conception of multidomain operations
frequently culminates in large-scale, multidomain ground combat.
However, the multidomain and multifunctional demands on the
Army in the Indo-Pacific will likely call for a different employment
of Army forces. While multidomain ground combat may provide the
platform for success in a future European or Middle Eastern war,
INDOPACOM’s unique geography and threat profile do not bend as
easily to Army preferences.

China, China, China!

While the military was away in the Middle East, a fundamental
threat to American power emerged in the Indo-Pacific region.7
The strategic landscape there changed dramatically from the time
of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review to NDS 18.8 Over that time,
US political, economic, and military advantage eroded. China emerged
as a hypercompetitive regional juggernaut, and its explosive economic
growth—combined with strategic vision—enabled rapid expansion
of its diplomatic and economic influence, financial interests, military

4. Nathan Freier et al, “Game On or Game Over: Hypercompetition and Military
Advantage,” War Room, May 22, 2018, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles
/the-new-defense-normal-nine-fundamentals-of-hypercompetition/.
5. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD),
2018), 2–3, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=807329.
6. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army Concept for MultiDomain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade 2025–45: Versatile, Agile, and Lethal, Version
1.0 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, September 2018), https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files
/documents/ArmyEABConcept.pdf.
7. Paul McCleary, “Acting SecDef Shanahan’s First Message: ‘China, China,
China’,” Breaking Defense, January 2, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/01
/acting-secdef-shanahans-first-message-china-china-china/.
8. See Henry Shelton, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, DoD, September 30, 2001), https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf; and
Mattis, National Defense Strategy.
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transformation, and gray-zone activism.9 Now all of these factors
combine to position China as the most significant rival to American
power, influence, and freedom of action since the Cold War.
The method, scope, and pace of China’s approach to countering the
United States and the essential character of an American response is most
accurately described as hypercompetition.10 China’s growing influence,
reach, and raw potential means hypercompetitive military rivalry will
be most acute for the United States in the INDOPACOM theater well
through the next decade. Hypercompetition, the persistent struggle for
transient advantage across highly contested domains and competitive
spaces, is a business concept adapted by US Army War College
researchers to describe contemporary great power rivalry.11 It presumes
fortune favors the bold in an environment where no defense-relevant
advantage is permanent. Instead, hypercompetition is acknowledgement
that the persistent pursuit and exploitation of new or regained advantage
will characterize future great power rivalry and conflict.
US adaptation to hypercompetitive great power rivalry started late
and has only recently begun to take root. Most notably over the past
three years, the 2017 National Security Strateg y and NDS 18 offered clear
guidance that the United States should prioritize great power rivalry
in strategy, plans, acquisition, and employment of military capabilities
and methods. A byproduct of the two Trump administration strategies
is official identification of China as the United States’ pacing military
threat.12 Ongoing efforts to refocus the Department of Defense and
its Joint military forces on an aggressive hypercompetitive China are as
appropriate as they are overdue.

Identifying the Problem

The commander of INDOPACOM succinctly described a key
aspect of change in the Indo-Pacific military dynamic during a 2019
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing: “we speak frequently about
the erosion of our advantage . . . which is really the case here. China has

9. See Ashley J. Tellis, “Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific: Testimony:
Senate Armed Services Committee, April 25th, 2017,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace,
n.d.,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/25/protecting-american-primacy-in
-indo-pacific-pub-68754; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China Military Power: Modernizing
a Force to Fight and Win, DIA-02-1706-085 (Washington, DC: DIA, 2019), 2–6, https://www.
dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military
_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf; and James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Five Shades of
Chinese Gray Zone Strategy,” National Interest, May 2, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature
/five-shades-chinese-gray-zone-strategy-20450.
10. See Freier et al., “Game Over”; and Freier, John Schaus, and William Braun, “Prologue,” in
An Army Transformed: INDOPACOM Hypercompetition and U.S. Army Theater Design, ed. Freier, John
Schaus, and William Braun (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, forthcoming).
11. Richard A. D’Aveni and Robert Gunther, Hypercompetition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic
Maneuvering (New York: Free Press, 1994).
12. Department of Defense Budget Posture: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th
Cong. (March 14, 2019) (statement of acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan), https://www
.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Shanahan_03-14-19.pdf.
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seriously eroded that quantitative advantage—the number of assets that
they have—but they’re also eroding that qualitative advantage.”13
Aggregate military capability, however, is only one measure of
relative advantage or disadvantage. If, consistent with NDS 18, the United
States intends to reverse the erosion of military advantage and restore
a favorable military balance in an increasingly volatile INDOPACOM
theater, it needs to address key vulnerabilities in its current Joint Force
theater design across more than aggregate or measurable military assets.
A comprehensive view of theater design includes strategy and operational
concepts; forces and capabilities; footprint and presence; authorities,
permissions, and agreements; and mission command arrangements.
In this more comprehensive view, the United States is dangerously
out of position conceptually and physically, and as a result also out of
position with regard to deployed forces and capabilities for long-term
hypercompetition with China. This reality exacerbates the theater-wide
erosion of advantage. It limits military options available to Joint Force
commanders. It also simplifies the decision-making calculus of Chinese
political and military leadership.

Out of Position Conceptually
NDS 18 and institutional Army strategy both note the importance
of developing and experimenting with innovative operating concepts.14
Though there is some progress, INDOPACOM and its assigned service
components are not yet on a common Joint path that transfers greater risk
to China and imposes costs while lowering US and partner risks.15 China,
on the other hand, pursues its regional interests at US expense through
sweeping military transformation and effective gray-zone campaigning.16
Absent effective US counteraction—starting with a coherent and unified
Joint military approach—China’s aggressive military transformation
and its deliberate gray-zone maneuvering will progressively increase
US risk and limit realistic future US military options.

13. Posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea: Hearing before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th Cong. (February 12, 2019) (statements of Admiral
Philip S. Davidson and General Robert B. Abrams), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov
/hearings/19-02-12-united-states-indo-pacific-command-and-united-states-forces-korea.
14. Mattis, National Defense Strategy, 7; and Mark Esper and Mark A. Milley, The Army Strategy
(Washington, DC: HQDA, October 25, 2018), 8, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7
/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf.
15. Phillip S. Davidson, “Transforming the Joint Force: A Warfighting Concept for
Great Power Competition,” (speech, WEST 2020, San Diego, California, March 3, 2020),
https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/2101115/transfor ming
-the-joint-force-a-warfighting-concept-for-great-power-competition/.
16. See Michael J. Green et al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships:
An Independent Review of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Lanham, MD: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, January 2016), 15–19, http://csis.org/files/publication/160119
_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf; and Kathleen H. Hicks and Joseph P. Frederici,
“Campaigning through China’s Gray Zone Tactics,” in The Struggle for Power: U.S.-China Relations
in the 21st Century, ed. Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute,
2020), 96–104, https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2020/01/TheStruggleForPower
.pdf ?_ga=2.184197153.682513604.1579885138-406713349.1579619482.
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At present there are two Joint warfighting concepts under
development by separate US headquarters or staffs and at least six
independent service-specific operational concepts in various stages of
development. Army multidomain operations is among them. While
all these efforts are potentially value-added, the effect of multiple
uncoordinated and, at times, competing concept development efforts
threatens Joint unity of effort. Further, without strong senior-leader
oversight, new Joint concepts are vulnerable to suboptimal compromise
favoring service interests over emerging Joint operational requirements.

Out of Position Physically
The regional posture of the United States is concentrated in northeast
Asia, predicated on discredited assumptions of military advantage and
positioned for the efficient prosecution of a second Korean war. It is
not a forward posture conducive to effective hypercompetition or—
in extremis—transition to conflict with a hostile China. Substantial
advances in the number and quality of China’s precision-guided
munitions—delivered from land, air, and sea—by themselves may
nullify the deterrent effect of an American military heavily concentrated
on large bases in Japan, Korea, Guam, and the Hawaiian Islands.
Likewise in the event of increased tensions or conflict, China enjoys
strategic depth, internal or heavily protected lines of communication,
and the ability to employ and maneuver critical assets with the benefit
of relative sanctuary. But US and partner forces positioned in theater
are within reach of China’s substantial precision weapons inventory and
would be in immediate danger. Furthermore, US and allied surge and
sustainment forces pushed from the United States and other regions
would be under persistent threat as they attempted to reinforce forwarddeployed forces.17 En route to a conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater,
US and allied forces would have to navigate long, vulnerable lines of
communication at the end of which entry into and maneuver within the
theater would be heavily contested.

Out of Position in Capabilities
US Joint Forces currently lack the capability for the kind of largescale, widely distributed “all-domain” operations essential to give China
pause in escalating regional tensions or to defeat the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) in armed hostilities.18 In particular, power projection
and access, Joint command and control (including secure data and
communications), sustainment, protection, and intratheater movement
and maneuver are challenged by the tyrannies of antiquated posture,
distance, and an increasingly capable PLA.
For the Army specifically, delivery of lethal and nonlethal
multidomain effects and ground combat are favored at the expense of
17. See Mattis, National Defense Strategy.
18. See Davidson, “Transforming the Joint Force”; and Ernest Nisperos, “Joint All Domain
Effects Convergence: Evolving C2 Teams,” Over the Horizon, March 10, 2020, https://othjournal
.com/2020/03/10/joint-all-domain-effects-convergence-evolving-c2-teams/.
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Joint-enabling capabilities essential to an agile and distributed theater
Joint Force.19 According to one observer, the US military is figuring out
how to “shoot” without solving how it “moves” and “communicates.”20
Our research suggests adding protect and sustain to the deficits in
movement and communication as well.

From Strategy to Hypercompetition

The operational demand for more distributed Joint operations
within the INDOPACOM area of operations will expose the folly of
a suboptimized Joint approach, uncoordinated service concepts, and
persistent neglect of the enabling functions upon which successful Joint
operations rely. Continued disadvantages in concepts, physical posture,
and capabilities will increasingly constrain or deny the ability of US Joint
Forces to hypercompete, especially when confronted with escalation
from China.
A new hypercompetitive theater approach that is biased for action
is the most appropriate way ahead. This approach implies transforming
theater design across Joint functions and service components while
actively hypercompeting for and exploiting transient advantages. US Joint
Forces should pursue longer-lead, high-risk, high-reward technological
advancements. They cannot, however, necessarily rely on them for
decisive effect over the near- to midterm. Across the Joint Force, the
earliest wins will likely emerge not from breakthrough technological
change but from innovative and novel operational concepts, task
organization, mission tailoring, and physical posture.
Consistent with NDS 18, a transformed INDOPACOM theater
design should prioritize change to regain the strategic initiative. With
initiative, the Joint Force can expand the competitive space to complicate
rival decision-making and restore and maintain the favorable military
balance.21 A favorable military balance does not connote restoration of
permanent military advantage. Rather it implies the persistent ability to
generate and exploit opportunity faster and with greater impact than can
the pacing rival China.
Initiative, nurtured by deliberate choices in the application of
resources and effort, allows the Joint Force to identify and exploit
hypercompetitive opportunities as they emerge. This initiative starts in
the persistent campaigning that should inevitably occur in the gray space
short of armed conflict. As the Department of Defense works to develop
and consolidate around a new Joint warfighting concept, an essential
component of persistent campaigning is refocusing and repurposing
Joint and service-level priorities to maximize operational and theaterstrategic impact. We suggest the Army is central to such a change.

19. See Esper and Milley, Army Strategy, 1, 2, 6–8.
20. Telephone conversation with a senior military officer responsible for service concept
development in January 2020.
21. Mattis, National Defense Strategy, 4.
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Joint Transformation

Real Joint transformation in INDOPACOM can come when
one service embraces the job of enabling Joint multi- or all-domain
operations. This transformation is the Army’s greatest value proposition
in the INDOPACOM theater over the next decade as it relates to the
US-China rivalry. Toward this end, the Army can contribute most
effectively to a transformed Joint theater design by adopting four
transformational roles:
•• the Army as the grid
•• the Army as the enabler
•• the Army as the multidomain warfighter
•• the Army as the capability and capacity generator 22
The Army as the grid sees an Army-led establishment of a distributed,
resilient, and mutually reinforcing theater network of expeditionary
clusters, hubs, and nodes as the foundation for Joint multidomain
operations. The core purpose of the grid is to expand the competitive
space, creating options for Joint Force commanders, ultimately, enabling
effective Joint multidomain maneuver.
The Army as the enabler calls for a Joint-focused Army
transformation specific to INDOPACOM in mission command,
sustainment, protection, movement, and intelligence (and information)
to animate the grid. This transformation requires a persistent small-unit,
multifunctional Army presence prepared to activate clusters, hubs, and
nodes to meet Joint operational demands. It further requires missiontailored Army forces to task organize and operate in distributed fashion
well below the brigade level.
The Army as the multidomain warfighter sees the Army-led fielding
of a land-based, multidomain warfighting capability with theaterwide presence and reach in concert with sister services and foreign
partners. Army and sister service multidomain capabilities and concepts
should be inspired by and integrated into a unified Joint multidomain
theater concept.
The Army as the capability and capacity generator leverages a
significant asymmetric US advantage—a strong network of regional
allies and partners—to enhance traditional ground-force competencies
and expand complementary multidomain capability. In this regard, Army
forces—within a unified Joint concept—can be a catalyst for fielding a
combined land-based, multidomain warfighting network that draws on
the unique strengths and competencies of US partners.
The Army is currently focused on its roles of multidomain warfighter
and capability and capacity generator in INDOPACOM.23 The roles of

22. Freier et al., An Army Transformed.
23. Ryan McCarthy, “The Army’s Strategy in the Indo-Pacific,” (remarks, Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, January 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01
/fp_20200110_army_indopacific_transcript.pdf.
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grid and enabler will be more difficult to adopt and socialize—though
they are likely most important for the Army and the Joint Force in longterm hypercompetition with China. Only the Army can underwrite
effective Joint Force operations theater-wide operating at the scale
needed across the expanse of the Indo-Pacific region in the functions of
mission command, protection, sustainment, movement, and intelligence
(and information).

Conclusion

Thriving in hypercompetition first requires the United States to
recognize and commit to engaging in it. A hypercompetitive US approach
to INDOPACOM requires agile, disruptive, and mutually reinforcing
Joint and Service theater designs. This point is not lost on China, but
it remains conspicuously underdeveloped in US strategic calculations.
The Army is currently well positioned to take the first steps in inspiring
essential Joint transformation by creating a flexible, scalable, and dynamic
theater design biased first for distributed Joint theater enabling. This
bias also implies commitment to establishing the physical grid essential
to the enabling function. The grid and enabling functions combined will
require innovative reconfiguration and employment of Army mission
command, protection, sustainment, movement, and intelligence (and
information) capabilities. As it becomes a reality, transformed Army
theater design should help signal enduring US commitment to the
region, expand options available to Joint Force commanders, and help
them complicate rival planning and decision-making.
Success cannot be the result of good fortune or providence in
INDOPACOM.24 Rather it must rely on transformational change in Joint
and combined warfighting and the service concepts supporting them.
The window of opportunity to make bold transformational change will
not be open long and will be difficult to negotiate.
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Future Warfare: Weaponizing
Critical Infrastructure
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ABSTRACT: Adversaries are actively targeting US and NATO critical
infrastructure, particularly energy, transportation, information,
communications, and the defense industrial base sectors to
undermine military capability, readiness, and force projection. In
some cases, adversaries are penetrating the critical infrastructure of
the United States and our allies to identify vulnerabilities for later
exploitation, and in others critical infrastructure is being weaponized
by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as a form of hybrid warfare.

T

he West’s adversaries are using critical infrastructure (CI) as a
weapon of choice in three domains.1 First, Russia has weaponized
CI in Ukraine as a testing ground for the development of larger
hybrid warfare capabilities against the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.2 Second, Russia and other adversaries have
penetrated the US energy sector, particularly the US electric grid, as a
means to undermine future US warfighting capabilities. Third, China has
conducted strategic penetration of key critical infrastructure segments
of American and European defense industrial bases. The US military
and NATO have redressed these threats by investing in infrastructure
resiliency based on organizational and mission capacity-building and
public-private sector cooperation.

Russian Hybrid Warfare against Ukraine

The linkage between critical infrastructure as an instrument of
hybrid warfare has been on open display in Georgia and the Ukraine
where a Russian cyberarmy, closely affiliated with the Kremlin, has
systematically attacked almost every sector of Ukraine’s infrastructure
for the past five years.3 The most notable attacks included one against
Ukraine’s electric grid in December 2015, which left large parts of the
capital city, Kiev, and the western region of Ivano-Frankivsk in the dark,
and another, more technologically sophisticated attack in 2016 on one
of Kiev’s transmission substations. These attacks were set against the

1. This article is drawn from a larger publication by the author. Carol V. Evans, “The Economic
Drivers Reshaping the International Security Landscape,” in A Changing World Order? Implications
for the Security Environment, ed. William G. Braun, Stéfanie von Hlatky, and Kim Richard Nossal
(Kingston, ON: Centre for International and Defense Policy, 2020).
2. Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar,” Wired,
June 20, 2017, https://wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/.
3. Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,”
Wired, March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack
-ukraines-power-grid/.
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backdrop of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continued
military clashes in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Ukraine.
Governments and cyberexperts attribute these cyberattacks to a
Russian group known as Sandworm, which deployed its BlackEnergy
malware to penetrate specialized computer architectures used for
remotely managing physical industrial equipment and control systems.
What most worried these cyberexperts was Sandworm had already
targeted NATO networks and had compromised the computers of
American and European electric and water utility companies with the
same Trojan malware. This malware provided hackers with enough
control to induce blackouts on American soil. As one cyberforensic
expert forewarned: “An adversary that had already targeted American
energy utilities had crossed the line and taken down a power grid [in the
Ukraine]. It was an imminent threat to the United States.” 4
The repeated cyberattacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure as
part of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy serve Russian interests in several
ways. This campaign is designed to keep Ukraine in Russia’s continued
orbit by thwarting Kiev’s aims of integration with the European Union.
Critical energy infrastructure as a tool of Russian coercion is certainly
not lost on NATO and the EU. Since 2006, Russia’s Gazprom has
repeatedly halted gas supplies in the midst of winter to Ukraine—a
vital transshipment country with pipelines to Europe—over disputes
on gas pricing.
The upshot is European countries, particularly Germany, and
NATO writ large are attuned to the vulnerabilities associated with their
dependency on Russian gas and oil supplies. Europe could not survive
30 days without Russian gas in the winter, and its vulnerabilities will only
increase with Nord Stream coming online. Certain NATO countries
such as Germany are more dependent on Russian energy supplies,
leading President Trump at the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels to
tweet, “What good is NATO if Germany is paying Russia billions of
dollars for gas and energy?”5
Another rationale for Russian CI attacks in Ukraine is to test,
prove, and refine Moscow’s cyberwarfare capabilities against a country
unable to retaliate—in essence, use Ukraine as a test bed for Russian
hybrid warfare in future global conflicts, including with the United
States. By turning the power off in Kiev, Moscow is both signaling
and demonstrating to Washington its ability and willingness to
weaponize critical infrastructure to challenge America’s military might
at home and overseas.

4. Andy Greenberg, Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous
Hackers (New York: Doubleday, 2019), 53.
5. Donald Trump (@Donald Trump), “What good is NATO if Germany is paying Russia
billions of dollars for gas and energy?” Twitter, July 11, 2018, 10:07AM, https://twitter.com
/realdonaldtrump/status/1017093020783710209?lang=en.
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Russian Penetration of the US Energy Sector

In March 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Homeland Security confirmed Russian government
hacker teams had actively “targeted government entities and multiple
U.S. CI sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water,
aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.”6 The Russian cyberattack
teams included Sandworm, Dragonfly, and Palmetto Fusion, with some
attributed with gaining remote access to actual industrial control systems
and US energy sector networks including a Kansas nuclear power facility.7
Cyberattacks against the US power grid have continued. The group
Triton or Xenotime has compromised electric facility safety systems in
order to cause potential plant disruption and damage. According to a
researcher at the US cybersecurity firm Dragos, surveillance of the US
electric grid is “indicative of the preliminary actions required to set up
for a future intrusion and potentially a future attack.”8
Penetration of the US electric grid has sounded alarm bells in the
Pentagon. Department of Defense (DoD) installations and associated
infrastructure depend on continuous and assured power to support
missions and operations at home and abroad, and any extended loss of
power has been acknowledged as a glaring national security Achilles’
heel. America must expect our adversaries to disrupt the flow of power
with cascading impacts on transportation, communications, and other
critical infrastructure services upon which the US military depends.
After all, for decades the former Soviet Union carefully studied the
US homeland and its warfighting infrastructure for infiltration and
targeting purposes.
The game changer for today, however, is that with cyberspace and
the merging of CI with information and communications technologies,
our adversaries no longer require kinetic solutions and direct military
confrontation with the United States. Rather as one senior DoD official
conceded, “the smart thing to do is to maneuver around those forces,
attack the critical infrastructure, the facilities here in the United States
on which we depend to deploy, operate and sustain our forces abroad.”9
The willingness and ability of our adversaries to deploy destructive
cyberweapons in future warfare with the United States has immense
national security implications. Of immediate concern is the threat to
deterrence and intrinsic force projection capabilities—“it does not
matter how capable, how well trained or how advanced a nation’s forces
6. Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), US Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), “Alert TA18-074A: Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical
Infrastructure Sectors,” DHS, March 15, 2018, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A.
7. John Kennedy, “US Officially Blames Russia’s ‘Dragonfly’ Hackers for Attacks on
Energy Grid,” Silicon Republic, March 26, 2018, https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise
/dragonfly-us-russia-energy-grid-hackers.
8. Andy Greenberg, “The Highly Dangerous ‘Triton’ Hackers Have Probed the US Grid,”
Wired, June 14, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/triton-hackers-scan-us-power-grid/.
9. Paul Stockton cited in Cynthia E. Ayers and Kenneth D. Chrosniak, Terminal Blackout: Critical
Electric Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Civil-Military Resiliency, Issue Paper 1-13 (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
US Army War College, October 2013), CSL-5.
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are if they can’t get to the front in time.”10 The deliberate targeting of
civilian infrastructure has larger security and ethical implications which
have yet to be addressed fully.11

Chinese Investments in the United States and Europe

“China, in particular, has made it a national goal to acquire foreign
technologies to advance its economy and to modernize its military. . . . It
is comprehensively targeting advanced US technologies and the people,
the information, businesses and research institutions that underpin
them.”12 To achieve this national goal, China has used an effective
combination of industrial, trade, and investment policies.
Initiated in 2015, Beijing’s Made in China 2025 industrial policy
directs Chinese technological development in important dual-use
areas: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, aerospace,
autonomous and new energy vehicles, communications, and other
emerging industries. China analysts have focused largely on the
government’s illicit means to acquire these technologies through
espionage, cyberoperations, evasion of US export control restrictions,
and through coercive intellectual property sharing requirements for
foreign companies investing in the Chinese market. Less attention has
been paid to Beijing’s “Go Out” strategy of promoting Chinese stateowned and private sector champions to invest overseas, particularly in
the United States and Europe, in key defense industrial base sectors.
Outward foreign investments and acquisitions have been assisted by
Beijing-backed investment vehicles, such as the China Investment
Corporation and massive sovereign wealth funds.13
This inattention changed dramatically with the recent bid by Chinese
tech giant Huawei to provide 5G information and communications
technology networks in the United States and Europe. The case of Huawei
poses a number of concerns for the security of the defense industry base
in the United States and Europe. For example: Should the United States
and Europe be dependent on China to provide a key, dual-use defense
industry base infrastructure? Through its control of the world’s wireless
and telecommunications backbone, will the Chinese government use
5G as a Trojan horse for commercial and military espionage and hybrid
warfare purposes?

10. Omar Lamrani, “Why Logistics Will Be the Key to Any U.S. Conflict with Russia and
China,” Worldview, Stratfor, December 17, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why
-logistics-will-be-key-any-us-conflict-russia-and-china/.
11. Fritz Allhoff, Adam Henschke, and Bradley Jay Strawser, eds., Binary Bullets: The Ethics of
Cyberwarfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
12. Military Technology Transfer: Threats, Impacts, and Solutions for the Department of Defense:
Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. (June 21, 2018) (statement of Kari
A. Bingen, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence), https://armedservices.house.gov
/hearings?ID=FAC043FA-B7E9-4E08-A2A7-226F7DA5D8F8.63.
13. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression
Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World (Washington, DC: White
House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, June 2018).
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The response by the Trump administration to Huawei has been
swift and decisive. It has banned Huawei from all federal contracts
for telecommunications equipment and services, and US government
contractors are prohibited from doing business with Huawei as well.14
The US Department of Justice filed formal charges of fraud, obstruction
of justice, and theft of trade secrets against Huawei in January 2019.
Additionally, the administration has exerted considerable pressure on its
partners within the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to ban Huawei from
their respective markets.
Concerned about the larger implications of Chinese investments
and other adversarial activities involving the US defense industry base
infrastructure, Congress passed the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 as part of the larger National Defense
Authorization Act of 2019. This legislation expands the powers of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to prevent foreign
adversaries from gaining control of defense industrial infrastructure
assets.15 That same year, the Trump administration issued Executive
Order 13806, which mandated an assessment of US defense industry
base. This assessment concluded, “all facets of the manufacturing
and defense industrial base are currently under threat, at a time when
strategic competitors and revisionist powers appear to be growing in
strength and capability.”16
European countries have been slow to recognize the potential
security vulnerabilities and dependencies created by Chinese investments
in infrastructure. China has launched the 17+1 Initiative, a forum under
Beijing’s larger Belt and Road Initiative, that includes 12 EU member
states and five Balkan countries and provides major infrastructure loans
for the construction of high-speed rail networks, port infrastructure,
communications, bridges, and highways. Chinese companies have
acquired shipping terminals in Spain, Italy, and Belgium. Major Chinese
port infrastructure projects include the Italian ports of Trieste, Venice,
and Ravenna, as well as the Greek port of Piraeus, Koper in Slovenia,
and Fiume in Croatia. In October 2019, Germany’s Chancellor Angela
Merkel allowed Huawei and ZTE (also Chinese-owned) greater market
access into this key NATO ally’s 5G networks. This decision has multiple
international security implications—it threatens NATO security and

14. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L.
No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018); and US Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
Protecting against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through FCC Programs,
FCC 19-121 (Washington, DC: FCC, November 26, 2019), https://www.fcc.gov/document
/protecting-national-security-through-fcc-programs-0.
15. Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1701(c).
16. US Government Interagency Task Force, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and
Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States: Report to President Donald J. Trump
by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806 (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense [DoD], September 2018), 8.
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the operations of the US military presence based in Germany, and it
contravenes US intelligence warnings.17
Chinese involvement in key infrastructure projects in Europe has
garnered increasing concern by NATO regarding Beijing’s intentions
and the need for a shared Allied policy on China. On the occasion
of NATO’s 70th anniversary meeting in London in December 2019,
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned: “What we see is that the
rising power of China is shifting the global balance of power. . . . We
have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing
heavily in infrastructure. . . . So, of course, this has some consequences
for NATO.”18
A recent NATO report was more direct in identifying the potential
consequences of the penetration of defense industry base infrastructure
by adversaries on NATO security. “The degree and impact of foreign
direct investment in strategic sectors—such as airports, sea ports, energy
production and distribution, or telecoms—in some Allied nations raises
questions about whether access and control over such infrastructure
can be maintained, particularly in crisis when it would be required to
support the military.”19
As with issues of energy security, NATO is grappling with dependency
on European host-country infrastructure and the vulnerabilities this
poses for logistics, secure communications, and other requirements to
enable mobilization, force projection, and sustainment.
Arguably, Chinese Belt and Road Initiative investments in Europe
are part of a deliberate strategy by Beijing to target economically weaker
NATO members to draw them into China’s orbit. Indeed, this strategy
appears to be having some success. Hungary and Greece sought to block
any direct reference to China in an EU statement regarding the ruling
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that struck down
the People’s Republic of China’s legal claims in the South China Sea.20
Sounding the alarm over the long-term implications of European
Belt and Road Initiative investments on EU unity, Germany’s foreign
minister forewarned, “if we do not succeed for example in developing
a single strategy towards China, then China will succeed in dividing
Europe.”21 Incremental progress has been made recently with a new
17. John R. Deni, “Germany’s Refusal to Ban China’s Huawei from 5G is Dangerous
for the West,” Newsweek, October 30, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/germanys-refusal
-ban-chinas-huawei-5g-dangerous-west-opinion-1468520.
18. Holly Ellyatt, “China is ‘Coming Closer’ but We Don’t Want a New Adversary, NATO
Chief Says,” CNBC, December 2, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/02/jens-stoltenberg
-rising-power-china-must-be-addressed-by-nato.html.
19. Wolf-Diether Roepke and Hasit Thankey, “Resilience: The First Line of Defense,” NATO
Review, February 27, 2019, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/27/resilience-the
-first-line-of-defence/index.html.
20. Erik Brattberg and Etienne Soula, “Europe’s Emerging Approach to
China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October 19, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/19
/europe-s-emerging-approach-to-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-pub-77536.
21. Lucrezia Poggetti cited in Peter Frankopan, The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the
World (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2019), 172.
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EU regulation establishing a framework for screening foreign direct
investments in critical infrastructure and technologies. This new
regulation is due to come into full effect in November 2020.22

Redressing CI Vulnerabilities

Beginning in 2005, the DoD initiated an enterprise-wide Defense
Critical Infrastructure Program which focused on identifying key defense
infrastructure assets and developing guidelines and procedures for their
protection.23 With the launch in 2012 of the Department’s Mission
Assurance Strategy, the focus shifted from protecting defense critical
assets toward strengthening the resiliency of DoD missions. Mission Assurance
is “a process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience
of capabilities and assets—including personnel, equipment, facilities,
networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and
supply chains—critical to the performance of DoD MEFS [mission
essential functions] in any operating environment or condition.”24
Recognizing over 90 percent of US infrastructure resides in
the private sector, the Mission Assurance Strategy also called for
strengthening DoD partnerships with those commercial infrastructure
owners and operators. The strategy has been augmented by other
policy directives that require and provide all services, departments,
and agencies with guidelines for identifying, assessing, managing, and
monitoring risks to strategic missions.25
In contrast to the deliberate process of the US military, NATO
has taken a less structured approach to redress critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities. Its initial efforts focused on building organizational
capacity with the establishment of NATO Centres of Excellence (COE)
to support CI protection: Defense Against Terrorism-COE (Turkey),
Cooperative Cyber Defense-COE (Estonia), Energy Security-COE
(Lithuania). These centers have been bolstered by the work of the
European COE for Countering Hybrid Threats (Finland).
The targeting of civilian infrastructure as part of Russia’s hybrid
warfare in Ukraine further spurred NATO efforts, in cooperation with
the EU, to enhance critical infrastructure resiliency through developing
baseline requirements for measuring and improving civil preparedness.26
Additional mitigation measures include the deployment of cyber and
hybrid warfare support teams, enhanced information-sharing with
22. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European
Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The European Council and
the Council: EU-China—A Strategic Outlook,” European Commission, March 12, 2019, https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.
pdf.
23. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Defense Critical Infrastructure Program,
DoD Directive (DODD) 3020.40 (Washington, DC: DoD, August 19, 2005); and Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) (OUSD[P]), Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP)
Management, DoD Instruction 3020.45 (Washington, DC: OUSD(P), April 21, 2008).
24. OUSD(P), Mission Assurance Strategy (Washington, DC: DoD, April 12, 2012), 1, https://
policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/MA_Strategy_Final_7May12.pdf.
25. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Critical Infrastructure Program.
26. Roepke and Thankey, “First Line of Defense.”
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the EU and the private sector, and the integration of energy and
cyberinfrastructure requirements within NATO exercises—Locked
Shields 2018—and war games.

Conclusion

The use of critical infrastructure as a weapon by our adversaries has
received little attention in international security circles. As discussed
previously, CI can be used as an instrument of hybrid warfare among
weaker states such as Ukraine and against superpowers such as the United
States. Whether through the use of cyberattacks against a country’s
infrastructure, or more covertly through surveillance and penetration,
or via acquisitions and direct foreign investment, targeting of critical
infrastructure enables our adversaries to shape and control vital defense
industry base infrastructure upon which US and NATO militaries rely.
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ABSTRACT: Political and professional oath-takers are obliged to
abide by their oaths. But their understanding of this obligation
and the associated civil-military relations norms is uneven. This
article distinguishes between political and professional oath-takers
and examines how each should fulfill its obligations to uphold
the Constitution.

L

ieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, in his opening statement
during the House impeachment hearings, said, “I am a patriot,
and it is my sacred duty and honor to advance and defend
OUR country, irrespective of party or politics.”1 While the military
institution has been increasingly caught up in the political upheaval
surrounding the Trump administration, civilian control of the military
and the expectation that the military institution will remain apolitical
are the principal democratic civil-military relations norms that have
been prevalent in the literature.2 The question must be posed, however,
Is participating in acts in support of democratic institutions and the
constitutional process a violation of the nonpartisan professional
military norm, or do such activities constitute patriotic behavior
essential to upholding a military member’s obligation to support and
defend the Constitution?
In response, this article maintains military officers who testify
against the commander in chief in settings such as an impeachment
hearing do not violate the apolitical professional norm even if the
president explicitly prohibits such testimony. In fact, officers who
appear on the basis of legal congressional subpoenas uphold their oaths
to support and defend the Constitution and preserve the constitutional
powers of their second and coequal civilian master, Congress. Such
nonpartisan actions support the checks and balances fundamental
to the American democratic process, essential to the preservation of
democratic institutions.

1. Alexander S. Vindman, “Opening Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman
Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the House Committee on Oversight and Reform,” New York Times, October
29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/29/us/politics/vindman-statement
-impeachment.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage.
2. See Marybeth Ulrich, “Civil-Military Relations Norms and Democracy: What Every Citizen
Should Know,” in Blurred Lines: Examining Civil-Military Relations in an Increasingly Complex World, ed.
Lionel Beehner and Charles Jacoby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
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Constitutional Foundations

America’s founders authored a blueprint for a political system
Edward Corwin famously stated was “an invitation to struggle.”3 The
distribution of power across the presidency, Congress, and the judiciary
ensured the specific and separate powers of one branch could be
deployed to curb the excesses of another.4 The Constitution established
a process through which ideas and policy proposals would be vigorously
examined and debated. Various actors in any given debate might disagree
on the substance of policy proposals, but the democratic process within
which the debates occurred was not to have become a matter of debate.
It is this process to which military members and federal office holders
take an oath to:
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well
and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to
enter. So help me God.5

Loyalty oaths were part of early American political culture. The
colonists were accustomed to taking oaths pledging loyalty to the
monarch. Consequently, it is not surprising the Founders incorporated
oaths into the Constitution as an additional tool to safeguard democratic
institutions. Article 2 of the Constitution requires the president to take
an oath of office, and Article 6 requires members of Congress, the
federal judiciary, and officers of state legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government to take oaths. With regard to the military, oaths
had always been required at the time of enlistment in the Continental
Army, but in 1789 the first Congress legislated specific text swearing
to uphold the Constitution, swearing allegiance to the United States
of America, and swearing to obey the orders of the president and the
laws of Congress.6
Supporting and defending the Constitution means members of the
military have pledged to protect democratic institutions and the individual
freedoms of their fellow citizens enshrined in the Constitution.7 The
Founders laid out a civil-military order subjecting the military to two
civilian masters—the president and Congress. Their loyalty is not to an
3. John T. Rourke and Russell Farnen, “War, Presidents, and the Constitution,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 18, no. 3 (Summer 1988), https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574496
?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
4. Marybeth P. Ulrich, “National Security Powers: Are the Checks in Balance?” in U.S. Army
War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 5th ed., ed.
J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, June 2012).
5. US Air Force Profession of Arms Center of Excellence, The Officer’s Oath of Office, n.d.,
https://www.airman.af.mil/Portals/17/002%20All%20Products/006%20Trifolds/Oath
_Pamphlet_for_Officer.pdf ?ver=2015-12-22-113949-437.
6. “227 Years of Military Oaths to ‘Support and Defend the Constitution,’” Sextant (blog),
September 17, 2014, http://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/2014/09/17/227-years-of-military
-oaths-to-support-and-defend-the-constitution/.
7. Marybeth P. Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed
Forces (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 8.
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individual leader or even the state but to a particular form of democratic
government, or rules of the game, which the Constitution established.
Consequently, participating in any action that undermines constitutional
norms violates the oath of commissioning, the oath of federal office
holders, and the trust inherent in the civil-military bargain between the
military, the political leadership, and the people.
Loyalty oaths were the only normative tool inserted into the
Founders’ democratic playbook. They are an important component of
the civil-military norms derived from traditions and practices developed
over time to supplement and reinforce the constitutional rules explicitly
stated in the Constitution.8 The Founders’ emphasis on employing
tools like oaths to instill loyalty to democratic processes underlines
their understanding that constitutional rules may go unheeded without
socializing key actors to adhere to them.

The Impeachment Inquiry

In fall 2019, the United States House of Representatives investigated
allegations President Donald Trump made the provision of military
aid to Ukraine contingent on the Ukrainian government announcing
it was investigating his chief political rival, former vice president and
presidential candidate Joe Biden.9 Many members of the administration
complied with the president’s wishes to refrain from cooperating in the
impeachment inquiry, but several key actors obliged Congress’ request
citing their “duty” to appear.10 These impeachment proceedings are
an important case study when evaluating the responses of members of
the government in support of the inquiry, with a focus on the varied
understanding of professional obligation and democratic norms of
former and active military officers caught up in the inquiry. To facilitate
this comparison, it is necessary to distinguish between political and
professional oath-takers.

Political vs. Professional Oath-Takers

Political oath-takers are political actors elected to their offices or
appointed by elected officials to pursue a particular policy agenda. The
president, political appointees in the administration, and members of
Congress are examples of political oath-takers. Professional oath-takers
hold their positions regardless of the political party in power. In the
realm of policy development and implementation, military actors, as
professional oath-takers, provide nonpartisan subject matter expertise
and institutional know-how to political actors. Indeed, civil-military
relations theory argues military actors’ professional status stems from

8. See also Ulrich, “Civil-Military Relations.”
9. See also The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry Report, Report of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Pursuant to H.Res. 660, in Consultation with the House Committee on Oversight and
Reform and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 116th Cong. (December 2019), https://intelligence
.house.gov/uploadedfiles/the_trump-ukraine_impeachment_inquiry_report.pdf.
10. “User Clip: John McLaughlin: Thank God for the Deep State,” from U.S. Intelligence and
Election Security, aired October 30, 2019, on C-SPAN2, https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4826847
/user-clip-john-mclaughlin-god-deep-state.
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political actors’ reliance on their uniquely acquired military expertise.
Regardless of affiliation professional oath-takers are required to
remain nonpartisan in the performance of their duties. This apolitical
ethic serves as a sort of shield protecting the professional oath-takers
from allegations their motives are self-serving, political, or in some
way unpatriotic.
Military actors have a privileged voice in the national discourse
because of their perceived unique expertise and the elevated status of
the military institution in society.11 Polls in recent years have consistently
placed the military atop American institutions in terms of public trust.12
The military’s status as the most trusted national institution stems
at least in part from the public’s perception of its apolitical nature.13
Scholars have warned politicization and loss of institutional trust go
hand in hand.14 The Ukraine scandal has also highlighted that the public
notices when officials who leverage their military experience to gain
political offices commit ethical lapses, indicating the public expects
more of former professional oath-takers.15

Professional Oath-Takers

The Ukraine scandal revealed a political climate where political
oath-takers were caught up in the polarization of the times, which limited
the objective functioning of the checks and balances so fundamental
to American democracy. The scandal also highlighted the role oaths
played in motivating some participants to adhere to professional norms
developed in their experience as national security professionals. The
next section presents the examples of a former military officer and an
active military officer who honored their oaths while participating in the
impeachment inquiry.

Ambassador William Taylor
William Taylor graduated from West Point in 1969 and went to war
as an infantry officer in the 101st Airborne Division. He remained in
government service for the next 50 years as a military officer, Department
of Energy employee, Senate staffer, and Foreign Service Officer. A
diplomat at the center of the Ukraine inquiry, his media profiles invariably
include the term “patriot” and link his military service to his integrity
11. Risa A. Brooks, “Perils of Politics: Why Staying Apolitical Is Good for Both the U.S. Military
& the Country,” Orbis 57, no. 3 (Summer 2013).
12. “Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup Poll, accessed April 20, 2020, https://news.gallup
.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.
13. Leo Shane III, “Survey: Public Confidence in the Military Is High, Especially among
Older Generations,” Military Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon
-congress/2019/07/22/survey-public-confidence-in-the-military-is-high-especially-among-older
-generations/.
14. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Increasingly Dangerous Politicization of
the U.S. Military,” War on the Rocks, June 18, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/06
/the-increasingly-dangerous-,politicization-of-the-u-s-military/.
15. Scott Simon, “Opinion: Did Secretary Pompeo Forget his West Point Pledge?” Weekend
Edition, National Public Radio, October 5, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/05/767383696
/opinion-did-secretary-pompeo-forget-his-west-point-pledge.
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and commitment to American ideals.16 Taylor retired from the Foreign
Service and was working as executive vice president of the United States
Institute of Peace when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tapped him to
come out of retirement to take the top diplomatic post in Kiev, Ukraine,
a position previously held by Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch. (He
previously served as ambassador to Ukraine from 2006–9.) Both were
political appointments making him a political oath-taker more recently,
but a professional oath-taker formerly.
Taylor testified before the House impeachment inquiry despite
White House orders not to cooperate. His opening statement made
his motivation clear. Taylor was concerned the strategically important
US-Ukraine relationship “was being fundamentally undermined by an
irregular, informal channel of US policy-making and by the withholding
of vital security assistance for domestic political reasons.”17 Timothy
O’Brien of Bloomberg News opined that Taylor put his career on the line
and defied White House orders not to cooperate because he thought
members of the administration were undermining the national interest.
O’Brien wrote Taylor’s testimony stood apart from others in the
administration who were:
opportunists . . . perverting the wheels of government to feather their
own nests. Taylor is a person of purpose, integrity and decency, and his
testimony before legislators exploring impeachment has been one of the
most devastating and consequential episodes of the Trump presidency.18

Former Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns told the New York
Times: “Ambassador Bill Taylor is a person of integrity with a strong,
ethical base. I would also describe him as a true patriot. His entire
professional life has been in service to the U.S.”19 Burns’ comments track
with the sort of deference professional oath-takers earn from a career
of staying true to their oaths. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, US
Army retired, a former ambassador to Afghanistan, added: “Ambassador
Taylor represents the best of our Department of State. His integrity and
courage are the true marks of patriotism, loyal to an oath of office and
never to be corrupted or intimidated by those seeking personal gain at
our Nation’s expense.”20

16. Michael Crowley, “William Taylor, ‘Model’ Diplomat, Is at Center of Impeachment
Inquiry,” New York Times, October 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/us/politics
/william-b-taylor-diplomat.html.
17. William B. Taylor, “Opening Statement of Ambassador William B. Taylor, October
22, 2019,” Washington Post, October 23, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/context
/opening-statement-of-ambassador-william-b-taylor/6b3a6edf-f976-4081-ba7f-bce45468a3ff/.
18. Timothy O’Brien, “A True Public Servant Deals Trump a Crushing Blow: William Taylor
Demonstrates How to Stand Up for Integrity and National Purpose,” Bloomberg News, October
23, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-23/bill-taylor-s-testimony-deals
-trump-a-crushing-impeachment-blow.
19. O’Brien, “True Public Servant.”
20. Jake Tapper and Kate Sullivan, “Bill Taylor, Now Dodging Trump Attacks, Defended as a
‘Man of Honor’ by Three Veterans Who Served With Him,” CNN, October 27, 2019, https://www
.cnn.com/2019/10/27/politics/bill-taylor-vietnam-bob-seitz-robert-st-onge/index.html.
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Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman
Commissioned in 1999 as an Army infantry officer, Vindman is a
combat veteran who was wounded in Iraq in 2004. He subsequently
became a Eurasian foreign area officer and was assigned to the National
Security Council staff.21 Like Ambassador Taylor, his testimony focused
on US interests and the impropriety he witnessed as the senior National
Security Council Ukraine expert on the presidential call in question.
“I was concerned by the call. . . . I did not think it was proper to
demand that a foreign government investigate a U.S. citizen, and I was
worried about the implications for the U.S. government’s support of
Ukraine.”22 His credentials as a professional oath-taker were evident in
his opening statement.
I have a deep appreciation for American values and ideals and the power of
freedom. I am a patriot, and it is my sacred duty and honor to advance and
defend OUR country, irrespective of party or politics. For over twenty years
as an active duty United States military officer and diplomat, I have served this
country in a nonpartisan manner, and have done so with the utmost respect
and professionalism for both Republican and Democratic administrations.23

Vindman’s actions were particularly courageous because he is still an
active duty Army officer. He came forward knowing he would implicate
the president, his commander in chief, in wrongdoing.
Yet some questioned his patriotism and adherence to civil-military
relations norms. An active duty officer stationed at the Pentagon likened
Vindman’s appearance before the committee in uniform to “the Army
pushing a coup.”24 A veteran who is a lawyer writing for the Federalist
website characterized Vindman’s decision to testify in uniform as
a “partisan move” akin to attending a political rally in uniform in
violation of civil-military relations principles.25 His testimony was also
criticized as “open insubordination” for questioning the commander in
chief.26 Some even challenged his loyalty to the United States due to his
immigrant status.27
21. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Meet Alexander Vindman, the Colonel Who Testified on Trump’s
Phone Call,” New York Times, October 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/us
/politics/who-is-alexander-vindman.html.
22. “Read Alexander Vindman’s full opening statement on Trump and
Ukraine,”
PBS,
October
28,
2019,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics
/read-alexander-vindmans-full-opening-statement-on-trump-and-ukraine.
23. Opening Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman Before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the House Committee on Oversight and
Reform October 29, 2019, in “Statement on Trump and Ukraine.”
24. Russ Read, “‘Pushing a Coup’: Fellow Soldiers Slam Vindman for Testifying in Uniform,”
Washington Examiner, November 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense
-national-security/a-bad-look-vindmans-testimony-while-in-uniform-divides-military-community.
25. John Lucas, “Alexander Vindman’s Impeachment Testimony Displays his Open
Insubordination,” The Federalist, November 22, 2019, https://thefederalist.com/2019/11/22
/alexander-vindmans-impeachment-testimony-displays-his-open-insubordination/.
26. Lucas, “Vindman’s Impeachment Testimony.”
27. David Leonhardt, “Who Alexander Vindman Really Is: ‘A Great American Patriot,’”
New York Times, October 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/opinion/alexander
-vindman-trump-ukraine.html.

TOC

Geostrategic Forecasting

Ulrich

49

Such criticism failed to acknowledge Vindman’s accountability to
Congress to respond to lawful subpoenas and to offer testimony as a
fact witness. In addition, his advice as a professional military expert on
national security processes and policies in question was also relevant.
Indeed, as a military professional, he had a professional responsibility
to share expert knowledge that would enable members of Congress to
make political judgments that were theirs uniquely to make. Vindman
also acted to preserve the office of the president by supporting Congress’
constitutional remedy to hold individuals who abuse the office
accountable through the impeachment power.
Other observers lauded Vindman’s decision to testify before the
House impeachment inquiry citing the unique professional ethic of
military oath-takers. Former assistant secretary of defense Evelyn
Farkas noted: “Military officers stress the duty to speak out and report
up the chain if they see something awry. This is something that we don’t
drill into civilians. But in the military they are not expected to resign
but to speak up the chain.”28 Tiana Lowe of the Washington Examiner
wrote, “it shouldn’t have to be said, but Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, the
National Security Council officer testifying in the House impeachment
proceeding, is a great American patriot.”29

Conclusion

This article has has discussed the need for new norms in civilmilitary relations theory, obligating citizens entrusted with positions of
national responsibility to uphold oaths they take to the Constitution of
the United States. The case considered—the Ukraine scandal and the
subsequent impeachment inquiry—simply asked, to what extent does
the traditional apolitical civil-military relations norm require or forbid
the involvement of military officers in such activities as testifying in an
impeachment hearing?
Exploration of constitutional foundations and civil-military norms
found that appearing before congressional committees carrying out
their constitutional powers of impeachment does not violate civilmilitary relations norms. On the contrary, such acts are consistent with
the primary civil-military norm of professional militaries to remain
subordinate to civilian control, in this case the control of Congress using
its constitutional power of impeachment to investigate the president.
Such acts preserve the powers of Congress and protect the office of the
president from office-holders who might abuse their power. Professional
oath-takers commit themselves to putting America first in terms of
preserving its democratic institutions. Political oath-takers take the
same oath. But in the current political climate many value their partisan

28. MSNBC, “Army Officer Who Heard Trump’s Ukraine Call Voiced His Concerns to
Superiors,” The Last Word with Lawrence O’Donnell, MSNBC, October 28, 2019, https://www.msnbc
.com/the-last-word/watch/army-officer-who-heard-trump-s-ukraine-call-voiced-his-concerns-to
-superiors-72223301604.
29. Tiana Lowe, “Vindman is a Patriot, Not a Ukrainian Spy,” Washington Examiner, October 29,
2019, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/vindman-is-a-patriot-not-a-ukrainian-spy.
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identification over their oaths. Their fellow citizens are taking note; many
are grateful, but others are critical due to a narrower understanding of
democratic and civil-military relations norms.
Effective practices may include better socialization into the
meaning of the oath similar to the military’s tradition of making the
readministration of the oath the center of promotion ceremonies.
More robust education in professional military education highlighting the
fact that the executive and Congress are coequal branches would help
to dispel the prevailing view that loyalty to the president trumps the
professional responsibility to appear before Congress.
Benjamin Franklin, when asked what sort of government the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had created, replied,
“a republic, if you can keep it.”30 This theme is on the minds of citizens
today. History may record that present-day professional oath-takers were
the critical keepers of the republic. Commenting on the role that a range
of oath-takers played in the impeachment inquiry, journalist Jonathan
Alter predicted, “history will look back and call this the ‘patriotic surge’
when people did their constitutional duty.”31

30. Richard R. Beeman, “Perspectives on the Constitution: A Republic, If You Can Keep It,”
The National Constitution Center, n.d., https://constitutioncenter.org/learn/educational-resources
/historical-documents/perspectives-on-the-constitution-a-republic-if-you-can-keep-it.
31. See Benjamin Siu and Anne Flaherty, “Key Players in the Trump Impeachment Probe
and What They Testified to Congress,” ABC News, December 4, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com
/Politics/trump-ment-inquiry-testified-congress/story?id=66763043; and MSNBC, “Concerns to
Superiors.”
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Designing Effective Military
Strategies under Uncertainty
G. K. Cunningham
ABSTRACT: The expanding complexity and variety of threats to
national security will require Joint commanders and planners who
champion innovative and comprehensive military campaigns. Thus
to educate future pragmatic practitioners, academic faculty should
devise curriculum which advances beyond formatting of plans and
orders to establish contextual frameworks for strategy.

U

ncertainty remains as inevitable today as it was when Carl von
Clausewitz discussed “‘the fog of war’” two centuries ago.1
Nonetheless, national leaders, whether autocrats or democrats,
set strategic goals which military commanders and planners are obligated
to attain. No matter how “wicked” the problems, the intent of Joint
military planning is to generate practical solutions. The goal should be to
develop leaders capable of “thriving at the speed of war.”2
In the effort to swing the pendulum of possibility as close to the
side of probability as possible, planners must analyze each contingent
environment to generate military actions with speed, magnitude, and
duration.3 This article explores how Joint commanders and planners
should incorporate the principles of operational design to deal with
the wicked, ill-structured problems they confront. It examines the
uncertainties of international security and the potential for use of design
methodology in the development of theater strategy. It considers problems
and challenges inherent in applying military strategy and recommends
Joint professional military education equip commanders and planners to
meet these challenges as a specific outcome of Department of Defense
war colleges and senior service schools.

Wonder and Warning

In the operating environment of the twenty-first century, social,
political, economic, historical, and geographic factors constitute complex,
ever-adapting open systems.4 In warfare, adversaries are simultaneously
protagonists and antagonists engaged in violent, destructive actions
spanning a continuum of activity from cooperation to coexistence
to deadly conflict. Nation-states operate in a condition of enduring
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 101, 140.
2. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., “The Character of War,” Joint Force Quarterly 89, no. 2 (April 2018): 3.
3. Clausewitz, On War, 92.
4. Simon A. Levin, “Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, the Unknown and the
Unknowable,” Bulletin (New Series) of the American Mathematical Society 40, no. 1 (January 2003): 3–19,
https://doi.org/10.1090/S0273-0979-02-00965-5.
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competition across a shifting continuum of cooperation, competition
below armed conflict, and armed conflict.5
In this state of affairs, framing the operational environment
decades out is difficult and ultimately often inaccurate. Intelligence
estimates, while recognizing the speculative nature of the work,
remain a planning necessity. That said, they uniformly forecast a future
operating environment as bleak as it is uncertain. Worldwide trends
and key developments extracted from the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) main report, Global Trends 2035, include rapid globalization
of technological advancements; workforces shrinking in developed
countries, Russia, and China but growing in poorer, developing
countries; and reduced productivity as global economies contract.
As national interests among major powers diverge, an escalating
terror threat, continued instability in fragile states, the wider availability
of lethal, long-range weapons systems, and the stress of expanding
environmental degradations will disrupt societies and increase the risk
of conflict.6
Accordingly, the accustomed post–World War II order may morph
into more complex and far-reaching arrangements and violence may
be perceived as a primary path to recognition, wealth, and power. Any
victories so gained may be short-lived, however, as state and nonstate
actors alike find it difficult to sustain control in the ever-shifting twentyfirst century international environment.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s futures assessment,
Joint Operating Environment 2035, is equally certain about uncertainty
concluding, “these conditions illustrate contested norms and persistent disorder
in the future security environment.” 7 Nongovernment prognostications
are often equally clouded. The World Economic Forum suggested
US global dominance will fade as power rebalances itself across a
small number of competitors. Most nation-states will endure in nearterm decades but they will become increasingly strained by the rise of
megacities, transnational oligarchs, and even online identities.8

Possibility from Paradox

Despite the likelihood of imprecision if not complete blunder,
strategic planners must consider and incorporate these prognostications
in order to link military campaigning to national strategy effectively
so strategy anticipates national policy outcomes. Clausewitz stated

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), 1–4, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/JDN_pdf/jdn1_19.pdf.
6. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Washington, DC: Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, January 2017), 6, 65–69, https://www.dni.gov/files
/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf.
7. JCS, Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2016), 4–20, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine
/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf ?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917.
8. Ceri Parker, “Global Agenda: 8 Predictions for the World in 2030,” Wo r l d
E conomi c For u m, November 1 2 , 2 0 1 6 , https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016
/11/8-predictions-for-the-world-in-2030.
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firmly that primarily, “it is clear that war should never be thought of
as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise, the
entire history of war would contradict us.”9 Military strategy employs
the threat or use of force to change the strategic environment to bring it
into consonance with policy, “the positions of governments and others
cooperating, competing, or waging war in a complex environment.”10
Joint planning generally follows a predetermined and heretofore
effective methodology for analysis established in doctrine as operational
design. The methodology can be visualized as a series of questions
(see figure 1) that commanders and their planning staffs might address.

Figure 1. The operational design framework (adapted from Joint Publication 5-0)

Given this doctrinal framework, Joint commanders and planners
face vagaries that provide an apt description of a complex, adaptive
system of systems. It will be increasingly difficult to derive conclusions
from analysis of data-driven intelligence collection, as the variety
of network nodes and possible links between them will proliferate
exponentially in unusual (or even unknowable) physical, behavioral, or

9. Clausewitz, On War, 88–89.
10. JCS, Strategy, JDN 2-19 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), II-1, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis
/JDN_pdf/jdn2_19.pdf.
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functional relationships.11 The validity of any such assessments of future
conditions is unlikely to be easily measurable.12
Moreover, the spectrum of challenges faced by military commanders
and planners includes contingencies where military power, traditionally
applied in large-scale combat, may be of little value. The extensive
logistical capabilities required by modern armed forces in warfare are
equally suitable for humanitarian relief, disaster response, and crisis
alleviation in peacetime. In earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods,
and wildfires, military forces are often the organizations of choice
for immediate mitigation of danger and suffering due to the logistical
resources they can bring to bear.
Often the soldier’s favored means of local transportation, the
heavy-lift helicopter, is the only means available to deliver aid and
supplies to the sites of large-scale natural disasters where great swaths
of infrastructure and utilities no longer exist. These contingencies, too,
must be anticipated and planned for with as much energy and precision
as combat operations.

A Dangerous Enticement

Often strategic thinking is viewed as abstract reflection on strategiclevel products or actions. Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Machiavelli,
Clausewitz, Jomini, Mao Zedong, and others have their advocates.13
But, excessive focus on grand strategy, as enticing as this may seem
theoretically and philosophically, may present a dangerous diversion
to Joint commanders and planners. Grand strategy as an overarching
concept for focusing whole-of-nation resources to realize enduring
national interests, in addition to being hard to define or articulate, may
be neither useful nor achievable.14
Moreover, as a practical matter, US doctrine does not mention
grand strategy as a functioning concept for national security and
military campaigning. National strategy is the highest conceptualization
of enduring, long-term national interests and values, including those
associated with social and cultural issues. National strategy, then, acts as
the “strategy of strategies” reflecting the nation’s predominant, broad,
and comprehensive vision of the role of the United States.15
The president’s National Security Strateg y is the commonly accepted
promulgation of policy guidance as national strategy. Yet the difficulty
comes when trying to apply national strategy to action. The background
canvas is too broad, and the possible mixes of color and texture too
11. JCS, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2014), III-33–III-48.
12. Horst M. J. Rittel, and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,”
Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 155–69, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730.
13. Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989).
14. Paul D. Miller, “On Strategy, Grand and Mundane,” Orbis 60, no. 2 (2016): 237–47, https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2016.01.002.
15. JCS, Strategy, I-2.
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plentiful. It is a relatively facile thing to identify likely major adversaries;
it is quite another to develop practical plans and orders for countering
their influence and deterring or defeating their aggression.
The National Security Strateg y of 2017, for example, presents 99 priority
actions across the whole of government. But these priority actions are not
compared against each other or associated with resource constraints or
operational feasibility. The National Security Strateg y addresses outcomes
and strategic goals but offers little with regard to resource allocations,
fiscal constraints, or military effort, forces, or processes to be set against
potential threats. It is aspirational in nature and relates little specific
planning guidance.

Pragmatism in Planning

While grand strategy is academically appealing, in practice military
commanders and planners cannot luxuriate in theories and lofty strategic
concepts. The contemplation of operational design as described earlier is
a useful methodology to employ to this pragmatic end, but the requisite
framing is often a troublesome enterprise. Strategic guidance is quite
often difficult to obtain, much less understand. Further, William E.
Rapp argues persuasively that it is psychologically, culturally, and even
structurally difficult to communicate across the civilian and military
divide that characterizes strategy formulation at national strategic
levels.16 Framing the operational environment is a complex and nuanceprone venture, demanding multicultural understanding in almost every
instance. This context is culturally ambiguous, situationally convoluted
and unclear, and subject to rapid change.
Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s model of military strategy as national security
supported by a three-legged stool provides a time-tested heuristic that
has become a basic paradigm within current planning. While it has its
detractors, the ends, ways, and means model is ingrained in US doctrine.17
Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (2017) begins with a description of
Lykke’s model: “Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining
how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and
space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated
risks.”18 To the degree these three legs might be misaligned (tilt), the
military strategist would likely encounter risk to assigned missions and
tasks (see figure 2).19

16. William E. Rapp, “Ensuring Effective Military Voice,” Parameters 46, no. 3 (Autumn 2015):
13–26.
17. For a summation of opposing critiques to Lykke’s model, see Gregory D. Miller et al., “A
Dialogue on Strategy: On Strategy as Ends, Ways, and Means,” Parameters 47, no. 1 (Spring 2016–17):
125–31; and Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” Parameters, 46, no. 4
(Winter 2016–17): 125–31.
18. JCS, Joint Planning, JP 5.0 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2017), I-1.
19. Arthur F. Lykke Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” in Military Strategy:
Theory and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1989), 3–8.
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Figure 2. Lykke’s ends, ways, and means model of military strategy (adapted from
Lykke, 1989)

Unfortunately, national-level policy and guidance often misses
elements of the Lykke model integral to its utility, such as the ways in
which a strategy may be implemented or the means by which a strategy
may be accomplished. Unfortunately, national strategy as a primary
vehicle for carrying out policy determinations and achieving political
outcomes and end states, tends to focus on the element of “ends” to the
exclusion of other factors.20 Military strategy requires both coherency
and acceptance of risk.21 Coherency between national or grand strategy
and military strategy becomes hard to maintain when corresponding
national-level guidance or direction is not part of the planning paradigm,
a condition that impedes the assessment of risk.
Exacerbating the challenges of understanding national strategy as
strategic direction are the difficulties associated with the constraints
of limited forces and capabilities. Approaches which rigidly follow
predetermined, assigned geographic theaters or which consolidate
globe-spanning functions will be inadequate to confront, deter, or defeat
adversaries who adroitly integrate and employ military and nonmilitary
power at times of their own choosing. To meet this contemporary
challenge, the concept of global integration was introduced in the
2016 National Military Strateg y and further elaborated two years later as
a planning principle in the chairman’s instruction on the Joint Strategic
Planning System:
Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive Joint Force actions in
time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional,
20. Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 7.
21. F. G. Hoffman, “Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations,” Orbis 58, no. 4 (Fall
2014): 472–85.
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multi-functional challenges across all domains. It is a top-down, iterative
process that integrates planning, prioritizes resources, and assesses progress
toward strategic objectives. Global integration ends include enhanced senior
leader decision making, strategically integrated worldwide operations, and a
balanced and lethal future Joint Force.22

A Way Ahead

Operational design methodology provides a conceptual approach
to problem solving well-suited to connecting national strategic policy
guidance with theater strategy policy. The design process begins with
understanding the strategic direction. Yet this step has typically been
very difficult to do given the difference between national or grand
strategy and military strategy as a framework for operational art. But the
linkage is essential if military design is to produce ends that accomplish
the policy objectives mandated by the need to sustain national interests
in the face of dedicated opposition from sophisticated adversaries.23 To
attain this goal, commanders and planners should be well positioned to
employ operational design in formulating military strategy.
Specifically with regard to strategy comprehension and formulation,
the chairman’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)
aligns national- and theater-level strategy to senior-level education for
Joint officers—predominantly in grades O-5 and O-6—and equivalent
international officers and US civilians for service at strategic levels, with an
emphasis on Joint operations. 24 The OPMEP specifies, as a professional
military education outcome, that war colleges must prepare graduates
who are “strategically-minded warfighters or applied strategists who can
execute and adapt strategy through campaigns and operations.”25 A few
pertinent recommendations for inclusion or application of operational
design as a key topic within program curriculums follow.
First, institutions for Joint professional military education should
give themselves a frank azimuth check to determine they are in fact
accomplishing the objectives set forth by the chairman for these toplevel schools. The tendency appears to be drifting from meeting those
requirements to familiarization with theorists and national policy
as grand strategy. The OPMEP clearly states these requirements are
matters of federal law, not preference, and include not only national
security strategy but “planning at all levels of war . . . [including] theater
strategy and campaigning, joint planning processes and systems . . . [and]
joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and the integration of
those capabilities.”26
22. JCS, Joint Strategic Planning System, Chairman of the JCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01D
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2018), A-1, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library
/Instructions/CJCSI% 203100.01D.pdf.
23. Tami D. Biddle, Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, December 2015), 6–9.
24. JCS, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F (Draft)
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2020).
25. JCS, OPMEP, A-2.
26. JCS, OPMEP, A-1.
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Second, Joint professional military education must both capitalize
on and foster relationships based on existing alliances and coalitions.
The OPMEP points out that international officers are intended
recipients of US Joint professional military education at senior levels, a
policy in keeping with Tami Davis Biddle’s recommendation: “military
students in particular ought to have every opportunity to learn to see
their world through lenses other than their own. Cultural awareness
and cultural literacy are essential to politics and to strategy.”27 Such
broadening multinational perspectives support the framing of an
operational environment.
Third, curriculum relating to Joint planning must embrace
global integration with enthusiasm and incorporate interagency and
multinational partners as a matter of routine.28 Technological innovations,
economic globalization, and worldwide social changes have altered the
geostrategic landscape such that purely regionally focused planning
will not support decision-making and problem-solving global in scope.
Joint planning across all theaters and functions must apply a holistic
perspective incorporating all elements of power in plans and orders that
inherently reflect a Joint, interagency, and multinational character.
Fourth, the aperture through which senior service colleges view the
Joint planning process needs to widen considerably. Joint Publication
5-0 includes principles of Joint planning, but makes only cursory
mention of the principles of Joint operations, foregoing a discussion
of how to integrate these important operational considerations with
Joint planning in favor of a mere passing reference and a few examples.
In fact, principles of Joint operations are mentioned five times in the
context of validating Joint plans, but never completely listed.29
Rather than setting forth correct principles and concepts and
allowing latitude in applying critical thinking and seeking creative
solutions, planning doctrine has become heavily laden with processbound conceptual rigidity. Operational design was conceived as a
strategic thinking model, an intellectual framework intended to allow
commanders and planners to quickly synthesize information and
intelligence in chaotic, time-constrained conditions, collaboratively
visualize how a Joint operation would unfold, and forge consensus
around the commander’s intent.30 The extensive conceptual coverage of
the four major components of operational design has now been reduced
to a single graphic and a nine-step checklist of actions.31 Top-level war
college curriculum needs to compensate for this flawed doctrine and
urge its correction.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Biddle, Strategy and Grand Strategy, 55.
Hoffman, “Grand Strategy,” 475–76.
JCS, Joint Planning, xix, III-5, V-35, C-6.
JCS, Joint Planning, III-7–III-18.
JCS, Joint Planning, IV-6–IV-7.

TOC

Geostrategic Forecasting

Cunningham 59

Embracing Risk

The United States should embrace innovative and comprehensive
military theater and functional strategies. These should reflect widely
conceived, thoroughly coordinated campaign planning that capitalizes
on existing alliances and coalitions, builds partnership capacity, and
enthusiastically embraces global integration.
In a pervasive atmosphere of uncertainty, a professional military
will need to change to accept complexity and risk, rely on adaptability,
and embrace innovation. Educators, especially those responsible for
the development of courses and curricula, should respond to this need
by taking an approach to teaching that itself is less structured and
more holistic.
If Joint professional military education is to seriously concentrate
on the development of adaptive, innovative, chaos-tolerant leaders
“capable of thriving at the speed of war,” then course design and
curricular development must model the creativity and analysis we expect
to produce.32 To educate such practitioners, academic faculty should not
simply address formatting of plans and orders but establish contextual
frameworks for both the strategic planning process and the international
strategic circumstances of each actual crisis or contingency. Such a
perspective should impel top-level war colleges and schools, which are
mandated to focus on strategy and campaigning.

32. Dunford, “Character of War,” 3.

TOC

TOC

Leadership and Innovation

The Future of Strategic Leadership
Steven Metz
ABSTRACT: In the coming years a number of factors will expand
and accelerate changes to the character of strategic leadership—
shifts in the nature of armed conflict, the weaponization of
everything, the development and utilization of new technologies,
the decline of authority structures, political hyperpartisanship, and
the coalescence of new ethical structures. Strategic military leaders
must, therefore, transcend the twentieth-century industrial-style
leadership model and embrace a model based on entrepreneurship.

C

lausewitz famously noted that war has an enduring nature and
a changing character. The same holds for strategic military
leadership—it intermixes both consistency and change. The
changing character of strategic leadership implies traditional methods
for developing strategic leaders and exercising strategic leadership
may no longer be adequate. Like their forebears, tomorrow’s strategic
leaders must assure their organizations are effective at core warfighting
functions, whether defeating enemies, maintaining security, or supporting
other organizations. They must create and sustain effective, ethical
organizational cultures. And they must think horizontally—integrating
diverse activities and organizations—and vertically—planning for the
long-term future and considering second- and third-order effects—while
addressing near-term issues and challenges. These are the components
of the enduring nature of strategic leadership.
But much is changing. The evolutionary forces shaping strategic
leadership are powerful, intense, and complex, suggesting traditional
methods for developing strategic leaders and exercising strategic
leadership may no longer be adequate. It is impossible to predict precisely
what attributes and capabilities will be most important in the coming
decades but it is possible—and important—to identify likely ones. One
way to do this is to take the major trends underway in the strategic
environment and assess how they might require changes to the character
of strategic leadership, conceptualizing this in the three interconnected
realms of sustainment of security (strategic leadership’s outward-looking
function), organizational design, and organizational culture and ethic.

Entrepreneurship and the Changing Character of Security
Imagine the commander of a future combatant command—or
whatever integrated, multinational, dispersed, networked, public/private
security organization replaces today’s combatant commands. She or he
must deal with conventional enemies and the need to deter or defeat
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them in combat but also face nonstate adversaries exploiting what is
called the “weaponization of everything.”1 “Modern technology,” as
Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum write, “enables individuals to
wield the destructive power of states.”2 Multidimensional attacks and
disruption are increasingly easy; creating and maintaining security,
difficult. According to strategic futurist Sean McFate: “in the coming
decades . . . wars will be fought mostly in the shadows by covert means,
and plausible deniability will prove more effective than firepower in
the information age. If there are traditional battles, they will not prove
decisive. Winning will change, and victory will be achieved not on the
battlefield but elsewhere.”3
As the essence of security changes, so too must strategy. The architects
of strategy—strategic leaders—must think in multiple dimensions
involving a diverse range of adversaries or potential adversaries. Being
able to defeat enemies will be necessary but not sufficient; security will
be holistic. And once security is created, it will immediately erode as the
forces of instability innovate and proliferate. Sustaining it will truly be
a Sisyphean task.
This future commander will be surrounded by and part of
revolutionary advancements in biology and bioengineering, neurologic
enhancement, nanotechnology, advanced material sciences, quantum
computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, and additive manufacturing.4
Artificial intelligence in particular is likely to fuel extensive change in
armed conflict particularly in the realm of decision-making.5 As Thomas
Adams put it, “the military systems (including weapons) now on the
horizon will be too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an
environment too complex for humans to direct.”6
Judgment alone will no longer be adequate for effective decisionmaking, particularly against adversaries using artificial intelligence and
technology-enhanced decision systems. While this will be most stark at
the tactical level, it will also play out at the strategic level, forcing future
leaders to identify the optimal blend of human judgment and artificial
1. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Ex-CIA Director Petraeus: Everything Can Be Hijacked, Weaponized,”
Jerusalem Post, January 30, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Ex-CIA-Director-Petraeus
-Everything-can-be-hijacked-weaponized-540235; Steven Metz, “America Isn’t Ready
for the ‘Weaponization Of Everything’,” World Politics Review, June 8, 2018, https://www
.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24846/america-isn-t-ready-for-the-weaponization-of-everything;
and Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales From the Pentagon
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016).
2. Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum, The Future of Violence – Robots and Germs, Hackers and
Drones: Confronting the New Age of Threat (Stroud, UK: Amberley Publishing, 2015), 131–37, Kindle.
3. Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder (New York: William
Morrow, 2019), 8–9, 67.
4. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The Operational Environment and the
Changing Character of Warfare, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, October
2019), 9.
5. TRADOC, Changing Character of Warfare, 18.
6. Thomas K. Adams, “Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking,” Parameters
31, no. 4 (Winter 2001–2002): 58; Zach Hughes, “Fog, Friction and Thinking Machines,” War on
the Rocks, March 11, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/fog-friction-and-thinking
-machines/; and Yuna Huh Wong et al., Deterrence in the Age of Thinking Machines (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 2020).
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intelligence then constantly reassessing and revising it. The skill to do
this will be vital, perhaps even decisive.
Dynamic narrative shaping will be critically important for future
strategic leaders. Since war is waged for political objectives, it is ultimately
psychological; what matters most is not how many of the enemy are killed
or how many targets destroyed but how audiences understand and react to
military actions. In a strategic environment characterized by a profusion
of information, highly fluid ideas and beliefs, intricate connectivity, and
intense, global transparency, the psychological component of military
action will be even more important than in the past. “The only outcome
of military action that ultimately matters,” Brad Dewees wrote, “occurs
at the cognitive level—at the level where adversaries perceive and give
meaning to actions taken against them.” 7 Or as P. W. Singer and Emerson
Brookings put it: “What determines the outcome is not mastery of the
facts, but rather a back-and-forth battle of psychological, political and
(increasingly) algorithmic manipulation. Everything is now transparent,
yet the truth can be easily obscured.”8 Thus future conflicts and future
strategy will largely be a “clash of narratives.”9
Traditional methods of narrative shaping that rely on the
transmission of information through formal media will no longer
be sufficient. “These are not the kinds of battles that a plodding,
uninventive bureaucracy can win,” as Singer and Brookings note.10
Having public affairs officers pass information to traditional media—
being the stewards of information—will be woefully inadequate.
Dynamic narrative shaping will require strategic leaders who are
psychologically astute and understand how beliefs and ideas form,
spread, merge, mutate, die, and are reborn across national, subnational,
and organizational cultures. And they must communicate in an
information environment where it is difficult to distinguish truth from
deepfakes or “fake news,” where the authoritativeness of information
no longer determines its impact.11 But however difficult, dynamic
narrative shaping to create desired psychological effects may be the sine
qua non of future strategic leadership—cross-cultural communication
to attain desired psychological effects may be more important than
enterprise management.

Entrepreneurship and Organizational Design

In the past most strategic military leaders—at least American ones—
were the stewards of the organizations they commanded rather than their

7. Brad Dewees, “Measuring War: Cognitive Effects in the Age of AI,” War on the Rocks, October
3, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/measuring-war-cognitive-effects-in-the-age-of-ai/.
8. P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (New
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 262.
9. David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is Reshaping Conflict in the TwentyFirst Century (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 260.
10. Singer and Brookings, LikeWar, 161.
11. See also Donie O’Sullivan, “What Is a Deepfake, Explained,” CNN Business Video,
1:37, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2019/02/01/deepfakes-interactive-what-is-a
-deepfake-intro-orig.cnn.
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creators. They might make some incremental changes or improvements
but in most cases did not have to create new organizations from scratch
or totally rebuild an existing organization. The pace and extent of change
suggests those days are past: future strategic leaders will need to be the
creators and revolutionizers of organizations, entrepreneurs rather than
simply stewards. As with many aspects of life, technology will be the
locomotive, defining the possible.
For instance, strategic military leaders have long relied on staff work
and their own judgment to make decisions. But as information expands,
leaders of all kinds increasingly will use data-based, technologically
enhanced analytics. Effective strategic leaders cannot simply depend
on staff to tell them what they need to know but must have a working
knowledge of the analytical processes and the information that feeds
decisions. While strategic leaders may not themselves be experts on the
design of artificial intelligence, they must be “aware of the significance,
capabilities, and risks associated with algorithms.”12 Put differently,
strategic leaders must understand the gestalt of artificial intelligence and
analytics-based decision-making even if not its architecture.
Future strategic leaders will no longer face a shortage of vital
information but will struggle with its profusion. As James Mancillas
writes: “One of the principal challenges of today’s military leader is
managing the ever-increasing flow of information available to them.
The ease and low cost of collecting, storing, and communicating has
resulted in a supply of data that exceeds the cognitive capacity of most
humans.”13 Accordingly, strategic leaders must help develop and learn to
use a constantly shifting and evolving array of analytical tools so they can
identify what is important in an ocean of information. They must adapt
analytical tools to their organization’s needs instead of automatically
taking what is readily available or provided to them. Analytical and
decision tools will not only be tailored to an organization, but will
change over time. Rather than simply making decisions, future strategic
leaders must understand and shape the process of decision-making.
“Nothing breeds complacency like success,” writes Charles
O’Reilly of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, “the point for
maximum strategic paranoia is when you are at the top of your game.”14
Effectiveness has a definitive lifespan, and in the future it will become
shorter and shorter. Future strategic leaders must be constant disrupters
and innovators.15 In an environment of deep, rapid, and expansive

12. TRADOC, Changing Character of Warfare, 10; and Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn,
“The AI Literacy Gap Hobbling American Officialdom,” War on the Rocks, January 14, 2020,
https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-ai-literacy-gap-hobbling-american-officialdom/.
13. James Mancillas, “Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations,”
Mad Scientist Laboratory (blog), December 16, 2019, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army
.mil/198-integrating-artificial-intelligence-into-military-operations/.
14. Charles A. O’Reilly, Lead and Disrupt: How to Solve the Innovator’s Dilemma (Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2016), 219, Kindle.
15. Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1997).
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change, incremental adaptation and improvement will be necessary but
not sufficient.
There is a saying that in war “speed kills.” Soon this dictum will apply
not only to the maneuver of forces but also to organizational adaptation.
Admittedly, innovation has long been a component of strategic leadership
from the redesign of tactical formations by Alexander the Great, Maurice
of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus and Napoleon, to the nineteenth-century
development of general staffs and professional military education,
through the twentieth century’s combined arms warfare on both land
and sea. But most often innovation was a response to failure or defeat or
to a fear of failure or defeat. In the future, disruption, innovation, and
entrepreneurship must be constant and preemptive rather than reactive.
As soon as an organization is functioning at a high level, strategic leaders
must begin redesign.

Entrepreneurship and Organizational Ethics

Traditionally, strategic leaders in the US military also approached
culture and ethics from the perspective of stewardship rather than
entrepreneurship. Rarely were organizations completely broken, so
strategic leaders focused on sustaining what worked and fixing what
was not. As with organizational design, future strategic leaders will need
to be disrupters of culture and ethics, innovators and entrepreneurs,
“empathetic crafter[s] of culture” as General Stanley McChrystal,
US Army retired put it.16 This disruption must happen even when
organizations are not yet broken: future strategic leaders will know that
every highly functioning organization is on the precipice of decline,
even failure.
It is to impossible know exactly what ethical challenges will be most
pressing in the coming decades, but is possible to identify candidates.
Take, for instance, the political and informational context of strategy.
In previous decades there were only a few authoritative sources of
information for the public—three television networks, a few major news
magazines, a handful of major newspapers, and an array of influential
journals of opinion. Reliance on a limited number of carefully edited
information sources pushed political discourse and ideas toward the
middle; this allowed compromise and consensus building.
Now the information environment is very different. There are
thousands, perhaps millions, of sources but few indicators of reliability.
Young people in particular do not rely on traditional media sources
for information so the traditional media, with its emphasis on balance,
fact-checking, and careful editorial control, does not reach them.17
Everyone can tailor information to their own biases and proclivities.
And it is hard to attract attention in this environment. The result is a
16. Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York:
Penguin Publishing Group, 2015), 222, Kindle.
17. “In the Age of Memes, How Are Young People Getting Their News?,” PBS, January
23, 2020, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/in-the-age-of-memes-how-are-young-people
-getting-their-news.
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kluge of political discourse and entertainment. How an idea is packaged
matters as much, sometimes more, than its content. Infotainers shape
the national narrative as much as professional journalists, policy experts,
or elected officials.
The profusion of information also contributes to the fracturing of
consensus and hyperpartisanship, pushing political positions away from
the middle and toward the ideological poles. It increases hostility toward
people and organizations on a different end of the partisan spectrum,
creating a climate of intense political tribalism. Politics today is treated
less like a process for reconciling diverse positions and reaching
consensus than war by other means. Compromise is treated as a loss
and no one wants to lose.
Hyperpartisanship and the politicization of security policy already
create intense ethical dilemmas for military strategic leaders and are
shaking the foundation of American civil-military relations. This
situation is likely to escalate. Will it be incumbent on future military
strategic leaders to tailor their advice to the ideological biases and
proclivities of the political leader they are presenting it to? Must strategic
advice be shaped by political tribalism? Can military strategic leaders
be above or outside of this tribalism? Will uniformed leaders have to
propose military options they know can be completed in one presidential
administration since the next one is likely to reverse it? Must future
strategic advice be entertaining so political leaders will remember it?
Future strategic leaders will also face immense ethical challenges
deciding how to use new technology like artificial intelligence and the
human-technology interface. Even now movements to limit or ban things
like “killer robots” are gaining strength.18 Linking brains to technology
and adapting neurotechnology will raise difficult and complex ethical
issues for the military.19 Could a technologically enhanced super soldier
(or sailor, airman, marine, or space warrior) easily integrate back into
civilian society once their service is complete? These challenges will
affect the use of technology by the military, particularly the integration
of humans and technology. And the more human-enhancement
technology proliferates and matures, the greater the political resistance
to it will become. Strategic leaders will have to navigate this complex
ethical terrain. And every balance they reach will be precarious and
temporary.

18. Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2018), 251–318.
19. See also Joseph DeFranco and James Giordano, “Linking Brains to Machines, and Use
of Neurotechnology to the Cultural and Ethical Perspectives of the Current Global Stage,” Mad
Scientist Laboratory (blog), August 8, 2019, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/168-linking-brainsto-machines-and-use-of-neurotechnology-to-the-cultural-and-ethical-perspectives-of-the-currentglobal-stage/.
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Conclusion

In the twentieth century, successful strategic leaders were like
the titans of industry, managing increasingly large enterprises and
increasingly complex endeavors. Winning often meant bringing the
most resources to bear at the appropriate time and place. Particularly
in the American way of war, logistics were decisive. Henry Ford or
John D. Rockefeller probably would have been good strategic leaders
while George Catlett Marshall or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have
founded or led massive corporations. But future strategic leaders will
need to be more like cutting-edge entrepreneurs, out-innovating and
out-adapting adversaries.
Defeating the armed forces of enemies may be necessary but not
sufficient as future strategic leaders struggle to sustain security in an
interconnected environment with the weaponization of everything,
where destroying and destabilizing are easy but sustaining security, hard.
Building an organizational culture that is both effective and ethical will
be challenging; success, short-lived. The process of reinvention and
innovation will be constant. What works today, whether an organization,
an ethic, a process, or a concept, may not work tomorrow.
To prepare for this future, the US military must institutionalize
disruption, innovation, and entrepreneurship, creating organizational
cultures based on rapid, persistent adaptation. It must develop campaigns
of learning to identify both best practices and potential pitfalls in
organizational disruption, innovation, and entrepreneurship. The
military must integrate disruption, innovation, and entrepreneurship
deep into its educational systems, teaching and testing for them, failing
those who cannot thrive. It must constantly experiment with new
strategic concepts and organizational forms.
As the military develops and promotes strategic leaders, it must
test and select for skill at dynamic narrative-shaping. And the military
must undertake even more robust partnerships and exchanges with the
private sector, possibly even making such exchanges a requirement for
leadership positions much like joint assignments. The US military’s
method for identifying, developing, and empowering strategic leaders
has not adjusted to the onrushing change in the strategic, political, and
informational environment, nor has it focused on the skill sets strategic
leaders will need in coming decades. Now it must—time is short.
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Military Ethics below the Threshold of War
C. Anthony Pfaff
ABSTRACT: The future of military ethics will be profoundly
affected by competition below the level of war. Such competition
de-emphasizes military force while expanding permissions on the
ways and means militaries employ to shape enemy interests. This
resulting new ethic will introduce norms associated with escalation,
reprisal, and risk that will increase permissible uses of force while
limiting their scope.

T

he ongoing violent exchanges between Iran, its proxies, and
the United States bring into stark relief the legal and ethical
challenges associated with the use of force below the threshold
of war. Driven by developments in technology and doctrine, state and
nonstate actors are finding more space to compete, often using military
force but avoiding an all-out war. But as the inconclusive debate regarding
the moral and legal legitimacy of the ongoing tit-for-tat exchange
between the United States and Iran continues—including the strike in
Iraq that killed dozens of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) members, KH leader
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds
Force Commander Qasem Soleimani—much regarding the character of
this competition is not clearly covered by the current norms of warfare.1
What stands out in the competition between the United States and
Iran is the role proxies, reprisals, and escalation management play in
the evolution of new norms. I do not mean to settle the legality of any
specific act or means. Given the paucity of law coupled with increasing
pressure to adopt nontraditional means, not enough shared norms exist
to settle such questions. I do not, therefore, offer new norms as much
as argue for a method to establish them. Of course, these means are
not new. The problem for current norms of war, however, is they either
say too little or too much. Proxies are under-regulated, allowing actors
to avoid cost and accountability. Where actors avoid accountability,
aggrieved parties have little choice but to engage in reprisals, which
are illegal in peacetime, to discourage and deter future aggressions.
Reprisals, of course, set conditions for escalation risking wider conflict
for otherwise limited ends. Avoiding the resulting lawlessness will
require proactive efforts to regulate the new environment these trends
describe. What is needed to regulate this environment is a robust
account of jus ad vim and jus in vi—much like what exists for jus ad bellum

1. Charlie Dunlap, “The Killing of General Soleimani Was Lawful Self-Defense, Not
Assassination,” Lawfire (blog), January 2020, https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2020/01/03/thekilling-of-general-soleimani-was-lawful-self-defense-not-assassination/; and Scott Anderson, “The
Law and Consequences of the Recent Airstrikes in Iraq,” Lawfare (blog), January 2020, https://www.
lawfareblog.com/law-and-consequences-recent-airstrikes-iraq.
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and jus in bello—to address when actors are permitted to resort to force
and what limits on such force there should be.

Jus ad Vim and the Future of Competition

Sean McFate, in The New Rules of War, writes, “conventional war
is dead.”2 In its place, he argues: “Future wars will not begin and
end; instead, they will hibernate and smolder. Occasionally, they will
explode.”3 More to the point, rather than relying on battlefield victory
to achieve their objectives, adversaries will move into the “shadows,”
where “anonymity is the weapon of choice.” 4
Just war theory and the law of armed conflict have little to say
about such anonymous means, and even where they do, international
institutions are often incapable of enforcing relevant norms. As McFate
argues, “the laws of war will fade from memory, as will the United
Nations, which will prove useless in the face of conflict.”5 He is optimistic
to believe the laws of war will fade into memory because, if for no other
reason, “lawfare” is such a critical aspect of competition—a point
he recognizes.6 What he gets right, however, is the future normative
environment will be characterized both by uncertainty on what the rules
are as well as a lack of accountability, as international institutions—not
just the United Nations—will find little leverage to regulate the behavior
of state and nonstate actors.
Determining the evolution of these norms is the purpose of jus ad
vim, a term Michael Walzer coined in 2006 when he raised the concern
that without such norms governing force below the threshold of war,
war itself would be more likely as limited attacks could set off a wider
escalation.7 Determining what those norms should be requires balancing
the norms of law enforcement, which emphasize limited force and
human rights, and warfighting, which enables wider latitude regarding
the use of force, but denies due process and places innocents at risk.
While the law enforcement model is obviously preferable, it requires
effective governance and a monopoly on the use of force. Where those
conditions do not exist, one may be permitted to loosen restrictions on
force but must at the same time avoid depressing the peacetime standard
for human rights to the war time standard.8 Thus jus ad vim will be more
permissive than jus ad bellum in permitting the use of force. Maintaining
2. Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: How America Can Win Against Russia (New York: William
Morrow, 2019), 6.
3. McFate, New Rules of War, 246.
4. McFate, New Rules of War, 246.
5. McFate, New Rules of War, 9.
6. McFate, New Rules of War, 68–69.
7. Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun, “From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim: Recalibrating
Our Understanding of the Moral Use of Force,” Ethics and International Affairs 27, no. 1 (February
2013): 97–98.
8. Daniel R. Brunstetter, “The Purview of State-Sponsored Violence: Law Enforcement, Just
War, and the Ethics of Limited Force,” in The Ethics of War and Peace Revisited: Moral Challenges in
an Era of Contested and Fragmented Sovereignty, ed. Daniel R. Brunstetter and Jean Vincent Holeindre
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 235.
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the peacetime standard for rights, however, means establishing a clear
link between a proposed use of force and its effect, while tolerating little
in the way of collateral harm. These requirements further entail that
discrimination and proportionality in jus in vi will have to meet a higher
standards than its jus in bello counterparts.9 Thus, shaping the evolution
of these norms does not require a reimagining of the international order
but it will require new practices and precedents to address the challenge
that proxies, reprisals, and escalation represent.

Proxies
If anonymity is the weapon of choice then proxies are one way of
achieving it. Even when anonymity is not possible, proxies, as Iranian
reliance on them suggests, are an effective means of transferring risk
and lowering one’s costs while imposing them on others.10 From the
perspective of international law, moreover, it is difficult to hold
state actors responsible when they do employ proxies. For a state to
be accountable for a proxy’s actions, it must have “effective control”
over a proxy’s operations.11 The standard for effective control, however,
appears high. In one precedent, the International Court of Justice
found the United States had provided the contras in Nicaragua not only
with weapons but also a manual that advised them to “shoot civilians
attempting to leave a town, neutralize local judges and officials, hire
professional criminals to carry out ‘jobs,’ and provoke violence at mass
demonstrations to create ‘martyrs.’”12 The International Court of Justice
however, did not find the United States accountable for the crimes the
contras subsequently committed because no one directly associated with
an organ of the United States government directed them to commit
these crimes.
A second precedent establishing standards for effective control arises
from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s
findings regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army’s
use of proxies against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here they found the
FRY was responsible for the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) because the
FRY had transferred officers to serve in the VRS, paid their salaries, had
the same military objectives, provided financial and logistical support,
and “directed and supervised the activities and operations of the VRS,”
effectively giving them “overall control.”13
It is not hard to see the difficulty here. Soleimani may have provided
KH with weapons, funding, and even encouragement to attack US
forces. But given either precedent those actions do not establish
9. Brunstetter and Braun, “Jus ad Bellum,” 96–101.
10. Candace Rondeaux and David Sterman, Twenty-First Century Proxy Warfare: Confronting
Strategic Innovation in a Multipolar World (Washington, DC: New America, February 2019), 5,
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy
-warfare-confronting-strategic-innovation-multipolar-world/.
11. Oona A. Hathaway et al., “Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 1 and State
Responsibility for Non-State Actors,” Texas Law Review 59, no. 3 (March 2017): 546.
12. Hathaway et al., “Ensuring Responsibility,” 548–9.
13. Hathaway et al., “Ensuring Responsibility,” 554–6.
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accountability. As long as he avoided giving specific instructions tied
to particular operations and maintained some organizational distance
between the Quds Force and KH, he was not legally accountable for
the actions of KH. If he was not legally accountable for their actions
then killing him was illegal, if not also unethical. The problem here is
not whether these facts regarding the relationship between the Quds
Force and KH are true; rather, the legal standard for establishing them
establishes a “perverse incentive” encouraging proxy employment while
discouraging any effort to moderate proxy behavior, since doing so could
imply effective control.14 Future norms should address this incentive.15

Reprisals
Whatever one thinks about the legality of the US air strikes targeting
Soleimani and KH leadership, attacks by Iranian proxies that provoked
them clearly broke international law. While the administration’s maximum
pressure policy has dramatically impacted the Iranian economy, it does
not justify an armed response.16 When faced with such a violation by
an adversary (Iran) and in light of unsuccessful attempts for redress or
accountability, the only resort for an aggrieved party (United States) was
to reciprocate in the form of a reprisal. In this case—the strikes against
KH and Soleimani—the United States claimed self-defense. This claim
remains very much in dispute, however, so it is still worth exploring
reprisals as an alternative justification.17
In general, reprisals permit an otherwise illegal act to compel an
adversary to conform to the law. Thus reprisals are not justified because
someone did something wrong first, but rather as a means of law
enforcement. Such uses of force must be proportionate and directed
only at those involved in the violations it is supposed to address.18 The
problem for competition is while reprisals are permitted in war time,
they are generally regarded as illegal in peacetime.19 This does not mean
one cannot use force to encourage conformity to a norm, but such use
still has to meet the standards of self-defense.20 Simply attacking back
when it is not clear any future attack is forthcoming would not meet this
standard. Absent imminence, actors are obligated to seek alternatives
before using force.
14. Hathaway et al., “Ensuring Responsibility,” 562–3.
15. See C. Anthony Pfaff, “Proxy War Ethics,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 9, no.
2 (August 2017).
16. Rick Noack, “How U.S. Sanctions Are Paralyzing the Iranian Economy,”
Washington Post, January 10, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/10/
how-us-sanctions-are-paralyzing-iranian-economy/.
17. Andrew Cheung, “U.S. ‘Self-Defense’ Argument for Killing Soleimani Meets Skepticism,”
Reuters, January 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-legal-analysis/u-sself-defense-argument-for-killing-soleimani-meets-skepticism-idUSKBN1Z301R.
18. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 5th ed.
(New York: Basic Books, 2015), 207; and Nicholas Fotion, “Reprisals,” in An Encyclopedia of War and
Ethics, ed. Donald Arthur Wells (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 410–12.
19. Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), 150–1.
20. Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 10.

TOC

Leadership and Innovation

Pfaff

73

The difficulty here is these alternatives are often ineffective. The
United States could have taken Iran to court for its role in the December
27 attack, but as the discussion regarding proxies indicates, it is not likely
Iran would have been held responsible. The United States could also have
tried nonviolent means to impose greater costs on Tehran, but given the
already stringent sanctions Iran is under, it is not clear this course of
action would be any more effective. This point suggests as adversaries
increasingly engage in illegal behavior, there may be room for limited
peacetime reprisals. As Walzer argues: “Reprisal is a practice carried
over from the war convention to the world of ‘peacetime,’ because it
provides an appropriately limited form of military action. It is better to
defend the limits than to try to abolish the practice.”21

Escalation
Of course, a primary reason peacetime reprisals are illegal is the risk
of escalation. Managing escalation requires having a plan for escalation
dominance prior to initiating any competitive act, violent or nonviolent.
As Herman Kahn notes, escalation dominance goes to the side that “fears
eruption the least,” or at least is the side best able to bear the cost should
the conflict escalate.22 Effective escalation management thus requires at
least three things: (1) a demonstrated willingness and capability to strike;
(2) an off-ramp that gives an adversary a less costly but acceptable option
other than continued escalation; and (3) a consensus among key allies
and partners regarding the legitimacy of one’s response.
The operative word in the first condition is “demonstrated.” It is
not sufficient that one is able to bear the cost of further violence better
than the adversary. The adversary also has to believe this to be the
case. Military capability, of course, is important to demonstrating such
capability. But it is just as important one demonstrate resolve as well.
While there are numerous ways to do this, broad international support
for one’s cause can help to underscore the strength of the commitment.
Thus, it makes sense to cultivate such support on an ongoing basis.
A good off-ramp is a clear policy statement giving the adversary
something it can do that will avoid further retaliation—an alternative
representing a lower cost than continued escalation. If conditions for
escalation termination represent existential costs to an adversary then it
has no reason not to continue the violence. Accordingly, off-ramps that
undermine an actor’s ability to govern or essentially disarm it will not
likely be effective, which is why Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s twelve
demands for Iran, including abandoning its nuclear program, ending its
development of ballistic missiles, and ceasing its use of proxies, are not
an effective off-ramp. It is not that the United States should not pursue
these goals relative to Iran. It is just that those conditions are, at least
in Tehran’s perspective, equivalent to surrender and would make then
vulnerable to regional adversaries such as Saudi Arabia.
21. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 221.
22. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1965), 290.
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Consequently, when in an escalatory cycle, actors have to offer
something else. In this case, it seems Iran was the one who found the
off-ramp for the United States, temporarily at least. By striking back
in a way that avoided fatalities it appeared, at least, to acknowledge
the United States’ redline regarding fatal attacks on US personnel
while avoiding the appearance of backing down, which would have
likely undermined the regime’s domestic credibility. As Iran’s renewed
attacks have demonstrated, however, escalation termination is not the
same as conflict termination. In competition, sometimes the practical
if not ethical thing to do is limit violence, especially when that violence
risks harms to civilians.
Both conditions suggest the importance of ensuring international
support for one’s actions. To the extent escalation entails political
isolation, one increases one’s costs to oneself while at the same limiting
the resources available to find alternatives to continued escalation. The
former is more a practical concern but the latter is ethical. The strike
that killed Soleimani received widespread condemnation, even from
European partners.23 Given those partners’ utility in shaping Iranian
behavior, alienating them simply strengthens the Iranian position and
is thus self-defeating. The point here is not whether those partners
should have condemned the attack on Soleimani. Rather the point is,
given the uncertainty regarding how actors should respond in such
circumstances, it is worthwhile to establish in advance a set of shared
expectations regarding appropriate responses.

The Impact of Technology
Technologies such as cyber, artificial intelligence, robotics, and
additive manufacturing among others are also going to impact the
character of competition.24 In general, military innovation provides
advantage by either reducing one’s own risk or increasing it for the
enemy, preferably in ways the enemy would not expect. In reducing this
risk, technology raises a number of ethical concerns. First, as Christian
Enemark points out, the prospect of avoiding “deaths, injuries, and
grieving families,” encourages political leaders to resort to force.25
Instead of fewer lethal individual engagements, the result may be more
of them, thus creating greater risk for escalation.
Second, the proliferation of these technologies risks destabilizing the
international order. As Margaret Kosal points out, “new technological

23. “World Reacts to Killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani,” Euronews, January 3, 2020, https://
www.euronews.com/2020/01/03/a-declaration-of-war-and-an-escalation-the-world-reacts-tosoleimani-killing.
24. T. X. Hammes, “Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 81, no. 2 (April 2016).
25. Christian Enemark, Armed Drones and the Ethics of War: Military Virtue in a Post-Heroic Age
(London: Routledge, 2014), 22–23.
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developments have become accessible and relatively inexpensive to
a larger number of nations and within the grasp of nonstate actors:
advanced technology is no longer the domain of the few.”26 As a result,
these technologies enable smaller actors, including nonstate actors
such as proxies Iran employs, to pursue political objectives effectively,
despite relative weakness. It also enables nonviolent coercive measures
state actors can employ as reprisals thus raising the question whether
nonlethal but indiscriminate cyberoperations, like disrupting a power
grid, be permitted when the alternative is lethal, but discriminate force.
These points suggests a moral, if not practical, obligation to regulate
the availability of these technologies.
Third, while risk of physical harm may be reduced to near zero,
the risk of psychological harms may increase and in unexpected ways.
While studies have observed mental trauma associated with autonomous
technologies, this can range unpredictably from desensitization and
moral disengagement to trauma and moral injury.27 Making matters
even more complex, a 2019 study of British drone operators suggested
environmental factors such as work hours and shift patterns were as
important, if not more so, to the experience of mental injury as visually
traumatic events associated with the strikes themselves.28 These effects
will require rethinking what counts as fulfilling ethical obligations to
one’s own soldiers and veterans.

Conclusion
It should now be apparent what the broad contours of the resulting
normative environment for competition would look like. From a
practical perspective, low-cost measures that transfer risk and avoid
attribution will proliferate, expanding targets to include those normally
proscribed by international law. From a moral perspective, employing
such measures will still be subject to conditions such as just cause,
proportionality, reasonable chance for success, and last resort.
In doing so, any resulting ethic will make coercive measures,
including the use of force, more permissive while limiting its scope. This
ethic will prioritize nonlethal over lethal alternatives, and where lethal
force is used, demand a higher standard for success and a much lower
tolerance for civilian harm. These measures represent an alternative
to war; therefore, actors will be morally required to take measures to
avoid escalation.29

26. Margaret Kosal, “Introduction,” in Disruptive and Game Changing Technologies in Modern Warfare,
ed. Margaret Kosal (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 3.
27. Alaa Hijazi et al., “Psychological Dimensions of Drone Warfare,” Current Psychology 38, no.
5 (September 2017): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-017-9684-7.
28. A. Phillips et al., “Occupational Stress in Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Operators,”
Occupational Medicine 69, no. 4 (June 2019): 244–50.
29. Brunstetter and Braun, “Jus ad Bellum,” 104.
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There is no bright line between competition and armed conflict. So
while the military, political, and economic tools available to actors yield
utility in either setting, the differences in ends competition and armed
conflict represent differences in how these tools should be used both
from a practical and ethical perspective. This last point is important.
While the ethical does not follow the practical, the practical certainly
shapes, in conjunction with a society’s values and ideals, how the ethical
gets put into practice.
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Army Modernization in the 21st Century
Michael E. Lynch
ABSTRACT: Harsh lessons from the failure of the US Army’s future
combat system a decade ago continue to haunt Army modernization
efforts today. The advent of Army Futures Command and changes
to the modernization and acquisitions process signal progress
toward exorcising these ghosts of the past, enabling the Army to
work with rather than against industry as it formulates its future
combat systems requirements.

T

he failure of the US Army’s future combat systems (FCS)
program destroyed the public’s confidence in the Army’s
modernization processes. The Army’s latest modernization
strategy, however, reflects a unity of purpose and structure unseen since
World War II. The creation of Army Futures Command in 2018 provided
an opportunity to reform and improve modernization processes that had
been plaguing Army combat developments for decades. Inculcating hard
lessons from the failure of FCS to sufficiently reform modernization
and acquisition processes, Futures Command has labored to improve
these modernization programs. But as it looks to the future, as its name
demands, it should examine the causes of previous failures with an
eye toward preventing them. An examination of the recent request for
proposals for the optionally manned fighting vehicle (OMFV) in 2019
and again in early 2020 provides compelling lessons learned that can
promulgate future success.1

Ghost of Systems Past and Concepts Future

The ghost of FCS haunts Army modernization and provides a
cautionary tale for innovators and futurists. The FCS program, the
largest planned modernization program in Army history, planned 18
separate systems integrated by a wireless network in a brigade structure
and operating under emerging doctrine. The program aimed to provide
weapons, individual computer systems, manned and unmanned vehicles,
and a sensor suite. All vehicles would be transportable by C-130 and
would be “more lethal, survivable, deployable, and sustainable than
existing heavy combat systems.”2 After nine years and $87 billion, the
Department of Defense canceled the FCS program in 2009.3
The FCS was haunted by the ghost of systems past—the so-called
Big 5: M1 Abrams, M2/3 Bradley, UH-60 Black Hawk, AH-64 Apache,
1. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Cross-Functional Team Pilot In Support Of
Materiel Development, Army Directive 2017-14 (Washington, DC: HQDA, October 6, 2017).
2. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems
Program, GAO-03-1010R (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003), 2; and Christopher G. Pernin et al., Lessons
from the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 55.
3. Mark L. Bradley, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 2009 (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, 2015), 42–43.
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and the Patriot.4 Modernization enthusiasts often incorrectly assume
the Big 5 were developed together. Though the systems were called
the Big 5 as early as 1972 for acquisition purposes, they remained five
separate modernization programs, four of which began as product
improvements to systems being replaced. Each spent an average of 17
years in development, and the changes they brought were evolutionary
rather than revolutionary.5 The final products fielded in the 1980s were
all tremendous improvements over the original designs in the 1960s,
and the improved versions that have seen combat from Desert Storm
to the present were orders of magnitude better than their predecessors.
The AirLand Battle Doctrine, developed as a result of the Yom Kippur
War and using the capabilities of these new systems, really made them
successful as the Big 5.6
The FCS program was also haunted by the ghost of concept future,
the Army After Next, which envisioned development of systems over
a period of decades using technologies as yet unknown. The program
hoped to marry the idea of simultaneous acquisition with modernization
using leap-ahead technology. But an ambitious yet unfeasible operational
concept, immature technology, and an overly aggressive timeline
doomed the program to failure. Current modernization programs must
avoid these ghosts within the machine in order to succeed where other
programs failed.

Unfeasible Operational Concepts

General Eric Shinseki’s vision of the Army unveiled in October
1999, required the capability to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world
in 96 hours with a full division on the ground in 120 hours, and five
divisions in 30 days.7 This flawed operational concept required a C-130
sortie for each of the two-to-three-hundred light armored vehicles in
an FCS brigade combat team. Large operations would require hundreds
of C-130s, likely making the plan unfeasible. The C-130 requirement
came from a notional vertical takeoff and landing aircraft designed
to support futuristic forces during Army After Next war games. This
theoretical aircraft used the internal cube of the C-130, so the mission
needs statement defined C-130 deployability as critical to achieving both
“‘rapid tactical and strategic air deployment’” and therefore “the only
‘non-tradable requirement.’”8
The FCS concept supposedly eliminated the need for heavily
armored vehicles by replacing mass with superior information allowing
the soldier to see and hit the enemy first. The FCS brigade combat team
would have the capability to “see first, understand first, act first, and to

4. David C. Trybula, “Big 5” Lessons for Today and Tomorrow (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War
College, 2012), 3.
5. Trybula, Big 5, 11, 26, 41, 51, 58.
6. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 9.
7. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 9.
8. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 16, 55–57.
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finish decisively.”9 The system survivability depended upon “its ability to
detect and kill the enemy beyond direct combat range,” while avoiding
detection itself and surviving the enemy’s first shot.10
The challenge with ground vehicles has always been the balance
between weight and armor. Initial planning for C-130 transportability
imposed a 20-ton limit on the vehicle assuming perfect conditions
operating at sea level, while the add-on armor and reserve fuel for the
C-130 (normal for combat missions) further reduced the maximum
payload to 17 tons. Additionally, assault landings enabling the
operational scheme overly stressed the airframes, which resulted in the
requirement for an even lower payload. To reduce the vehicle weight,
developers repeatedly decreased mandatory deployment configurations,
but these conflicted with the operational concept requiring the FCS to
be combat ready upon deployment. The military’s experience in Iraq
and Afghanistan, moreover, proved no amount of tactical intelligence
could replace physical force protection from improvised explosive
devices, refuting the operational concept’s reliance on intelligence to
overcome the need for protective armor. This fact drove an operational
need for more heavily armored vehicles such as mine-resistant,
ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles.

Immature Technology

As the pace of technological change has accelerated, the Army has
sought to take advantage of new, emergent, and possible technology,
always looking for the “leap ahead.” The FCS project manager
identified 31 critical technology elements whose readiness determined
the system’s effectiveness. A technology readiness assessment in 2003
found significant problems, neither new nor unexpected.11 A 2003
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report warned, “many
critical technologies will not be mature at Milestone B [acquisition
program start], thus technology development and product development
will occur concurrently.”12 Congress ordered an investigation of the
FCS program in 2009 and determined few things had changed with the
program in the intervening six years.13 These warnings went unheeded.
A RAND Corporation study of FCS in 2012 determined,
“technical development must be rooted in exploratory basic science
and advanced development programs validated by early and realistic
field experimentation with real products, and not in SDD [Systems
Development and Demonstration] phases of major acquisition
programs.”14 The FCS program proved the danger of attempting to leap
too far ahead.
9. GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed to Shape Army’s Combat Systems for the Future, GAO09-288 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2009), 3.
10. GAO, Future Combat Systems Program, 30.
11. GAO, Future Combat Systems Program, 24–25.
12. GAO, Future Combat Systems Program, 41.
13. GAO, Defense Acquisitions, 10.
14. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, xxvii, 242.
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Rush to Failure

An artificially accelerated timeline driven by the desire to jumpstart transformation became a primary cause of the FCS system
failure. In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pressured
the Army to modernize and adapt to emerging threats, reduce the
logistics infrastructure, increase lethality, and speed deployment time.
The term revolution in military affairs distinguished the effort from
previous evolutionary changes of the 1990s.15 Despite the immature
technology, Army senior leaders accelerated the timeline for Milestone
B from 2006 to 2003, effectively dooming the program by eliminating
time to correct deficiencies as they appeared.16

Army Modernization Strategy

The Army seems to be in a golden period now with the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan winding down and no new near-term threats.
The 2018 National Defense Strateg y articulates, “long-term strategic
competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities . . .
because of the magnitude of the threats” and the potential for them
to increase in the future.17 While the United States competes below
the level of armed conflict, the Army is using the time to modernize
decades-old equipment quickly to avoid facing the next war with
inferior weapons. The 2019 Army Modernization Strateg y is based on four
key assumptions:
•• The US Army’s budget remains flat with reduced spending power
over time.
•• Demand for Army forces remains relatively constant.
•• Research and development matures in time to make significant
improvements in Army capabilities by 2035.
•• Adversary modernization programs stay on their currently
estimated trajectories in terms of capability levels and timelines.18

The strategy also outlines a 15-year plan to build an Army for a new
doctrine, multidomain operations (MDO).
Period of rapid change:
•• Fiscal year (FY)2020 to FY2022: Begin initial fielding of the
cross-functional teams’ signature efforts.
•• FY2023 to FY2025: Adapt formations and organizational designs
to incorporate the modernized equipment required for MDO.
15. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 9.
16. Conrad C. Crane, Michael E. Lynch, and Shane Reilly, A History of the Army’s Future: 1990–
2018 (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2018), 7, 20.
17. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 2018), 4.
18. HQDA, 2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future (Washington, DC: HQDA,
2019), 3.
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Period of fundamental change:
•• FY2026 to FY2028: Certify first MDO force package and begin
building the second. Field optionally manned fighting vehicle and
future attack reconnaissance aircraft.
•• FY2029 to FY2035: Finish certifying next force package while
continuing to innovate.19

Deus Ex Machina—Army Futures Command

The role of Army Futures Command as a modernization
headquarters allows the Army to consolidate and focus modernization
and acquisition efforts; its initial development has proceeded with an
eye toward correcting past failures, merging all technological research,
modernization, and capability development processes into one command
to better focus those efforts. Six priorities drive the Army’s equipment
modernization strategy: long-range precision fires, next-generation
combat vehicles, future vertical lift, networks, air and missile defense,
and soldier lethality.20
Eight new cross-functional teams (all the above, plus assured
positioning and timing, and synthetic training environment) focus
modernization programs. Each cross-functional team is led by a
senior military or civilian leader and includes specialists in acquisition,
requirements, science and technology, test and evaluation, resourcing,
contracting, cost analysis, sustainment, and military operations. These
cross-functional teams develop capabilities, leveraging industry,
academia, and soldiers in an iterative process to inform materiel
solutions, ensuring appropriate stakeholders are represented, empowered,
and connected.21
Lack of coordination in the research and development area has
plagued the modernization system, leading to fragmented efforts. Future
Command’s new Combat Capabilities Development Command aligned
each of the Research, Development, and Engineering Centers as lead
support to one or more of the cross-functional teams and as supporting
efforts to others (see table 1).
With the failure of FCS still fresh in the Army’s consciousness,
Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy challenged the modernization
community to “fail early, fail cheap.”22 The January 2020 cancellation of
the OMFV request for proposals provides an example of this dictum.
The Army realized the project was on the wrong track and needed a
course correction: “the most prudent means of ensuring long-term
programmatic success is to get this multibillion-dollar effort correct.”23

19. HQDA, Army Modernization Strategy, 10–11.
20. HQDA, Army Modernization Strategy, 6.
21. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, 103; and HQDA, Cross-Functional Team Pilot.
22. John M. Donnelly, “The Army’s Ryan McCarthy Pulls the Plug on Bad Acquisitions,” Roll
Call, January 18, 2020.
23. Sean Kimmons, “Vice Chief of Staff: Speed of Modernization No Longer at
‘Glacial Pace’,” Army News Service, Feb. 7, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/232408
/vice_chief_of_staff_speed_of_modernization_no_longer_at_glacial_pace.
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This cancellation also set off alarm bells throughout the defense media
and Congress, both questioning whether this was not just the latest in
a long string of Army modernization and acquisition failures—a valid
question given the Army’s recent history.
Table 1. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Centers’ assignments to
cross-functional teams24
Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC) Components
(former name in parenthesis)
Armaments
Center

Chemical
Biological
Center

C5ISR
Center

Army
Research
Laboratory

Aviation &
Missile Center

Ground
Vehicle
Systems
Center

Soldier
Center

Army
Priorities

(ARDEC)

(ECBC)

(CERDEC)

(unchanged)

(AMERDEC)

(TARDEC)

(NSSC)

1

LRPF

LEAD

support

support

support

2

NGCV

support

3

FVL

support

4

Network

5

AMD

6

SL

support

support

support

support

support

support

LEAD

LEAD

support

support

support

support

support

LEAD

support

support

support

LEAD

support

LEAD

Air & Missile Defense (AMD)
Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC)
Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMERDEC)
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C5ISR)
Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC)
Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command (ECBC)
Future Vertical Lift (FVL)
Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF)
Natick Soldier Systems Center (NSSC)
Network (Network)
Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)
Soldier Lethality (SL)
Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC)

Despite the Army claiming to have learned from failures such as
the FCS, the initial OMFV request for proposals in March 2019 began
with some of the same traits as FCS—unreasonable expectations and
an impossible timeline.25 The Army intended to issue an ambitious draft
requirement in order to push industry to provide the best solutions then
get industry feedback and adjust as required.
In addition to the age-old vehicle weight problem, height became a challenge.
Recent combat experience shows ground clearance enhances land mine
survivability. Industry leaders warned the Army that some requirements
24. Table data from US Army in Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army R&D Chief: ‘I Don’t
Think We Went Far Enough’—But Futures Command Can,’” Breaking Defense, February
8, 2019, fig. 1, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/02/army-rd-chief-i-dont-think-we-went
-far-enough-but-futures-command-can/.
25. Ashley Tressel, “Army Releases Final RFP for OMFV,” Inside Defense, March 29, 2019.
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were unattainable and requested modifications. The Army subsequently
removed the requirement to transport a full nine-soldier infantry
squad—the original purpose of the vehicle. The objective requirement
called for a 50mm cannon with a 30mm acceptable as an interim. With
an added Modular Active Protection System, the vehicle was required to
defeat rocket-propelled grenades, missiles, and long-rod penetrators.26
Army leaders argued soldier survivability was paramount yet sacrificed armor
to remove weight. The Army remained just as focused on air transport as it
had been during the FCS development, distorting OMFV development.
The required protection was reduced making the vehicles light enough
for two to fly on a C-17 as the Bradley does today.
Soldier survivability and vehicle reliability were compromised in order to achieve
impossible standards. Part of this survivability lies in the potential to take
soldiers out of it completely, hence optionally manned, but the vehicle
would still be remotely controlled by soldiers. Bidders had roughly six
months to produce a working prototype for testing.27
Although Congress and the press criticized the Army’s cancellation
of the OMFV request for proposals in January 2020 to start over again,
the restart was actually good news and indicates the Army’s willingness
and ability to learn from its own mistakes.28 It is also visible evidence of
the ability of Futures Command to change the landscape.
In April 2020, the Army unveiled a new and innovative approach
to designing the OMFV. It began by soliciting ideas from industry, first
on what vendors found difficult about the initial request for proposals,
and then requested recommendations for how to revise OMFV
development.29 The Army released an Industry Day Narrative listing broad
characteristics rather than specific requirements for the OMFV (see
table 2).30 It ranked survivability first among nine desired characteristics
and also relaxed air transportability as a firm requirement for the first
time since the FCS period, almost 10 years ago.
Table 2. Nine desired characteristics
Survivability

Lethality

Transportability

Mobility

Weight

Manning

Growth

Logistics

Training

26. Freedberg Jr., “NGCV: Hard Choices in Bradley Replacement, RFP Out Friday,” Breaking
Defense, March 27, 2019.
27. Freedberg Jr., “NGCV: Hard Choices.”
28. Freedberg Jr., “Can the Army Convince Congress It’s Learned from FCS?” Breaking
Defense, March 16, 2020.
29. HQDA, “Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Market Survey,” SAM.gov, https://
beta.sam.gov/opp/37a6d32f8ef34272bd94c8340f05dd41/view.
30. National Advanced Mobility Consortium (NAMC), Industry Day Narrative for Optionally
Manned Fighting Vehicle (Ann Arbor, MI: NAMC, April 9, 2020), 6.
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The timeline for the OMFV, with five specific phases, is much more
realistic:
•• Phase 1 (FY2020 to FY2021): Develop and refine OMFV
acquisition and ontracting strategies
•• Phase 2 (FY2022 to FY2023): Preliminary design
•• Phase 3 (FY2023 to FY2024): Detailed design
•• Phase 4 (FY2024 to FY2027): Prototype build and test
•• Phase 5 (FY2027 to FY2030): Production and fielding31
Finally, the Army seemed to recognize the impossibility of
transporting large numbers of armored vehicles by air. The Industry Day
Narrative acknowledges units will still primarily deploy by water with the
option to deploy by air. Not limiting deployability to one specific airframe
allows more flexibility to continue to deploy primarily by water. The
narrative also acknowledges the continued requirement for protective
armor, but those requirements are more realistic—the OMFV must
protect its crew from other infantry fighting vehicles, not from tanks.
Elimination of tank main gun survivability makes the armor problem
much easier.32
Perhaps the most important part about the narrative, however, is the
new approach to design. One sentence indicates the Army’s final rejection
of the old FCS-type process—“the Army recognizes the importance
of accurately defining the capabilities without over constraining the
design.”33 This approach encourages industry to use virtual reality and
modeling and simulation in providing initial digital designs rather than
demanding a prototype within six months, demonstrating the Army’s
willingness to be much more open and sensible, listening to expert
opinions from industry. This approach is an improvement—during the
FCS program some contractors complained overzealous Army combat
developers had vision but no practical knowledge. They reported that
when they told developers certain things were impossible with existing
technology, the developers replied, “work the problems harder.”34

Trouble Ahead?

Despite evidence of good news, the original request for proposals
process revealed a potential problem between the modernization and
acquisition communities. GAO had previously identified a lack of formal
coordination procedures between Futures Command and the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), despite
early attempts at aligning the processes.35 In October 2019, defense

31. NAMC, Industry Day Narrative, 3–4.
32. NAMC, Industry Day Narrative, 3, 9.
33. NAMC, Industry Day Narrative, 4.
34. Pernin, Future Combat Systems, xx, 58n, 102.
35. Army Should Take Steps to Reduce Risk: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land
Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, 116th Cong. (May 1, 2019) (statement of Jon Ludwigson,
Acting Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions), 10.

TOC

Leadership and Innovation

Lynch

85

media outlets reported that after Bradley manufacturer BAE Systems
Land & Armaments dropped out of the OMFV competition, the Army
disqualified Raytheon Rheinmetall Land Systems for not shipping the
prototype shipped from Germany in time. Army Futures Command had
insisted at the time that the process must stick to the schedule, but the
acquisition community favored an extension. Restarting the process has
reset the clock to zero but the Army needs better coordination between
the modernization and acquisition communities.36

Conclusion

Failure is the ghost in the Army modernization machine but one
that can be exorcised. The new modernization strategy has changed
the nature of the machine, and Army Futures Command is the deus
ex machina, providing a unified infrastructure with which to conduct a
new, coherent, reasonable modernization strategy. The Army frequently
uses the phrase “lessons learned,” but very often the lessons are only
gathered rather than learned. The recent restart of the OMFV indicates
the Army might finally be learning the harsh lessons taught by the FCS
experience. If those lessons truly have been learned and the experiences
passed on to the rest of the modernization enterprise, the Army need no
longer fear the ghosts in the machine.

36. Jen Judson, “Lynx 41 Disqualified from Bradley Replacement Competition,” Breaking
Defense, October 4, 2019.
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Winning the Narrative War
Samantha A. Taylor and Amanda B. Cronkhite
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ABSTRACT: A president’s ability to control the policy narrative
during a military intervention is crucial to maintaining public support,
especially when American blood might be shed. An examination of
policy narratives couching the military interventions in the Gulf War
and in Haiti reveal both the fragility of these narratives and the
importance of framing.

B

e it Roosevelt and infamy, Kennedy and Pax Americana, or
Reagan and a wall that needed tearing down, framing a policy
narrative with the right words can be critical to the legacy of
a president.1 Studies of successful framing of presidential messages
find repetition begets message penetration which begets impact. But
examples of failed presidential narratives are difficult to uncover for
one obvious reason: they failed to dominate. Nonetheless, studies of
unsuccessful framings and the policy implications thereof are important
for understanding the presidency, especially now in a fragmented media
environment when gauging the success of a narrative is more difficult.
Even today, the president makes no more compelling decision than
the one to risk the lives of American servicepeople. Consequently,
studying successful and unsuccessful presidential wartime message
framing can illuminate the importance of controlling narratives under
the highest of pressures.
This article explores two cases of presidents framing messages
addressing military interventions. Specifically, it examines George H.
W. Bush’s messaging regarding the Persian Gulf War and William J.
(Bill) Clinton’s messaging surrounding the invasion of Haiti following
that country’s 1991 coup. The authors contend an executive’s ability
to keep terminology dominant and forestall any counternarratives
is a measure of rhetorical success. Being on the defensive or
constantly having to reframe one’s message is a measure of failure.
Not all successful presidential framings will sway public support but
maintaining a consistent narrative about a crisis is itself a measure of
any administration’s efficacy.

Background

Frames are subtle changes in language that can have dramatic
impacts on public opinion by focusing attention on certain, select aspects

1. Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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of an event or issue.2 Historically, elites set news frames since their word
choices and perspectives are critical for journalists in the initial stages of
reporting any story.3 Well-known examples of framing in news coverage
include presenting a rally or protest as a matter of free speech versus a
public safety risk or using terminology like welfare instead of the more
sympathetic framing of assistance to the poor.4
Cognitive science has shown such linguistic choices impact how
information “encodes” in the brain and what becomes associated with
the topic.5 Specifically, the brain associates terminology and issues
because of recency or frequency: we associate B with A because we have
recently heard about B or because we think about B often.6
Creating a frame that will be adopted by the media in order that
a particular policy will be embraced by the public is highly beneficial
to a politician’s success. Competition between the press and politicians
over frames on domestic issues is common, but the press tends to more
readily accept politicians’ discourse on foreign policy.7 Cases of successful
counterframing of foreign policy should, therefore, be relatively rare—
on foreign policy especially, the framing game is the executive’s to lose.8

The Persian Gulf War

When the Gulf War began in August 1990, Bush condemned the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait calling it a “blatant use of military aggression

2. Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame after 9/11,”
Political Communication 20, no. 4 (2003): 415–32.
3. W. Lance Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States,” Journal
of Communication 40, no. 2 (June 1990): 103–25.
4. Paul M. Sniderman and Sean M. Theriault, “The Structure of Political Argument and the
Logic of Issue Framing,” in Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error and
Change, ed. William E. Saris and Paul M. Sniderman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),
133–64; Kenneth A. Rasinski, “The Effect of Question Wording on Public Support for Government
Spending,” Public Opinion Quarterly 53, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 388–94; and Dennis Chong and James N.
Druckman, “A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments,”
Journal of Communication 57, no. 1 (March 2007): 99–118.
5. Dietram A. Scheufele, “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects,” Journal of Communication
49, no. 1 (March 1999): 103–22, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x; and
Scheufele, “Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects
of Political Communication,” Mass Communication and Society 3, no. 2–3 (2000): 297–316, https://
doi.org/10.1207/S15327825MCS0323_07.
6. John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818691; and David Domke, Dhavan V. Shah,
and Daniel B. Wackman, “Media Priming Effects: Accessibility, Association, and Activation,”
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 10, no. 1, (Spring 1998): 51–74, https://doi.org/10.1093
/ijpor/10.1.51.
7. John Zaller and Dennis Chiu, “Government’s Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign
Policy Crises, 1945–1991,” Political Communication 13, no. 4 (1996): 385–405, https://doi.org
/10.1080/10584609.1996.9963127; and Entman, “Cascading Activation.”
8. This research analyzes public statements of Bush and Clinton from August 1, 1990 to January
15, 1991, and from January 20, 1993 to September 18, 1994, respectively. The data represent all
official statements as documented in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, the official
collection of administration pronouncements. Scholars looking to replicate this collection can access
the papers at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/ using key words like: “Persian Gulf Crisis,”
“unconditional withdrawal,” “military invasion,” or “military aggression.”
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and violation of the UN [United Nations] Charter.”9 Bush repeatedly
described the invasion as “naked aggression,” a “brutal act of aggression,”
and an “unprovoked invasion.”10 His word choices signaled to the public
how to understand what was occurring in the Persian Gulf—specifically,
Iraq had brutally attacked Kuwait without reason. Bush also established
that the United States was not responding to the crisis alone, but had
dispatched envoys to work with the UN and allies around the world to
convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. This narrative would prove
important moving forward when Saddam Hussein later attempted to
introduce a counterframe that the conflict was a bilateral fight between
him and America.11
Early in the conflict, Bush spoke frequently about diplomatic
efforts to achieve his objectives for the conflict: Iraq’s complete and
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait’s
legitimate government, the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf, and the protection of US citizens abroad.12 Throughout
the first months of the Gulf War, Bush focused his language on these
objectives, successfully establishing a dominant initial frame for the
crisis and leaving little room for critics to introduce counternarratives.
Public opinion polls in August 1990 reveal Bush’s narrative and
rhetoric was successful: 60–75 percent of Americans were keeping
abreast of events and supported Bush’s policy.13 There were complications
though, as a majority also believed the United States was involved to
protect American economic interests in the Persian Gulf and a minority
believed the involvement was to deter Iraqi aggression.14 From August
1990 through January 1991, even when Bush was unable to convince a
majority of Americans about the justifications for US involvement in
the Persian Gulf, he was able to maintain a majority of support for US
military presence in Saudi Arabia.15 These polls suggest Bush’s framing
was working.
In November, Bush adjusted his narrative to gain support for military
intervention, building upon the existing framing to justify the use of
force. Bush emphasized lessons learned from World War II, repeatedly
drawing analogies between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler and
emphasizing the world could not appease aggressors.16 Bush continued
to express his desire for a nonmilitary resolution to the crisis, but now
added that UN Security Council resolutions had to be implemented.
9. George H. W. Bush, George Bush, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2,
July 1 to December 31, 1990 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and
Records Administration [NARA], 1991), 1082.
10. George H. W. Bush, George Bush, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 1,
January 1 to June 30, 1990 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, NARA, 1991).
11. Bush, George Bush, 1990, bk. 2, 1082–183.
12. Bush, George Bush, 1990, bk. 2.
13. George Gallup Jr. and Frank Newport, “The Persian Gulf Crisis: American Opinion
throughout the Month of August,” Gallup Poll Monthly 299 (August 1990): 2.
14. Gallup and Newport, “Persian Gulf Crisis,” 7.
15. Gallup and Newport, “Persian Gulf Crisis.”
16. Bush, George Bush, 1990, bk. 2, 1148–256.
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Bush and his allies had a large hurdle to overcome before using
force: the concern over another Vietnam-like quagmire, which, in
August 1990, 48 percent of Americans admitted to fearing.17 Polls
indicate Bush overcame these fears by stressing American forces had
sufficient resources to overwhelm Iraqi forces and the administration
had every intention to depart the region quickly.18
As months passed, as a result of the framing of this narrative, Bush
succeeded in convincing a majority of Americans to support his policy
choices.19 By January 1991, almost two-thirds of Americans said they
had given a “great deal” of thought to whether the United States should
invade to retake Kuwait from Iraq, and over half reported supporting
military intervention.20
In addition, Bush’s many statements, news conferences, and
exchanges with reporters ensured three-fourths of Americans said they
understood why the United States was involved in the Persian Gulf.21
Polls show Bush’s statements brought public understanding in line
with his own reasons for US involvement: peace, security, and stability
in the region over access to oil supplies.22 Despite Saddam Hussein’s
counterframing efforts, public concerns that oil was the real reason for
the conflict, and worries about a second Vietnam, Bush successfully
controlled the narrative about the Gulf War until the invasion in 1991
and the commencement of Operation Desert Storm.

The 1991 Haiti Coup

In addition to establishing the policy narrative for the Gulf War, Bush
also established the narrative for the Haitian coup that ousted President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September 1991. From the beginning Bush
stated the United States was “worried about Haiti” and supported the
“restoration of the democratically elected government to Haiti.”23 He
also stated he was “wary of using US forces in the hemisphere” and he
hoped a resolution could be “done without any kind of force,” publicly
supporting efforts by the Organization of American States to resolve the

17. Gallup and Newport, “Persian Gulf Crisis,” 7.
18. Data from polls on Persian Gulf War in Gallup Poll Monthly from August 1990 to January
1991.
19. Adam Clymer, “War in the Gulf: Public Opinion; Poll Finds Deep Backing While Optimism
Fades,” New York Times, January 22, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/22/us/war-in
-the-gulf-public-opinion-poll-finds-deep-backing-while-optimism-fades.html.
20. “Times Mirror News Index, January 1991,” Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
Poll Database, Pew Research Center, https://www.people-press.org/question-search/?qid=237708
&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
21. “Buildup to War,” Gallup Poll Monthly 304 (January 1991): 21.
22. Data from polls in Gallup Poll Monthly from August 1990 to January 1991.
23. George H. W. Bush, George Bush, 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2,
July 1 to December 31, 1991 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, NARA, 1992), 1246–646;
Bush, George Bush, 1992–93, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 1, January 1 to July
31, 1992 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, NARA, 1993); and Bush, George Bush,
1992–93, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2, August 1, 1992 to January 20, 1993
(Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, NARA, 1993).
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crisis.24 Bush’s narrative constrained US support in this crisis to diplomatic
efforts and economic sanctions against the illegal government.25
Throughout 1992, Bush narrowed his rhetoric, advocating for
Aristide’s return, continuing economic sanctions, and the repatriation
of refugees. Further, Bush’s statements made clear the United States
would not use force or send troops to restore democracy to Haiti or
Aristide to power.26 This policy position would change with Clinton. At
first, Clinton continued Bush’s narrative with little adjustment. But as
the crisis continued, Clinton tried to change the narrative to fit with his
own emerging policy.
Similar to Bush, Clinton’s policy narrative discussed the US
preference for restoring democracy in Haiti and returning Aristide
to power, as well as US efforts to support international negotiations
toward these ends. Clinton’s narrative however, referred to the US
“commitment” and “determination” to restore democracy to Haiti,
whereas Bush only said “worried” or “supported,” without committing
the country to any solution to the Haitian crisis.27
While seemingly minor, this variation in terminology, when applied
to policy decisions, makes a significant difference in public messaging.
Commitment and determination imply significantly different degrees of
willingness to work toward a policy goal than worried does. This was
the first of several differences between the two presidents’ framings
of the Haitian crisis. Other significant divergences included Clinton’s
decreased focus on the Haitian refugee policy, increased attention to
human rights, and stating Aristide had been elected by “two-thirds of
Haitian voters.”28 This messaging foreshadowed a policy shift and an
attempt to change how the public understood the crisis.
In overcoming Bush’s hands-off narrative to gain public support for
his own more interventionist policy, Clinton faced an uphill battle after
seeming to (at first) accept Bush’s more laissez-faire policy. Establishing
a foreign policy narrative is hard; changing one is even harder. Further,
Clinton did not deliver his Haiti narrative frequently or consistently,
mentioning Haiti on average three days per month throughout 1993.
24. Bush, George Bush, 1991, bk. 2, 1247, 1263.
25. Bush, George Bush, 1991, bk. 2, 1246–646; Bush, George Bush, 1992–93, bk. 1; and Bush,
George Bush, 1992–93, bk. 2.
26. Bush, George Bush, 1991, bk. 2, 1646.
27. Bush, George Bush, 1991, bk. 2, 1246–646; Bush, George Bush, 1992–93, bk. 1, 376–908;
Bush, George Bush, 1992–93, bk. 2, 1954; William J. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, bk. 1, January 20 to July 31, 1993 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Federal Register, NARA, 1994), 55, 290, 309, 311; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2, August 1 to December 31, 1993 (Washington, DC: Office of
the Federal Register, NARA, 1994), 184, 1743, 1758, 1864; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 1, January 1 to July 31, 1994 (Washington, DC: Office
of the Federal Register, NARA, 1995), 1292; and Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2, August 1 to December 31, 1994 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Federal Register, NARA, 1995).
28. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, bk. 1, 823, 832; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, bk. 2,
1730, 1731–2, 1744, 1764; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1; and Clinton, William J. Clinton,
1994, bk. 2, 1548.
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The consequence in terms of public opinion was clear: October 1993
polling indicated more Americans disapproved of Clinton’s handling of
Haiti than approved of it.29
In early May 1994, Clinton revealed a more forceful policy toward
Haiti by introducing two new phrases: “not ruling out any option[s]” and
“time for a new initiative.”30 He began emphasizing the length of the
coup—almost three years—and stated, “maybe we’ve let it run on a bit
too long.”31 He also harkened back to earlier narratives that two-thirds
of Haitian voters had elected Aristide and the US mission was to restore
democracy.32 Additionally, Clinton more frequently referred to the
fact that following the coup, Haiti was one of just two nondemocratic
countries in the hemisphere and therefore of significant strategic interest
to the United States.33 In fact, between May and August 1994, Clinton
began to include “defending democracy” as a specific US interest in his
increasingly hawkish narrative.
Nonetheless, he failed to outline specifically what US interests
or mission objectives were. For example, Clinton first talked about
Haiti being in the United States’ backyard, then walked back this
messaging.34 He talked about Haiti sending drugs and that it, like
Cuba, was a nondemocracy.35 During this period of a lack of specificity
and contradiction in the policy narrative, in July 1994, 50 percent of
survey respondents opposed the military intervention desired by the
Clinton administration.36
In an attempt to gain public support, Clinton made a flurry of public
statements in mid-September to update Americans on developments
and explain his policy decision. After Clinton addressed the nation on
September 15, 1994, support for an intervention increased somewhat,
possibly due to a rally-around-the-flag effect: Gallup reported 66
percent of Americans were convinced by Clinton’s arguments, but 43
percent disapproved of the way Clinton had handled the situation in
Haiti.37 These gains were temporary: by October, approval of Clinton’s
handling of the crisis fell to 54 percent.38 By February 1995, while 47
29. “International Policy Opinion Survey, October 1993,” Pew Research Center for the People
& the Press Poll Database, Pew Research Center, accessed April 2, 2020, https://www.people
-press.org/question-search/?qid=278345&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
30. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 859.
31. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 819.
32. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, bk. 1, 823, 832; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, bk. 2,
1730, 1731–2, 1744, 1764; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1; and Clinton, William J. Clinton,
1994, bk. 2, 1548.
33. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 954.
34. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 954, 1217.
35. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 954.
36. “People, The Press & Politics Poll—New Political Landscapes, July 1994,” Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press Poll Database, Pew Research Center, accessed April 2, 2020,
https://www.people-press.org/question-search/?qid=292467&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
37. David W. Moore and Lydia Saad, “After Clinton Speech: Public Shifts in Favor of Haiti
Invasion,” Gallup Poll Monthly 348 (September 1994): 16–17.
38. “The People & the Press Poll—Prelude to the Election October 1994,” Pew Research
Center for the People & the Press Poll Database, Pew Research Center, accessed April 2, 2020,
https://www.people-press.org/question-search/?qid=292638&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
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percent said they had approved of his handling of the crisis, 47 percent
also reported disapproval.39 Our analysis of Clinton’s framing of the
military intervention in Haiti concludes he failed to establish a policy
narrative convincing Americans that the seriousness of the Haitian crisis
warranted armed intervention.

Implications for Future Executives

A successful presidential policy narrative rallies domestic and
international support behind a policy decision. A strong narrative
successfully framed helps coalesce support for a policy and quiets
potential counternarratives. But such narratives and frames must remain
agile—media and communications theory reveal a presidential narrative
cannot be presented and then left alone. A successful narrative and frame,
repeated with some frequency, keeps the event relevant for the public.
These two case studies provide the following three insights:
•• Whenever possible, a president should establish a narrative early.
This timing is important for new initiatives or events and for
efforts to redirect an existing policy narrative—the sooner an
administration publicizes its version of events or policy position,
the better chance a message has of gaining traction.
•• The success of the narrative depends on how well an administration
conveys the relevancy of the issue in question. Presidents
employing consistent, sustained phraseology are more likely to
beget success than presidents using inconsistent, contradictory, or
confusing language.
•• A successful frame evolves with the situation but has consistent
foundations, and allows a president to establish national interests
and objectives. During the Gulf War, Bush established US interests
early and did not change them. Clinton did not do this—the
administration’s narrative regarding US strategic interest in Haiti
morphed multiple times.

Every administration faces messaging and optics problems. While
no one case can provide comprehensive instructions for all occasions,
executives would be well-served to study the messaging strategies of
Bush and Clinton in the examples above, one of successful control of a
presidential policy narrative and the other, a mishandling of the same.

39. “Policy Opinion Survey, October 1993.”
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Integrated Campaigning in
the Pacific, 1918–1948
Earl J. Catagnus Jr. and Jonathan P. Klug
ABSTRACT: Russia, China, and other nations operate in a perpetual
state of competition with the United States. Recognizing this reality,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently published the Joint Concept for
Integrated Campaigning and Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition
Continuum. This article places these documents within the historical
context of World War II in the Pacific and argues they are a return to a
traditional American approach to the employment of military force.

T

he Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning ( JCIC) and the Joint
Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19, Competition Continuum, are a return to
a more traditional American strategic approach where, in times of
peace, military power was applied mostly to advance economic interests.1
Often, promoting US economic interests required the application of
military force within the so-called gray zone between war and peace, a
place in which American military leaders were quite adept at operating.
The Pacific region from 1918–48 provides an excellent example of this
strategic environment. Military force was applied along the competition
continuum within integrated campaigns. All stages of the continuum—
cooperation, competition below the level of armed conflict, and armed
conflict—were present, sometimes occurring simultaneously. The region
was hotly contested and never fully at peace, requiring leaders to employ
all elements of national power to secure American interests. Playing out
across vast distances, this great-power rivalry ranged from the relatively
benign to the waging of a total war and featured both the first-ever
international arms reduction action and the only uses of atomic weapons.
A wide range of national security challenges face the United
States—confronting near-peer adversaries, containing rogue states, and
defeating nonstate, transnational terrorist and criminal organizations,
posing a significant dilemma for American national security leaders.2
The JCIC called for Joint Force commanders and their staffs to think,
plan, and execute integrated campaigns where the Joint Force works in
concert with the interagency, partners, and allies rather than as an
independent entity only employed in direct military conflict. Building on
previous assessments of the current and future operating environments,
JDN 1-19 began the process to codify Competition Continuum, a construct

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Operating Environment, 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and
Disordered World (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016); and JCS, Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note
(JDN) 1-19 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019).
2. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017), 8–13, 45–54.
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embracing the spectrum of challenges within an era of enduring global
competition.
Compared to other agencies and organizations, the sheer size
of the Department of Defense has the potential to make it the lead
agency for most national security endeavors. Unilateral leadership,
however, is not the objective of integrated campaigns. Although Joint
Force capabilities are unparalleled in size and scope, the JCIC calls for
Joint Force commanders to “identify physical and cognitive campaign
objectives and then align resources and actions—across the range of
partners—to ensure the accomplishment of these objectives.”3 They
are not to exercise command or attempt to control those outside their
legal jurisdictions. Instead, while campaigning through the competition
continuum to secure national interests—not all military in nature—
Joint Force commanders are to collaborate with civilian agencies, allies,
and partners to create unity of effort.

Prior to Pearl Harbor

The historical antecedents for integrated campaigning are much
older than the relatively recent Cold War period. Prior to World War
II, gray zone conflict was a natural part of the operating environment,
ambiguous strategic guidance and shifting policies were the norm,
interagency collaboration was expected, officers routinely performed
diplomatic functions to include negotiating treaties, and it was
understood that economic progress was usually the underlying motive
behind most foreign policy.
Securing the industrial base, particularly its labor force, technological
innovations, and manufacturing capacity, was essential for maintaining
American hegemony. At its core, this approach was conceptually
Hamiltonian and reflective of Edward Meade Earle’s influential essay,
“Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic
Foundations of Military Power.”4 Hamilton viewed military power as
both a byproduct and an adjunct to economic power. The pursuit of
military power was not an end unto itself, but rather a means to an
economic end resulting in national independence and individual freedom.
Although Hamilton’s system was not adopted wholesale, the assumption
that military capacity was drawn from and supported the economic
needs of the people has become part of the collective American mind.
This was assumption especially true when military force was applied
outside the confines of war in periods of contested peace.5

3. JCS, Joint Operating Environment, 11.
4. Edward Meade Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic
Foundations of Military Power,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to
Hitler, ed. Earle, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 3rd ed. (1943; repr. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1948), 117–54.
5. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York:
MacMillan Publishing, 1980).
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Throughout the middle to late 1800s, Americans sought new trading
partners and relatively untouched markets.6 Since European empires like
Britain, France, and Spain dominated trade in Africa and Central and
South America, only Asia was open for economic expansion. Diplomats
secured trade treaties across the Pacific and established consuls in
many fledgling island nations. By the 1870s, the United States had
a foothold in the Chinese market and had opened trade with Japan.
The Spanish-American War made the United States a global power
with colonial possessions of Guam and the Philippines to administer
and defend.
Adding these new territories to other Pacific territories such as
Hawaii and Wake Island provided the bases that naval officer and
historian Alfred Thayer Mahan so adamantly argued the US Navy
required to project power. In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt
declared the “Mediterranean era died with the discovery of America,”
and “the Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, is just at its dawn.” 7
Shortly afterward, the Russo-Japanese War broke out. It ended with
Japan’s stunning victory, which established it as a regional power and
set the conditions for a future war.
Following the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 in China, the US Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps maintained garrisons and ships at strategic locations
along critical waterways, rail lines, and internationally controlled
sections of cities. Their tactical mission was to protect American lives
and property, but their strategic objective was to maintain the Open
Door policy in China and enhance American influence throughout the
region. American commanders worked closely with and sometimes
under the direct control of State Department officials.
American naval officers became naturally at ease operating within
this complex environment. In a 1922 Naval War College lecture, Rear
Admiral H. S. Sharp explained, “the life experience of a naval officer is
a broadening one,” specifically in the “practical matter of international
affairs and foreign people” where their duties, and, more importantly,
individual professional responsibility, often called upon them to act as
diplomats, negotiators, law and treaty enforcers, and peacekeepers.8
During the interwar years as their commitments abroad expanded,
Army officers demonstrated equal competence in such affairs. Both
naval and military officers coordinated with Christian missionary
organizations to ensure the safety and, at times, the safe evacuation
of far-flung missions. Freedom of navigation patrols, field maneuvers,
and even the routines of military courtesy and protocol were used to

6. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since
1776 (New York: Mariner Books, 1997), 50–51, 96–97, 106–9.
7. Quoted in John Costello, The Pacific War, 1941–1945 (New York: Quill, 1982), 3.
8. H. S. Sharp, “Naval Officer in Diplomacy” (lecture, Naval War College, Newport, RI, July 25,
1922), 2–3, Naval War College Digital Archives, https://www.usnwcarchives.org/.
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demonstrate power and exert influence over an array of international
navies and militaries.9

World War II

For the United States, the interwar years ended abruptly with
the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, which shocked and incensed
the American people. The next day, President Roosevelt made his
iconic “Day of Infamy” speech, to which Congress responded by
declaring war on Imperial Japan.10 The next four years consisted of
bloody warfare, but there was much more to American activities in
the Pacific than just armed conflict. From a national perspective, the
United States used the military instrument of national power exercised
through integrated campaigning in conjunction with diplomatic,
informational, and economic instruments of national power aimed at
both punishing Imperial Japan and achieving a better peace. From
a military perspective, fighting the Pacific War required cooperation
amongst the services and with Allies, armed conflict with Imperial
Japan, and even competition with Allies.11
Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 includes specific definitions of three forms
of cooperation: engage selectively, maintain, and advance.12 World
War II was global in nature and so was US cooperation with its Allies
Great Britain and the Soviet Union. When the Germans touched off
World War II with the invasion of Poland, a neutral United States sought
to engage selectively with Great Britain through loans. The relationship
was transactional in nature, as American legislation required other
nations to purchase US war goods, and the United States still sought
competitive advantage over the United Kingdom. Thus, the United
States sought to help Britain against Nazi aggression while improving
its own strategic position.
As the fortunes of Europe and the United Kingdom waned,
however, the United States sought to maintain Great Britain as a bulwark
against the Axis powers, creating the lend-lease program and then
system, which increasingly helped Britain while reducing competition
with Britain.13 After Pearl Harbor, American cooperation with its
erstwhile competitors now potential Allies increased dramatically,
and the United States advanced its relationship, becoming allied with
9. See General Charles L. Bolte interview by Maclyn Burg (oral historian), October 17, 1973,
transcript, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 16–23; and Costello, Pacific War, 3–54.
10. Costello, Pacific War, 149–50; and Ronald H. Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The American War
with Japan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 6–7.
11. JCS, Competition Continuum, v–vii; Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won:
Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000);
Costello, Pacific War; and Spector, Eagle against the Sun.
12. JCS, Competition Continuum, 6.
13. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Konecky & Konecky,
1956), 399–400, 457–59; Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (1940–1945) (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 24–25; Murray and Millett, War to Be Won, 136, 164–68, 243, 251, 269; and
I. C. B. Dear, ed., The Oxford Companion to World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995),
787, 790, 677–83.
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Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Nationalist China, and the
Soviet Union.14
The Allies’ war with Japan was total in nature, and JDN 1-19 defines
four activities conducted in armed conflict useful to help understand
this war: defeat, deny, degrade, and disrupt.15 After Pearl Harbor, the United
States made several efforts to deny the Japanese from achieving their
strategic objectives. First, American and Philippine forces defended the
Philippine Islands as long as they could, denying the Japanese a quick
victory and the ability to use those forces elsewhere. Similarly, the United
States and other Allies used naval forces in an effort to deny the Japanese
a quick victory in the Java Sea, which while it failed, it nonetheless served
to slow the Japanese. Meanwhile, the United States increased its efforts
to support the Nationalist Chinese against Japan, denying the Japanese
victory in China and thereby tying up a large part of the Japanese Army
fighting the Nationalist Chinese and Communist Chinese.16
Almost immediately after Pearl Harbor, the US military also began
efforts to disrupt the Japanese. The Doolittle Raid was one of the first
and most important of these efforts. This small raid had negligible
tactical impact but had strategic-level disruptive effects. The Japanese
military felt dishonored by the attack on the Japanese home islands—a
demonstration of the military’s potential vulnerability. Furthermore,
there was a perception of a threat to the Japanese emperor, however
remote in reality. The Japanese military reacted to the raid with the
attack on the Aleutian Islands and Midway Island, which was ultimately
disastrous. Carrier strikes, Marine Raider Battalion operations, and
some submarine efforts were other examples of operational-level
disruption efforts.17
The United States used three key efforts to degrade Imperial Japan’s
ability and will to wage war. The first two—a submarine campaign that
quietly eviscerated the Japanese merchant marine and an extensive
mining effort, which reached a crescendo in 1945 with the introduction
of B-29 Superfortress bombers—resulted in shortages of raw materials
that led to cascading effects upon Japanese industry and military
operations. Additionally, the mining effort limited and degraded both
operations and training programs, especially for aircraft pilots. The
third effort, a strategic bombing campaign, devastated the Japanese
ability to wage war in terms of war industry, infrastructure, and military
capabilities. But the will of the Japanese remained strong enough to fight
on until the deployment by the United States of two atomic bombs and
the Soviet entry in the Pacific War.18
14. Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 165, 197–99, 228, 232, 292, 388, 450, 472, 485, 488, 532,
534–36, 561; and Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 324–27.
15. JCS, Competition Continuum, 5.
16. Costello, Pacific War, 99–108, 171–72, 206–10, 236–44; Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 55–59,
133–34, 143–47, 466–68, 545–46; and Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 181–88, 220–22.
17. Costello, Pacific War, 219, 448–53; Murray and Millett, War to Be Won, 190–91, 347, 365; and
Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 154–55, 271–72.
18. Costello, Pacific War, 233–36, 245, 453–55; Murray and Millett, War to Be Won, 223–27,
503–7, 516–25; and Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 478–94, 503–6, 525–30, 554–58.
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The Allies had three theaters of war in which to defeat Imperial
Japan. In a sense, the oldest was the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI)
where Imperial Japan fought for years before Pearl Harbor. The Allied
command structure in this theater was complicated on paper and even
more so in reality—Chiang Kai-shek was in command in China and
American General Joseph W. Stillwell served as his deputy. The British
also had major subordinate commanders, most notably Admiral Louis
Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten, the nominal CBI theater commander.
The two newer theaters were the Southwest Pacific Area, under the
command of US Army General Douglas MacArthur and the Pacific
Ocean Areas under the command of US Navy Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
The two American theater commanders worked to defeat Imperial
Japan by forcing its unconditional surrender and changing its militaristic
nature while CBI remained a supporting theater.19 In 1942, MacArthur’s
forces stemmed the Japanese tide on New Guinea and then went on the
offensive, which picked up speed and momentum as he fought to retake
the Philippines in 1944 and 1945. Meanwhile, Nimitz’s forces took and
held Guadalcanal and later began the Central Pacific drive in 1943 that
would, like MacArthur’s forces, increase the pace of its offensive in
1944 and 1945.
Just as US cooperation with its Allies changed over the course of
the war, so did US competition with its Allies. The JDN 1-19 includes
specific definitions of three activities in competition below armed
conflict: enhance, manage, and delay. For example, America enhanced its
position at Britain’s expense as Great Britain took wartime loans and gave
up influence and bases in the Western Hemisphere.20 In the immediate
aftermath of the Japanese 1941 attacks, the Allies fought desperately
to stem the Japanese onslaught, which involved all Allies stepping up
their cooperation.
Despite this need for short-term cooperation to defeat the common
foe of Imperial Japan, some competition remained, and the United States
changed its competitive activities to focus on managing Great Britain.
As the Pacific War continued and the prospects of victory increased,
America and her Allies increased their competition for postwar political
and strategic advantage, especially as the war neared its conclusion.
Given the growing signs of war weariness in the American people, the
United States attempted to delay the Soviet Union over eastern Europe
and China.21

Beyond World War II

The unexpected speed of the Japanese surrender after the atomic
bombs were dropped in August 1945 caused immediate and massive
19. Costello, Pacific War, 225–26, 255–56, 388–89, 579–86, 607; Spector, Eagle against the Sun,
144–47 545–46; and Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 151, 157–64, 191, 197–98, 218, 227–32, 338,
349, 485, 509, 521.
20. Dear, Oxford Companion, 297–98, 787, 790, 677–83.
21. Costello, Pacific War, 536–38; Murray and Millet, War to Be Won, 521–22; and Spector, Eagle
against the Sun, 324–79.
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redeployments of troops to occupation duties throughout Asia.
Overnight, senior leaders made a conscious, deliberate, yet ultimately
swift strategic shift from fighting an unlimited global war to competing
against the ideology of communism and the state and nonstate actors
who embraced it. Although unsuccessful for many reasons, Operation
Beleaguer, the occupation of North China until 1947, combined force
deployments and Nationalist Chinese training programs in support of
diplomatic efforts to stem the onslaught of Chinese communism.
The 40 years of Japanese occupation left Korea in a vacuum, and
the US Army filled this void. The Korean Military Advisory Group
was hugely successful in South Korea, building partner capacity and
creating space for Syngman Rhee’s government to wage an effective
counterinsurgency campaign. The famed historian Allan R. Millett, an
expert on the Korean War, went so far as proclaiming this success was
what led to Kim Il-Sung’s decision to invade the south in June 1950.22

Conclusion

American cooperation, competition, and conflict in the twentieth
century in the Pacific demonstrate the JCIC and JDN 1-19 have deep
historical roots. Traditionally, the underlying reason America exercised
its military strength short of war was to bolster the other elements of
national power, chiefly economic power. Military force was adjunct
and even subordinated to diplomatic and economic action. Naval and
military commanders inherently understood this and waged integrated
campaigns to secure national interests in concert with other government
agencies, Allies, and partners.
Before 1941, naval and military commanders simultaneously executed
campaigns of cooperation and competition throughout the contested
Pacific region. They did this all while working for, with, and through
various agencies like the State Department as well as communicating
and coordinating with private entities such as news reporters and
Christian missionaries. During World War II, they created campaign
plans that were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval, integrated
into a global strategy, and executed across three different theaters of
operations. After the war, these same commanders confronted great
power adversaries, administered occupied governments, and competed
throughout the region below the level of armed conflict.
As a result of its growth and prestige as the Cold War progressed,
the US military became overly focused on purely military matters. Senior
military and political leaders perceived effective strategy was the ability
to enhance capabilities to deter war. If war did come, then a successful
strategy was winning enough battles to win that war. When the Soviet
Union fell, this condition only worsened. The current National Security
Strateg y and National Defense Strateg y make this strategic focus anathema.

22. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, Center for Military
History (CMH) Pub. 30-3 (Washington, DC: CMH, 1962); and Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea,
1945–1950: A House Burning (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).
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The JCIC and JDN 1-19 provide a blueprint for military leaders to return
to a more traditional American strategic approach to employing military
force in times of peace.

Earl J. Catagnus Jr.
Dr. Earl J. Catagnus Jr., a visiting professor of history in the Department of
Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College, is
currently revising his book manuscript titled, Blood Brothers: The Emergence of
Modern Warfighting in the US Army and Marine Corps, 1916–1945.

Jonathan P. Klug
COL Jon Klug, a faculty instructor in the Department of Military Strategy,
Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College, is a member of War
Room and the Military Writers Guild.

TOC

Applied Strategic Art

Origins of US Army Strategic Landpower
John A. Bonin
ABSTRACT: During World War II, the Army demonstrated the
core competencies outlined in Army Doctrine Publication 1, The
Army, in its application of strategic landpower. The Army of today
must retain its capability to perform these core competencies—
the requirement for the Army to provide true strategic landpower
in conjunction with other services, partners, and allies is as critical
today as it was then.

S

eventy-five years ago, the US Army completed the destruction of
its World War II enemies on land. While it received tremendous
support from the air, sea, and Allies, I agree with Professor
Russell Weigley’s assertion: “At the close of World War II, the United
States Army was the mightiest in the world. . . . In every theater the
American Army had faced enemies long trained in war and had speedily
overcame them.”1 While the Nazi German and Soviet armies fielded
more combat divisions, only the US Army participated in both theaters
of war and all six principal land theaters of operations at the same time.
While the Army has long used the term landpower to describe the
capabilities it provides the nation, it only officially defined landpower
in 2005.2 The current definition in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)
3-0 is “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain,
and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”3 In 2012 the
Army, in conjunction with the US Marine Corps and US Special
Operations Command, established a Strategic Landpower Task Force to
better inform Congress and American public about landpower.4 More
recently, the Army published its core competencies in ADP 1, The Army,
on July 31, 2019.
Core competencies are intended to express clearly how the Army
contributes to national defense and joint operations. These competencies
are: prompt and sustained land combat; combined arms operations
including combined arms maneuver, wide area security, armored and
mechanized operations, and airborne and air assault operations; special
operations; set and sustain the theater for the Joint Force; and integrate

1. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1984), 475.
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), The Army, Field Manual (FM) 1
(Washington, DC: HQDA, June 14, 2005), 1-1.
3. HQDA, Operations, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, July
31, 2019), 1-9.
4. Terms of Reference for the Strategic Landpower Task Force, October 12, 2012. Document
in the author’s possession.
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national, multinational and joint power on land.5 However, not only are
these competencies not new, but they were observable during World War
II when the US Army demonstrated the origins of strategic landpower
in its ability to conduct simultaneous global operations to gain, sustain,
and exploit control over land, people, and resources.

US Army in World War II

The National Defense Act of 1920 specifically charged the War
Department and the Army General Staff with overall mobilization
planning and preparation in the event of war and remained unchanged
until 1947.6 In early 1942, then Chief of Staff General George
Catlett Marshall organized the Army into three major administrative
commands—Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Service Forces (ASF),
and Army Air Force (AAF). In 1945, 70 percent of AGF and ASF (some
six million personnel) were deployed overseas, of which only 20 percent
could be found in the 89 combat divisions, all overseas.7 Was some 80
percent of the Army unnecessary overhead or tail to the divisional tooth?
No! This arrangement was the complete force structure required for
the Army to perform its core competencies including providing prompt
strategic landpower and simultaneously sustaining global campaigns
in two theaters of war—Europe and Pacific—and six separate
theaters of operations.

Organization for Combat

The Army followed doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 100-15,
Field Service Regulations: Larger Units, which called for Army theater
commanders to be directly responsible for both administration and
combat within their assigned theaters.8 By late 1944, the Army had six
principal theater armies: the European Theater of Operations, US Army
(ETO), North African and later Mediterranean Theater of Operations,
US Army (MTO), Persian Gulf Command (PGC), US Army Forces in
the Far East (FE), US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), and
US Army Forces, China-Burma-India (CBI).9 Each had a senior Army
officer as commander who reported directly to the Army chief of staff
for internal Army matters, and who, if not dual-hatted, also reported to
a joint or combined commander for operational matters.
Under Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur,
ETO and FE were extremely large and concerned with sequel planning

5. HQDA, The Army, ADP 1, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: HQDA, July 31, 2019), 2-7–2-9.
6. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 404.
7. Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945
(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History [CMH], 1989), 839; and Weigley, History of
the United States Army, 435, 442–44.
8. War Department, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, FM 100-15 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, June 29, 1942), 4–6, 49–51.
9. Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington, DC: US Army
CMH, 1951), 290, 373–81.
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including the occupation of Axis countries.10 Under theater armies with
significant combat requirements, the Army formed Army groups and
field armies. Based on World War I experience, field armies became
the fundamental unit of strategic maneuver capable of independent
operation, with a flexible structure, and expected to serve both as
senior operational and logistical headquarters. In World War II, corps
headquarters were flexible extensions of the field Army in tactical
command of divisions but without support structure and consequently
much smaller. Divisions were the largest unit with a completely organic
structure capable of limited duration operations.11 In addition to
divisions, the Army organized most AGF and ASF combat and support
units into groups, battalions, or companies which could be organized
at echelons above division and provided to streamlined divisions only
when required.12

World War II Army Core Competencies
Prompt and Sustained Land Combat
While the Victory Plan of 1941 envisioned an Army requiring some
6 million ground and service personnel with 215 ground combat
divisions, the Army never fielded that many divisions because of the
nondivisional support required.13 The Army provided joint and combined
theater commanders 9 field armies, 23 corps, and 89 combat divisions
(16 armored, 66 infantry, 1 dismounted cavalry, 5 airborne, and 1
mountain) totaling over 2 million in deployed AGF units by May 1945.14
At that date, 61 of the Army’s 89 fielded divisions were in Eisenhower’s
ETO alone.15 Charles B. MacDonald argues in The Last Offensive:
The efficacy of the American tank-infantry-artillery team, of methods
of air-ground co-operation, of the regimental combat team and combat
command concepts, and of the “lean” division with attachments provided
as needed . . . the general excellence of American arms and equipment, the
ability to motorize infantry divisions on short notice—all these had been
demonstrated and proved long before.16

The Army withstood the Japanese first strikes in 1941–42 in Hawaii
and especially the Philippines. From Operation Torch in November
1942, the US Army conducted all American amphibious operations in
the MTO and ETO. Once ashore, sustained land combat was exemplified
by the operations of General George Patton’s II Corps in Tunisia and
10. See Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 1954), 322,
app B, table 5, 534.
11. Shelby L. Stanton, Order of Battle: U.S. Army, World War II (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
1984), 3–5; and David W. Hogan Jr., A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe,
1943–1945 (Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 2000), 13–16.
12. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 461–67.
13. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of
1941 (Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 1990), 98–108.
14. Stanton, Order of Battle, 3–5.
15. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944–1945,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 727.
16. Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Offensive (Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 1973), 478.
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Seventh Army in Sicily, General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army, 15th Army
Group in Italy for the North African and MTO, and General Omar
Nelson Bradley’s 12th and General Jacob L. Devers’s 6th Army Groups
in the ETO. In the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur’s Sixth and Eighth
Armies conducted major amphibious operations in New Guinea and
in the liberation of the Philippines. In the Central Pacific, Lieutenant
General Robert C. Richardson’s Army forces also conducted amphibious
operations in conjunction with the Marines.17

Combined Arms Operations
Combined arms maneuvers conducted by US Army forces grew
in tactical excellence as the war continued and provided the winning
margin in applying landpower to defeat the Axis powers in four major
theaters of operations. After overcoming initial inexperience in North
Africa, II Corps demonstrated combined arms armored and mechanized
excellence as it defeated the Germans and Italians in Tunisia.18 At
Normandy and the breakout at Saint-Lô, Bradley’s First Army and 12th
Army Group demonstrated combined arms excellence in amphibious
and mobile warfare. Patton’s Third Army exemplified this combined
arms armored and mechanized excellence with its accomplishments,
especially in the 4th Armored Division’s relief of Bastogne in late 1944.19
Similarly during the Battle of the Bulge, the 7th Armored Division
exemplified this excellence with its defense and later liberation of
Saint-Vith, and the 2nd Armored Division with its destruction of the
2nd Panzer division.20 The US Army also developed forcible entry by
airborne and air assault capability (gliders at the time) with the First
Allied Airborne Army, XVIII Airborne Corps, and five airborne
divisions and several smaller units. These units conducted four divisionsized or larger airborne and glider operations: the 82nd and 101st at both
Normandy and Market Garden, the First Allied Airborne Army in south
France, the 17th during Operation Varsity, and numerous regimentalsized airborne operations in Sicily, Italy, and the Southwest Pacific.21

Wide-Area Security
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave the US Army the lead
conducting military government in 1942. In the ETO and MTO, the
Army conducted wide-area security by providing the occupation and
military government forces to secure the peace in North Africa, Italy,
France, and Germany after maneuver units had defeated the Axis forces.
The 12th Army Group established the Fifteenth Army after June 1944
17. Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History Volume 2: The United States Army in a Global
Era, 1917–2008, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 2010), 133–201.
18. Historical Division, War Department, To Bizerte with the II Corps, 23 April–13 May 1943
(1943; repr. Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 1990).
19. Stewart, American Military History, 146–61.
20. Gregory Fontenot, Loss and Redemption at St Vith: The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the
Bulge (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2019); and Donald E. Houston, Hell on Wheels: The 2d
Armored Division (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1977), 341–51.
21. James A. Huston, Out of the Blue—U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II (West
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1998).
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in ETO to relieve other units of mopping-up duties and to conduct
occupation and other operations in conjunction with French forces
against bypassed German units.22 In Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s
POA, Richardson employed Army base commands to secure, occupy,
and provide administration for most of the islands, including Okinawa,
in Nimitz’s Central Pacific whether assaulted by marine or army
forces.23 In addition, the Army provided the liberating forces and initial
military government in MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific for numerous
Japanese-occupied islands as well as the Philippines. Postwar, the Army
provided all of the US occupation forces for West Germany, West Berlin,
Austria, Trieste, Okinawa, South Korea, and Japan.24

Setting and Sustaining the Theater
The US Army set and maintained multiple theaters of operations
through the theater armies and their Services of Supply branch. Under
General Brehon B. Somervell, the ASF totaled over two million soldiers
and civilians by 1945. It provided logistical support and procured most of
the supplies and equipment for the AGF, AAF, and substantial numbers
of Allied and Marine divisions.25 Even theaters without significant
ground combat forces—the PGC and CBI—had large numbers of
ASF: “the relatively high support strengths for the Central Pacific Base
Command are explained in part by the Army support rendered to 6
Marine divisions also present in the theater.”26
In addition, the Army remained responsible for most major
domestic or overseas infrastructure/base and road construction.27 As
the war continued, the Army also took responsibility for the evacuation
and detention of over 400,000 Axis soldiers at over 600 facilities and for
the evacuation and hospitalization of some 231,000 American casualties
in the United States.28

Special Operations
As the war progressed, the Army created numerous new units to
meet particular operational requirements. Army special operations
forces for World War II included six Ranger battalions for special
assault missions; the joint US-Canadian, First Special Service Force for
operations in Italy; the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) for longrange penetrations in Burma; and other special reconnaissance units such
as Alaskan and Alamo Scouts. Although the Office of Strategic Services
formed in 1942 was an independent government agency growing to over
22. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 668.
23. Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 448; and Robert C. Richardson Papers,
Museum and Archives, US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
24. Stewart, American Military History, 208–10.
25. Stewart, American Military History, 89, 90.
26. Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 840; and Stewart, American Military History,
123.
27. Stewart, American Military History, 90.
28. Arnold Krammer, Prisoners of War: A Reference Handbook (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008),
40–46; and Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 839.
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thirteen thousand personnel, its larger military units were recruited
from, manned by, and under the command of Army personnel.29
In Europe, the Army created Jedburgh teams specifically to liaise with
the French resistance and operational groups. These groups, composed
of foreign-language qualified soldiers who were skilled in sabotage and
guerilla warfare, were designed to be employed in small teams in enemy
territory. In the Pacific, Office of Strategic Services personnel played a
major role in training thousands of Nationalist Chinese troops as well
as over ten thousand Kachin and other indigenous irregular forces
in Southeast Asia fighting the Japanese. In Axis-occupied Europe,
regionally aligned operational groups conducted strategic intelligence
and unconventional warfare operations.30

Integrating National, Multinational, and Joint Power

National. On September 1, 1939, the Regular Army consisted of only
190,000 in 11 understrength divisions. The Army also had divided the
nation into field Army areas responsible for all bases, stationing and
training on a geographic basis. Using the above framework, between
July 1940 and June 1941, the Army mobilized over 215,000 members
and 18 infantry divisions of the Army National Guard and over 100,000
officers of the Organized Reserve Corps. Later under the ASF, the Army
remained responsible for acquiring and building the necessary bases for
expansion and mobilization for millions of new draftees.31 Additionally,
the Army Corps of Engineers provided oversight of the $2 billion
Manhattan Project building the atomic bomb.32
During World War II, the Army conducted support to domestic
civil authorities and provided for the active defense of the US homeland.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the Army established several defense
commands to coordinate military responses to potential foreign attack.
In the continental states, Second Army (Eastern Defense Command)
and Fourth Army (Western Defense Command) never deployed and
remained in place until war’s end. The forces assigned to continental
defense peaked at 379,000 in July 1943, including 140,000 in antiaircraft
and coast artillery units.33 The Army established the Caribbean Defense
Command to protect US interests in South America and the Alaska
Defense Command to defend Alaska and conduct operations to repel
the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands.34
29. David W. Hogan Jr., U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington, DC: US Army
CMH, 1992), 3-139.
30. Hogan, Army Special Operations, 47–61, 120–132; and Richard W. Stewart, “The Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) Operational Group Burma: The ‘Arakan Group,’” in The U.S. Army and World
War II: Selected Papers from the Army’s Commemorative Conferences, ed. Judith L. Bellafaire (Washington,
DC: US Army CMH, 1998), 317–24.
31. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 419, 427–31, 599.
32. Stewart, American Military History, 123.
33. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, Defense of the Americas: The U.S. Campaigns of World War II (Washington,
DC: US Army CMH, n.d.), 18; and Jean R. Moenck, A History of Command and Control of Army Forces
in the Continental United States, 1919–1972 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, HQ, US Continental
Army Command, 15 August 1972), 15–20.
34. Cline, Washington Command Post, 381.
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Multinational. Besides fielding 89 divisions, the US Army supported
security cooperation for Allies. The Army provided equipment and
supplies, mostly under the Lend-Lease Act, for 60 Russian divisions
(PGC), 36 Nationalist Chinese divisions (CBI), 12 French divisions
(MTO/ETO), and 1 Brazilian division (MTO). In addition, the Army
provided significant numbers of combat advisers, down to the battalion
level, to the Nationalist Chinese, and advisers to the regimental level to
the French and Brazilian divisions.35 In this manner, the Army more
than doubled its own number of fielded divisions.
Joint. Since AAF remained part of the US Army, ASF provided an
estimated 167,257 personnel in direct support of AAF.36 In addition
to Army tactical headquarters, under provisions of the prewar Joint
Action of the Army and Navy, the Army provided the joint theater
commander—dual-hatted as the theater Army commander—and the
core joint headquarters for four theaters: ETO, PGC, FE, and CBI. The
Army also provided separate service component staffs for MTO and
POA of the combined or joint commander. The Army also provided
additional headquarters when required.37 In 1944, the Army established
the 1st Airborne Task Force (Allied) as a provisional airborne division
for the invasion of southern France, and later the First Allied Airborne
Army with command over both airborne units and their airlift as
Eisenhower’s theater reserve.38 When a large ground headquarters was
required in late 1944 with both an Army and a Marine amphibious corps
for Nimitz’s Central Pacific drive, the Army activated Tenth Army under
General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr.39 The Army also provided hundreds
of battalions of coast and antiaircraft units to defend joint forces.40

Conclusion

The US Army of World War II demonstrated the value of strategic
landpower on a global scale. After the fall of the Philippines, the US
Army never failed a strategic mission during the war. These missions
included protecting the homeland; mobilizing, training, and equipping
over ten million soldiers; setting, maintaining, and then dismantling
six major theaters of operations; maneuvering on land to defeat three
major enemies; building the atomic bomb; occupying, governing,
and returning defeated countries to the community of nations; and
humanely conducting detention operations for our captured enemies.
Consequently, the Army demonstrated all current core competencies in
its application of strategic landpower during World War II. Today the
35. See Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French, (Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 1957); and T.H.
Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and the Aid to Russia (Washington, DC: US Army CMH, 1952), 4.
For China see Marc Gallicchio, “Army Advisors and Liaison Officers and the ‘Lessons’ of America’s
Wartime Experience in China,” in Bellafaire, U.S. Army and World War II, 353–70.
36. Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 839.
37. Stanton, Order of Battle, 184–85.
38. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 227; and Huston, Out of the Blue, 76–82.
39. Sharon Tosi Lacey, Pacific Blitzkrieg: World War II in the Central Pacific (Denton: University of
North Texas Press, 2013), 166–73; and Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington,
DC: US Army CMH, 1948), 3–4, 21–27.
40. Kirkpatrick, Victory Plan of 1941, 93–101.
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Army must retain its capability to perform these same core competencies
as the global nature and requirement for the Army to provide true
strategic landpower in conjunction with other services and allies still
remains.
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The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia
Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe
By George Beebe
Reviewed by James P. Farwell, associate fellow in the Centre for Strategic
Communication, Department of War Studies, Kings College, University
of London, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute
in Washington

G

eorge S. Beebe served as the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Russia analysis and was Vice President Dick Cheney’s
adviser on Russia. Savvy and insightful, he contravenes the conventional
wisdom calling for increased pressure on Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin
for its disruptive activities in US elections, Europe, and other places. In an
excellent new book, The Russia Trap, he lays out a clear history of modern
Russian relations with the West, explaining how tensions escalated after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, where we are headed, and the grave
risks the current trajectory poses.
He begins with a proposal: The United States and Russia are fighting
an undeclared virtual war. It is not a cold war between two ideological
adversaries but a shadow war in which the two nations are competing
for strategic advantage without direct use of military force. While the
United States pioneered the use of soft power, Moscow has learned fast.

New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2019
240 pages
$28.99

The weapons include cybersabotage, cyberespionage, and
cyberinfluence. These confluent tactics, he argues, create escalating
spirals of aggression and suspicion. In a networked, globalized world in
which digital networks, national economies, media systems, and nuclear
command and control systems are all linked together in some way, it
is difficult to limit damage inflicted from any of these cyber weapons.
The potential consequences of these attacks could range from armed
hostilities to nuclear war.
Beebe’s strength has always been as an analyst and grand strategist.
One of his keenest skills lies in his ability to see how the other side thinks
and acts. He recognizes America’s agenda looks different in the eyes of
Moscow. The Russian government “sees ‘instability and destabilization’
as the defining characteristic of US foreign policy” (27). In this view,
Russia is a victim, not a perpetrator, of disruption and the United States
has brought disorder, not prosperity.
He traces the history of US-Russia relations over the last three
decades, from Kosovo to the Arab Spring—Libya and Syria. As relations
have evolved—perhaps more accurately, devolved—the United States
and Russia each views itself as engaged in legitimate, defensive, and
benign actions, while the other engages in the opposite. These attitudes
reinforce one another, deepening mistrust and eliminating important
brakes on escalatory spirals.
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Americans dismiss Russian objections to an eastward expansion
of NATO or efforts to foster democracy in Russia. Russia, Beebe
argues, feels threatened by NATO and sees activities like the National
Endowment for Democracy as fostering sentiment in Russia intended
to ignite regime change. Beebe feels the nations are experiencing brake
failure. The Cold War was fought over a set of rules that imposed vital
restraint. Today’s shadow war lacks them. The US withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has intensified suspicions, and the Kremlin
rejects as implausible the explanation that the US focus is Iran, rather
than exploiting a perceived Russian vulnerability. Problems with other
strategic arms control agreements deepen the challenge.
Russian meddling in the 2016 US election raised emotions to a new
high. Washington responded with tough sanctions aimed at squeezing
Russia into submission. In Beebe’s view, that strategy is doomed and
more likely to make the Kremlin more aggressive.
He discusses a scenario that could trigger all-out war, closely tied
to a plausible rendering of current events; it is a nightmare scenario.
Beebe also offers a series of initiatives to absorb shocks wrought by
security tensions. He defines these as surprise developments that diverge
suddenly and sharply from the trends preceding them. As examples, he
cites the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 2008 financial crisis, and
the Arab Spring. The challenges are not linear. We must recognize this
and build resilience into the system to achieve stability.
Solutions Beebe proposes include resilience through more
frequent and open personal communication between officials. Critical
infrastructure requires technical resilience. Informal understandings
such as those following the Cuban missile crisis are vital. He argues we
need to look beyond our relations with Russia, incorporating them into
mutually beneficial strategies, such as checkmating Chinese expansion.
Beebe knows his subject. He has thought long and hard about the
challenges US-Russia tensions pose. He understands the escalatory risks
and argues cogently for practical approaches that lower tensions and
reduce the risk of accident or strategic miscalculation leading to war.
The Russia Trap is a must read. It is well written, informing, enlightening,
and provides a needed perspective that lights the road ahead to strength
and stability.
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On Absolute War: Terrorism and the Logic of Armed Conflict
By Eric Fleury
Reviewed by LTC Nathan K. Finney, US Army

W

restling with the underlying elements of theory—picking it apart
and refashioning it to describe the issues we face today—can be
a challenge for military members engaged in the day-to-day rigors of a
career in the armed forces.
Fortunately, Eric Fleury’s On Absolute War provides a compelling
example of how to think deeply about the underlying logic of military
theory and its application to contemporary problems. Initially, based
on the title and the table of contents, I was expecting to find terrorism
explained with well-known Clausewitz quotes. I could not have been
more mistaken. Fleury digs thoroughly into theory—specifically the basic
logic of Clausewitz’s On War, including its purpose and application—and
then uses it to fashion his own concept which he then applies to the
underlying drivers and dynamics of terrorism as a method of warfare,
creating a general theory of terrorism. I was exceedingly skeptical at
first but by the end, On Absolute War convinced me of the merits of
Fleury’s approach.
Using the structure of On War as a model, On Absolute War begins
with a dialectical comparison of terrorism and conventional warfare,
which includes a more nuanced look at the former through the assessment
of terrorism as practiced by both state and nonstate actors. Through
case studies he explains the dynamics of terrorism and its inherent goal
of perpetual escalation, militarizing all sides to a conflict in a manner
that approaches absolute war as described by Clausewitz. Finally, Fleury
grafts the Clausewitzian concept of battle onto terrorism demonstrating
how a theory of terrorism can describe the relationship between the
state and its citizens under this form of warfare.
What is so impressive about On Absolute War is its nuance and
understated breakthroughs. Fleury undoubtedly understands On War
better than most, going beyond the surface of Clausewitz’s work into
what drove the development of his theory and the logic behind it. He
recognizes and uses techniques that make On War a relevant to military
art and science to this day. In addition to adopting a dialectic approach,
Fleury focuses on key elements of the Clausewitzian theory such as
the permanent interplay of human nature and historical evolution. By
understanding these elements, Fleury is able to progress beyond simply
applying Clausewitzian phrases or surface-level ideas to his own work,
and instead engages the underlying theory as it relates to terrorism in
order to ascertain something wholly new. In the process, he advances
beyond the analysis of the last few decades, which “have precluded a
more fundamental examination of how to understand the nature of
war between such dissimilar combatants”—terrorist and conventional

Washington, DC: Lexington
Books, 2019
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forces (2). Fleury determines that we “must reevaluate the nature of the
conflict itself, not just revise its tactics” (5).
The most innovative and thought-provoking concept in Fleury’s
work is the idea that “terrorism is an attempt to approximate a condition
of absolute war in reality as much as possible” that strives to bypass
“traditional limits of warfare, especially friction and reciprocity,” to
coerce all actors to escalate their actions, and thereby create ever more
militarized communities on all sides, ultimately aiming to “reorient
. . . loyalties around the architects of the campaign” (5). Contrary to
traditional military perspectives on absolute war—that it includes
nuclear weapons and threatens the end of humankind—the nuanced
and analytical approach Fleury uses to make such a case for terrorism is
quite masterful.
Despite its many strengths, On Absolute War is not perfect. While
Fleury’s overall assessment of the motivations behind the Global War
on Terror, and his descriptions of approaches taken in its prosecution
are well summarized, he somewhat mischaracterizes the counterand anti-terrorism policy continuum from the Bush to the Obama
administrations. While the former certainly viewed a campaign against
terrorism as global, and the commitment as total, the latter fundamentally
changed its focus and approach, attempting to back away from and solve
challenges created by the former. Small details like these are almost
inconsequential, however, given the intellectual innovation and insight
gained throughout the rest of the book.
On Absolute War is my top recommendation for 2019. On Absolute War
presents a strong theoretical and intellectual framework for planners,
strategists, and decision makers in the national security realm. Thinkers,
planners, and strategists—even those not interested in terrorism—stand
to gain valuable insight into how to dissect, reformulate, create, and write
about military theory. Fleury has provided not only an insightful general
theory for terrorism, but guidance on engaging with theory in general.
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Military History
The Girls Next Door: Bringing the
Home Front to the Front Lines
By Kara Dixon Vuic
Reviewed by Dr. Jacqueline E. Whitt, associate professor of strategy, US Army
War College

K

ara Dixon Vuic’s second book, The Girls Next Door: Bringing the
Home Front to the Front Lines, should have been written ages ago, yet
it is well-timed to make a meaningful impact on the field today. Both
academic and analytical, this serious yet accessible and expertly written
book centers on the physical and emotional experiences of the women
who volunteered to work in wartime troop support programs and whose
service as historical agents and important actors in a broader story might
have been marginalized or absent from other accounts.
Vuic captures and preserves the unique voices and stories of
these women and presents a straightforward and compelling case for
the careful study of people who move in and around military circles
in wartime. She offers critical analysis, avoids jargon and theory-laden
discursive passages, and makes it clear through her construction and
analysis that she is well attuned to more academic concerns.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2019
392 pages
$29.95

While war accounts often center on male combat experiences, The
Girls Next Door focuses on women and their service to the nation during
war. The book rounds out the reader’s understanding of women’s wartime
work when accounts of these official recreation and entertainment
responsibilities are considered alongside studies of women laboring in
wartime industrial jobs and serving in uniform. Vuic connects conceptual
ideas about the home front and the battlefront—these women were
employed in programs specifically designed to “domesticate the military
environment,” and these “recreation programs variously sought to
combat prostitution, remind soldiers of their mothers or sweethearts,
and symbolize a supportive American home front” (1).
Take a moment to reread the program goals: it is a whiplash-inducing
set of expectations for young women to navigate. Their tensions are
palpable throughout the book: be wholesome and pretty, but not too
pretty. Be friendly and available, but not too available. Remind them
(simultaneously?) of their mother and their sweetheart at home. Make
friends but do not become too attached—some of them are going to
die. Work, travel abroad, and be independent, but move and live under
strict constraints to protect your safety. Boost soldier morale and bear
the burden of men’s emotions and experiences of war, but do not let your
vulnerabilities show.
Vuic expertly walks readers through these complexities, bringing
challenges to the forefront and embedding them within her deeper
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analysis of social and cultural changes in the United States—especially
regarding race, gender roles, and sexuality—that affected both the
institutional role of these women and their recreation and entertainment
work experiences. She also clearly recognizes that these women, while
working within structural and institutional constraints, sometimes
changed and subverted the instrumental institutional aims and exercised
agency to shape and interpret their experiences.
Vuic moves chronologically through the twentieth century,
beginning roughly with the First World War and culminating with an
examination of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The Second World War
merits two chapters, one of which examines the unique challenges of
race, colonialism, and exoticism in the Pacific and China-Burma-India
theaters. In the epilogue, Vuic offers a brief speculative commentary on
how women as entertainers and morale/recreation workers factor into
twenty-first-century American military engagements.
Vuic’s choice to organize each chapter with a different format and
thrust, depending on the most relevant analytical categories and sources,
is refreshing. The chapters stand well on their own and do not feel
forced into an artificial structure, although I did find myself occasionally
wishing for a deeper dive on the institutional side: How were women
selected, trained, equipped, funded, supervised, and evaluated? How did
differences in these patterns affect experiences and expectations?
By the end of the book, one point is crystal clear: women are not
peripheral to military history or to the history of war more broadly.
Gender and sexuality are central to these fields. Further, historians of
women and of gender should also make the careful study of military and
wartime contexts central to their work. By focusing on women who were
employed in official entertainment and recreation work, Vuic clearly
proves military history, the history of war and society, women’s history,
and the history of gender and sexuality are intertwined. Her spot-on
epilogue highlights the challenges arising as women have become fully
integrated members of the military profession: “Organizations that held
up women as symbols of both wholesome and sexualized ideals placed
them in untenable and often dangerous situations. And, recreation and
entertainment programs that offered women as antidotes to the military
suggested that they had no place in it” (271).
Contemporary military leaders of gender-integrated units who
want to understand more clearly how complex ideas about gender roles,
sexuality, masculinity, femininity, and domesticity have operated within
the military sphere should add The Girls Next Door to their reading
lists. It is more important than ever for members of the twenty-firstcentury US armed forces to understand the military’s historical pattern
of reinforcing binary and traditionally conservative gender roles and
create a new organizational culture that welcomes and includes women
as full members.
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Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam
By Ingo Trauschweizer
Reviewed by Frank Jones, professor of security studies, US Army War College

N

early thirty years have passed since Douglas Kinnard published
The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in
Vietnam. Kinnard, a retired Army brigadier general and later professor
of political science, was no stranger to Taylor. He served on Taylor’s
personal staff when Taylor was Army chief of staff, and spent hours
interviewing him. Now Ingo Trauschweizer, an Ohio University history
professor, offers a different portrait of Taylor—one long overdue.
In this well-researched book, Trauschweizer provides a balanced
and meticulous appraisal of Taylor’s career from 1945 until the general’s
death in 1987. This perspective advances our understanding of Taylor
through the author’s adroit use of archives, high-quality secondary
sources published since the 1990s and, most notably, declassified
information Kinnard did not have access to in the 1980s.
As Trauschweizer highlights in the introduction, Taylor’s detractors
are legion. They viewed him as a ruthless, mendacious, manipulative
micromanager or worse. Yet when he died, obituary writers and
politicians lionized him, citing his long service to the nation and brilliant
career. He remains an extraordinary example of an American leader in
the twentieth century—soldier, presidential adviser, diplomat, business
executive, and public intellectual. Trauschweizer brings each of these
roles into view with clarity, using speeches, articles, and Taylor’s books
to flesh out this accomplished officer’s strategic thinking and judgment.
These last two points are unmistakable in the chapters on Taylor’s
stint as West Point superintendent, and, even more impressively,
as Commanding General of the Eighth Army in South Korea and
Commanding General, US Forces Far East. As superintendent, Taylor
brought a different emphasis to the US Military Academy’s curriculum,
one that contemporary officers, regardless of rank, should heed: the ability
to think critically, communicate clearly, and employ military history for
leadership development. These strategic leader competencies are visible
in Taylor himself. His ability to use popular magazines and elite journals
such as Foreign Affairs to discuss world events and the Army’s missions is
an important element of Trauschweizer’s intellectual biography. Taylor
understood the military instrument of power encompassed more than
the use of force. His 1948 Kermit Roosevelt Lecture, delivered two years
before NSC-68, is a testament to his prescience and comprehension of
the military strategy needed for the Atomic Age. His command of US
forces in West Berlin (1949–51), an island in a sea of Soviet power during
a period of intense hostility on America’s Cold War front lines, was
masterful. Trauschweizer underscores how Taylor used the instruments
of national power in this assignment and the economic instrument
in particular, working with his chief economist to make the Marshall
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Plan a reality, rebuilding war-torn Berlin. Trauschweizer’s discussion
of Taylor’s guiding hand to implement the Korean War armistice and
postwar activities buttresses the argument that Taylor was a strategist
of high order who understood the criticality of aligning ends, ways,
and means.
Equally important, Trauschweizer underscores Taylor’s assessment
of World War II—it was not simply the attainment of victory. More
broadly, Taylor recognized the war as an imperative for mobilizing the
American public in support of national interests, policy objectives, and
the US military. He grasped that the role of the military leader is to
improve relations with civilians, both political leaders and American
society, especially in a military dependent on conscription.
Taylor’s faith in the indispensable role of the infantryman was
never far from his mind as he attempted to organize the Army for
the atomic battlefield as chief of staff. The disagreements between
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Taylor resulted from differing
strategic visions, but as the author points out neither Eisenhower nor
Army Secretary Robert Stevens had Taylor as their first pick for chief.
Despite this fraught association, and the friction it created, Taylor’s wise
stewardship at a time of major transition in strategy, coupled with budget
battles with a president determined to cut defense spending and service
turf fights, should not be dismissed. Taylor’s thinking about deterrence
and operations below the nuclear threshold is valuable and relevant,
worthy of study by today’s strategists.
Yet Taylor is recalled as the Kennedy administration’s doyen. His
book The Uncertain Trumpet transfixed the president—here was a general
with new thinking. Taylor’s first assignment for JFK was a bureaucratic
labor—assessing what went wrong with the Bay of Pigs invasion of
Castro’s Cuba, a catastrophic failure and political embarrassment.
Taylor’s advice and the trust he engendered with Kennedy led to his
appointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, a position
he held into the Lyndon Johnson presidency. Johnson found Taylor’s
counsel similarly valuable and made him ambassador to South Vietnam
as America’s entry into the war was in play.
Like so many among the “Best and Brightest,” Taylor’s legacy is
tainted by Vietnam. He bears responsibility for that fiasco, which
he acknowledged publicly years later. Perhaps his optimism about
achieving US policy objectives was unrealistic, but he had an affliction
common among those who fought in World War II—they had difficulty
understanding their North Vietnamese adversary, perhaps out of hubris
and cultural insensitivity. Likewise, Taylor’s ignorance of the workings
of the North Vietnamese Central Committee, vital to assessing strategic
risk, was endemic in the US government. But even more fundamental,
US leaders could not reframe the environment. Here Taylor’s critical
thinking skills, the unerring judgment Eisenhower lauded him for in
Crusade in Europe, failed him abysmally.
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Kinnard ends his book by contending Taylor is a transitional figure,
the link between “heroic generals” of World War II and “managerial
generals” of the postwar period. Trauschweizer’s book presents sufficient
evidence to suggest a third group. Taylor was ahead of his time, a
forerunner of a new school, the politico-military general, fulfilled in
such figures as Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft and General Colin
Powell—generals endowed with the expertise and aptitude to move
proficiently between the civilian and military realms as presidential
agents and policy entrepreneurs. This conclusion may be Trauschweizer’s
most significant contribution to the study of civil-military relations in
the post-Goldwater-Nichols era.

My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness
By Howard Jones
Reviewed by Dr. Ron Milam, executive director, Institute for Peace & Conflict,
Texas Tech University

M

any books have been written about the My Lai Massacre during
the Vietnam War—most notably Michael Bilton and Keven Sims’
Four Hours in My Lai (1992). The latest and most complete book, and
certainly the most thoroughly documented of the very tragic story, is
Howard Jones’ My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness. Jones’s
book illuminates new issues associated with the tragedy that occurred
on March 16, 1968, in the village of Sơn Mỹ in Quang Ngai Province,
Republic of Vietnam. Telling this story is difficult for authors, and
Professor Jones has done it well.
To summarize the military operation that took place that day, soldiers
from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment of the
11th Brigade of the 23rd Infantry Division—known as the Americal
Division—were ordered to enter several hamlets and eliminate, destroy,
kill, or any one of several verbs soldiers understood to mean destroying
everything that lived in the village. An artillery barrage would precede
the operation since it was supposedly market day, and the soldiers were
told there would be no noncombatants in the area, and anyone there
would be either Viet Cong (VC) or VC sympathizers. The 48th National
Liberation Front battalion was known to be operating in the area, and
while soldiers differed in subsequent interviews as to what they were
ordered to do, there was unanimity in the understanding that all persons
and livestock were to be destroyed, and that they would probably receive
resistance from the VC in the area. They encountered none. After four
hours, over 500 elderly men, women, and children lay dead.
Jones documents not only the actions of March 16, 1968, but also
how Charlie Company engaged the enemy in previous weeks without
ever seeing them. In particular, members of 1st Platoon knew VC
soldiers had skinned alive an American soldier, and many members
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of the platoon had heard the soldier’s agonizing cries throughout the
night. Lieutenant William Calley of 1st Platoon had reportedly noted
his men’s response was, “you had to kill” (29). The extent to which
revenge was the motivating factor is part of the mystery associated with
the My Lai massacre.
Jones examined the depositions of many soldiers involved in the
operation and writes of rampant sexual assault and the horrific murder
of women and children. His words create a difficult narrative to read,
especially for combat veterans of any war. Perhaps the most revolting
picture of the more than forty-two presented in the book is one captioned
“Lunch break a few feet from a pile of bodies.” The picture shows no
apparent security cordon, just five soldiers relaxing after killing hundreds
of noncombatants.
Jones discusses the heroes of My Lai, particularly helicopter pilot
Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson and door gunner Specialist Lawrence
Colburn who confronted Calley and threatened to shoot American
soldiers if the killing did not stop. These men provided the most details
of the massacre prior to the formal investigation. The Army cover-up
and lengthy trials are major parts of the book, with the author providing
a very balanced look at the way the evidence linked the failures of
leadership to those connected, including Calley, and those acquitted,
including Captain Ernest Medina.
My Lai is the most complete and well-documented published
account of the massacre, one highly applicable to military leaders who
may be confronted with decisions about ordering men and women into
combat situations or in handling such information after war crimes are
alleged. My Lai should be read by active duty military personnel who
may have to engage enemy soldiers and make decisions about who are
noncombatants—at My Lai every person the soldiers encountered was
a noncombatant. Jones has done a great service to the field of military
history and Vietnam War scholarship with this very fine book.

Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army
on the Eve of the Korean War
By Thomas E. Hanson
Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, director, Plans and Policy, G2, US Army
Training and Doctrine Command

College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2010
158 pages
$45.00

I

n this history of the training of select US Army units in Japan on the
eve of the Korean War, author Thomas Hanson challenges a widely
embraced assessment of US Army units deployed in the immediate
aftermath of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea: their failure to
defeat those forces was attributable to occupation soldiers’ soft living.
Hanson effectively argues that such was not the case, at least not for the
quartet of infantry regiments that are his focus. The first three chapters
are the most valuable—indispensable context and a synthesis of what is
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to follow. Four central chapters, each covering a regiment representing
one of four infantry divisions in Eighth Army at the time, are impressive
in depth and detail. The conclusion reinforces points previously made
and offers several innovative and interesting thoughts on what might
have been, despite the author allowing himself a bit of subjectivity that
unfortunately detracts somewhat from the whole of his offering.
Hanson convincingly counters the allegation of “soft soldiers”
by demonstrating that commanders worked hard to train their
units in the months prior to the June 1950 incursion. He frequently
cites—and substantiates—factors impeding their efforts: undermanning, personnel turnover, frequent commander rotation, lack of
noncommissioned officers, deficient equipment, and ineffective training
areas. Division strengths were limited to 12,500 of 18,900 authorized for
financial reasons. Infantry regiments were short one battalion of three
authorized, and their artillery battalions were likewise deficient in one
of three batteries.
Army units in Japan remained an occupying force until early spring
of 1949, then transitioned to a defense of Japan mission, the primary
threat being the Soviet Union lurking not too distantly to the north of
Hokkaido. The mission should have been fair preparation for repelling
a North Korean attack a little over a year later, but volatility in the ranks
meant any training done other than at the individual level had a short halflife. Attempts at collective training, by necessity, had to await individual
preparation as seventeen weeks of pre-deployment basic training during
World War II had been cut by more than half to eight weeks by the late
1940s. And some soldiers arrived with less. Little wonder that Eighth
Army established its own basic training programs while subordinate
units were responsible for instilling branch-specific skills as, Hanson
relates, none of the latter training was provided stateside prior to a new
soldier’s arrival in Japan. It was a shortcoming redressed only in July
1950, the month following North Korea’s invasion.
Hanson is particularly critical of post–World War II officer
assignment policies in which leaders were assigned to command
positions with little if any attention given to previous experience. He
condemns “the assignment of patently unqualified officers to maneuver
unit command billets for their retirement tours . . . as one of the most
damaging policies implemented by the U.S. Army between 1945 and
1950” (37). The judgment may have value, but limiting his observation
to maneuver commands alone—a constraint that generally characterizes
the book as a whole—undervalues branch and combined arms expertise
so fundamental to the success of the US Army in World War II.
Recent veterans of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will find some
of Hanson’s insights all too familiar. Relying on civilians for vehicle
maintenance in Japan due to manpower shortages meant those skills
were later lacking on the Korean peninsula, particularly given the 24/7
requirements of combat. Those involved in more recent conflicts in the
Middle East and Central Asia likely felt a similar sting when contractors
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who provided maintenance for key systems could not or would not
deploy forward. Veterans whose careers include Vietnam will likewise
shake their heads at Hanson’s observation that “punching command
tickets” was behind the overly rapid turnover among battalion and
regimental leaders. The 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division
had three commanders within eleven months when a new colonel
assumed command in the opening days of February 1950. Hanson
regrettably again allows objectivity to slip here, concluding—without
citing a justification—that “The assignment of non-infantry officers to
command infantry battalions . . . can only be described as the exacting
of revenge by bureaucratic agents uncomfortable with their own
contributions to national defense during World War II” (113).
Hanson’s work would have benefited from more strategic context.
Hanson does take “Lightning Joe” Collins and General Omar Bradley
to task for not demanding more in the way of support from the
administration and Congress. But he underestimates the impact of
ongoing fiscal wrestling among DoD Joint Chiefs facing a never-beforeseen era of atomic weapons.
Ultimately, this analysis of how four infantry regiments struggled
to overcome severe handicaps to prepare themselves for war provides
insights otherwise unavailable in other histories. Hanson’s point, that
despite very significant initial setbacks these units were fundamental to
slowing and eventually halting the North Korean advance is well taken.
The first units to cross the Sea of Japan fought and failed to stop South
Korea’s invaders in the war’s opening weeks. Yet in the weeks to follow,
these units would be part of the tide that washed northward once again
to regain the territory lost, and then some. This book puts the challenges
faced by these men in context showing that the months leading up to
those initial setbacks included tough training and too little support from
the command structure. Hanson’s work does much to set the record
straight in terms of the real reason those opening weeks progressed as
they did, while reminding US political and senior military leaders how
decisions made in illusionary periods of peace come home to roost when
the illusion dissipates.
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